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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of the research for this dissertation has been to determine an approach to 
environmental ethics that could help resolve environmental challenges experienced today by 
people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. This research goal was motivated by the fact 
that many of the hitherto developed environmental ethics approaches fall short when called upon 
to provide guidance on how to resolve some of the environmental challenges experienced on the 
slopes of this mountain. In this regard, I demonstrate why this applies to some western 
approaches to environmental ethics, as well as certain efforts to base an indigenous 
environmental ethics on traditional African values. I also show that Norton’s process guidelines, 
which proceed from environmental pragmatism and the philosophy of adaptive management, 
provide a clue to how to effectively address the environmental challenges. Using Norton’s 
guidelines, I show that the challenges identified on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are down to 
two underlining causes. The first one is the lack of full involvement of the local people in matters 
regarding environmental management on the mountain slopes. The second one, which is closely 
related to the first, is the loss of the sense of pride and ownership, and hence the loss of sense of 
place values among the people living on the mountain slopes. I argue that Norton’s process 
proposal is a tool that could help to address the two problems mentioned above; thus I propose 
some context-specific strategies that could help to concretise Norton’s process proposal. I argue 
that proper implementation of Norton’s process proposal implies full involvement of all 
stakeholders in all matters regarding environmental management on the mountain slopes, and 
that ongoing debates, reiterative dialogues, information gathering, and revision of goals, all of 
which are important aspects of process ethics, form the core of this. In short: I develop a 
proposal for an environmental ethics in which full involvement of all stakeholders, including the 
villagers, in matters regarding environmental management, stands central, with the aim of 
restoring the sense of pride and ownership of the mountain and its forests and, consequently, the 
sense of place values among the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die hoofdoel van die ondersoek vir hierdie proefskrif was om ‘n benadering tot omgewingsetiek 
te formuleer wat kan help om die omgewingsprobleme op te los wat ervaar word deur die mense 
wat op die hange van Berg Kilimanjaro woon. Die motivering vir hierdie navorsingsdoelwit is 
geleë in die feit dat die benaderings tot omgewingsetiek wat tot op hede ontwikkel is, tekort skiet 
wanneer dit daarby kom om riglyne te verskaf om die omgewingsuitdagings op te los wat ervaar 
word teen die hange van hierdie berg. Ek demonstreer waarom hierdie kritiek van toepassing is 
op sommige westerse benaderings tot omgewingsetiek, maar ook op sekere pogings om ‘n 
inheemse omgewingsetiek op tradisionele Afrika-waardes te basseer. Ek toon ook aan dat die 
prosesriglyne wat Norton bied, wat uitgaan vanaf omgewingspragmatisme en die filosofie van 
aanpassingsbestuur, ‘n rigting aandui vir hoe hierdie omgewingsprobleme doelgerig aangespreek 
kan word. Deur gebruik te maak van Norton se riglyne toon ek aan dat die probleme wat teen die 
hange van Berg Kilimanjaro voorkom, toegeskryf kan word aan twee onderliggende faktore. Die 
eerste een is die gebrek aan volle deelname van plaaslike inwoners in sake wat betrekking het op 
omgewingsbestuur teen die berghange. Ten tweede, en dit hou nou verband met die eerste, is 
daar die verlies van ‘n gevoel van trots en eienaarskap, en daarom ook die verlies van ‘n sin vir 
plek-waardes onder die mense wat teen die berghange woon. Ek argumenteer dat Norton se 
prosesvoorstel ‘n instrument bied wat kan help om die boegenoemde twee probleme aan te 
spreek, en gevolglik stel ek sekere konteks-spesifieke strategieë voor wat kan help om Norton se 
prosesvoorstel konkreet te maak. Ek argumenteer dat ‘n behoorlike implementering van Norton 
se prosesvoorstel die volle deelname impliseer van alle belanghebbendes in alle sake rakende 
omgewingsbestuur teen die hange van die berg, dat dit spesifiek die deelname van die plaaslike 
gemeenskap moet behels, en dat voortgaande debatvoering, herhalende dialoë, 
inligtingsversameling, en die hersiening van doelwitte, wat almal belangrike aspekte is van ‘n 
proses-etiek, tot die kern hiervan behoort. Kortom: ek ontwikkel ‘n voorstel vir ‘n 
omgewingsetiek waarin ‘n proses van volle deelname in omgewingsbestuur, waarby die plaaslike 
gemeenskap ingesluit is, sentraal staan, met as doelwit dat ‘n gevoel van trots op en eienaarskap 
van die berg en sy woude, en gevolglik ook ‘n sin vir plekwaardes, herstel kan word onder die 
mense wat teen die hange van Berg Kilimanjaro woon. 
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 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Background to the study and problem statement 
In this section, I first give a brief description of the state of environmental degradation on and 
around Mount Kilimanjaro. Then, the problem statement, and specific research questions to 
address the research problem will follow. 
1.1.1 Background to the study 
Mount Kilimanjaro and its surrounding slopes present one of the iconic places in the world. The 
elegance and beauty of Mount Kilimanjaro is not just in its being the highest free-standing 
mountain in Africa, but also because of its snow-capped peak. The presence of snow on a 
mountain located in the tropics is what makes this mountain particularly unique and this has 
attracted much attention and interest from all over the world. It has been noted that “Not since 
Hemingway has the biggest isolated mountain in Africa been so talked about” (Sébastien, 2010). 
It also is one of the areas investigated by environmentalists and scientists to study climate 
change, especially by observing the changes in the snowfields on the mountain peak. It, 
furthermore, is a site of exceptional biodiversity. The mountain and the surrounding environment 
thus comprise a very important area worldwide, country wide and also for the local people. This 
most probably explains why it was granted the status of a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 
1989. Mount Kilimanjaro attracts a lot of tourists and is the leading National Park with regard to 
generating revenue from tourism, overtaking all National Parks in Tanzania. The melting glaciers 
used to feed countless springs and rivers in the mountain forests. The forests of Mount 
Kilimanjaro serve as a water catchment area for the Pangani River basin which also extends to 
parts of neighbouring Kenya. The Pangani river basin is critical for hydroelectric power 
production in Tanzania and for agriculture (Sébastien, 2010), while the local people’s livelihoods 
are highly dependent on the presence of the mountain and its surrounding forests. Activities 
related to tourism, farming, bee keeping, livestock keeping, etc. are highly dependent on the 
mountain ecosystem. All of the above makes protecting the mountain and its environs critically 
important.   
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However, the current state and future prospects of the mountain slopes are not very promising. It 
was estimated in 2000 that the volume of the snow cap had decreased by 82 percent since it was 
first measured in 1912, and it is likely to disappear by 2020 if things remain as they are (Boko, et 
al., 2007). There is still no consensus among scientists about the reasons for the continual 
decrease of the snow cap. However, apart from climate change – which has usually been 
assumed to be the main cause of environmental changes on the mountain –, local processes such 
as fire, changes in vegetation and human modifications are currently being recognised as having 
a bigger role for the deteriorating state of the mountain and its slopes (Hemp, 2005).In fact, 
Professor Pius Yanda, a renowned scholar in climate change from the University of Dar es 
Salaam, has challenged the earlier assumption, saying that the decreasing ice cap is more a result 
of deforestation and land use changes on the mountain slopes than of climate change/global 
warming. In other words, while climate change certainly has a role in the current state of the 
mountain, the changes in land use or human activities on the mountain slopes have played a 
bigger role in contributing to the declining icecap on the mountain and the general environmental 




Figure 1: Ice-cap or snow on Mount Kilimanjaro in 1970s and in 2017 respectively 
Source: National Geographic (2017) 
 
Industry logging and the rapid increase in clearance of forests for cultivation together with other 
human activities such as collecting honey, hunting, grass burning, and collection of fodder have 
transformed the altitude ecosystem on the mountain slopes (Sébastien, 2010). These activities 
have resulted in extensive expansion of the ‘degraded forest cover’ from 1,606 ha in 1973 to 
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5,170 ha in 2000.
1
  Furthermore, some perennial rivers and streams formerly fed by the melting 
glaciers are now dry for part of the year, and other seasonal streams have dried up completely 
(Chuwa, 2008; Sébastien, 2010). As a result, agricultural activities all over the mountain slopes 
have been affected badly, hence driving people into extreme poverty which in turn has created 
more dependence on natural resources, and hence more degradation of the environment – a 
vicious circle of sorts.  
 
In 2012, the environmental situation on the mountain slopes had deteriorated to the extent that 
the Regional Government issued a Circular on the Priority of Environmental Conservation, and 
declared the Kilimanjaro environmental decline a disaster (Temba, 2012). This was followed by 
very strict measures including restricting the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
from accessing the Half Mile Forestry Strip (HMFS)
2
 and imposing a ban on harvesting trees on 
the mountain slopes. Rampant harvesting of trees was also restricted, and intensive campaigns of 
reforestation have been ongoing. On the other hand, these environmental policies and 
management practices have not helped to support the goals of environmental protection; instead 
they have frustrated people, and jeopardised their livelihoods. They also created numerous 
governance problems.  
So, the Regional Government and the Kilimanjaro National Park (KINAPA) are faced with a real 
two-fold problem, namely how to arrest the deteriorating environmental condition of the 
mountain slopes; and how to do that without pushing the adjacent communities who depend on 
the mountain’s resources for their livelihood into abject poverty. 
In this dissertation, I attempt to show what environmental ethics can contribute to addressing 
such environmental concerns on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
 
                                                          
1
 Unfortunately no current data on the extent of the degraded forest cover is available. However, judging from the 
urgency with which the government of Tanzania views the deterioration of the environment around the mountain 
slopes, it is obvious that the forest cover has been degraded even more than is evident from formal studies.   
2
 The Half-Mile Forestry Strip (HMFS) was a social forest 0.8 km wide (area of 87.69 square kilometers) which acted 
as a buffer zone between the forest reserve and the adjacent densely populated villages (up to 650 people per 
square kilometer) (see, Sébastian, 2010). In this area the villagers were allowed to collect firewood, fodder, 
building poles, wood and non-wood products (Newark, 1991).   
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1.1.2 Problem statement 
Many efforts and extensive research have been undertaken to address the environmental situation 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro (see, for example, Newmark & Leonard, 1991; Mbonile, 
1999; Yanda & Shishira, 2001; Mbonile, Misana & Sokoni, 2003; Soini, 2005; Chuwa, 2008; 
and Sébastien, 2010). However, conflict and complaints involving the adjacent villages versus 
KINAPA and the Regional Government continue to date.   
I argue that one of the causes of the continued conflict and complaining is that most of these 
studies see the environmental problems on the mountain slopes as a failure of economic, physical 
environmental and technological systems, and thus address these problems with the use of a 
purely technical template. However, many scholars today increasingly acknowledge that 
environmental problems are also a result of the failure of our current moral and spiritual systems 
(see, for example, Dudley et al., 2006; Watling, 2009; Gambril, 2011). Thus, the use of a purely 
technical template to address environmental problems can risk overlooking the values that 
underlie human behaviour. This implies that environmental problems have an ethical or moral, as 
well as a spiritual, dimension that needs to be taken into account when contemplating solutions 
to problems or challenges. 
In this dissertation, I thus argue that environmental ethics could contribute to addressing 
environmental problems around Mount Kilimanjaro. I do that by revisiting different approaches 
to environmental ethics so as to determine which approach is more appropriate for the task. I 
take issue with mainstream approaches to environmental ethics, however, by arguing that, since 
mainstream environmental ethics emerged in western, mostly Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
western values accordingly seem to have dominated it, such environmental ethics is not likely to 
be effective in addressing environmental problems in an African context with different sets of 
values and different environmental problems. As a response to this shortcoming, I show that 
some environmental philosophers, especially from Africa, have tried to develop alternative 
African environmental ethics approaches different from the west and with African roots.  
I also take issue with these alternative African approaches by arguing that they cannot adequately 
address present-day environmental challenges in Africa, and particularly on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. This, as I will show,  is because most approaches to traditional African 
environmental ethics rest on a false assumption of a “pristine” or an eco-golden African past 
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where Africans lived in complete peace and harmony with nature and that traditional African 
beliefs and values engendered a greater sense of ecological awareness that the current generation 
need to emulate. I argue that these romantic ideas about pre-colonial Africa have not been able to 
provide us with practical guidance to address real and concrete environmental concerns and 
challenges like those experienced on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. I show also that these 
alternative African approaches, like the western approaches, basically remain within the ambit of 
theoretical and academic debates with little practical insight on what to do to resolve concrete 
environmental challenges in Africa. 
So, as a way to address the inadequacies of these previous approaches, I defend environmental 
pragmatism, in particular Bryan Norton’s adaptive management principles of experimentalism, 
multi-scalar analysis and localism. Using these principles and the process guidelines they imply, 
I show how this approach could make a contribution in resolving some concrete environmental 
challenges and management problems around Mount Kilimanjaro.    
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The main purpose of this study was to answer the following major research question: What 
environmental ethics approach is appropriate to address environmental problems around Mount 
Kilimanjaro; and how can it help to resolve environmental problems there?  
To address the main research question, I attempted to answer the following specific questions: 
1. What is the problem with mainstream western environmental ethics? Here, I show the 
inherent problematic of mainstream approaches to environmental ethics when applied 
to an African context. I introduce environmental pragmatism and adaptive 
management as an alternative approach by examining what this approach entails and 
why it is useful in an African context. All of these form Chapter 2 of my dissertation.  
2. What is the nature of the response from Africa? Here, I briefly examine the 
alternative indigenous African environmental ethics, focusing on its foundations, 
strengths and its limitations in addressing the current environmental problems in 
Africa. Here, I consider, at some length, two approaches to African environmental 
ethics as propounded by Workineh Kelbessa and Felix Murove and show why they 
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fail in principle to address the environmental problems in Africa today. This forms 
Chapter 3 of my dissertation.  
3. Moving from theoretical discussion of the western and African environmental ethics, 
I ask: in which way a case study of the Chagga living on the slopes of Kilimanjaro 
can help to overcome the theoretical issues as well as the practical issues articulated 
in the main research question?  Alternatively, what happens when we use the same 
methodologies of Kelbessa and Murove in the case of the people living on the slopes 
of Mount Kilimanjaro? What emerges from that and what are the shortcomings 
thereof? In this chapter, I demonstrate what happens when we use the same 
ethnographic methodology, or else, what happens when we use Kelbessa’s and 
Murove’s models in the case of the Chagga context. My assumption is that these 
models fail to capture the present realities and experiences of the people living on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, the Chagga. This forms Chapter 4 of this dissertation.    
4. What are the actual experiences of the environmental problems of the people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro that we really need to take into account in order 
to arrive at a proposal for a new environmental ethics approach? Here, I try to address 
the present realities of the Chagga and what needs to be addressed. Alternatively, I 
ask: what needs to be done to persuade people on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro to 
actually protect the natural environment? This forms Chapter 5 of my dissertation. 
5. What would be the implications of all of the above in order to formulate an outline of 
an effective environmental ethics that could persuade the people living on the slopes 
of Mount Kilimanjaro to protect nature? This outline is summarised in Chapter 6, 
while the relevant policy implications are also discussed. 
1.3 Methods and research framework 
In this study, I made use of mixed methodology to answer the specific research questions 
presented above. Aspects of this mixed methodology concerned theoretical and conceptual issues 
which are covered in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The second aspect of my methodology was a case 
study that is mostly covered in Chapters 4 and 5.  But all these actually were a very integrated 
discussion in which environmental ethics theory informed practice, in that the discussion of the 
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case study and its practical implications and the discussion of context informed some theoretical 
insights which are formulated in Chapter 6.  
1.3.1 The study area and the rationale for its selection 
The case study was conducted among the villagers living adjacent to the Kilimanjaro National 
Park (KINAPA) which hosts Mount Kilimanjaro. KINAPA is one of the 15 parks in Tanzania 
under the umbrella of the Tanzania National Park Authority (TANAPA). The attention that is 
being directed at the area by both international, national and local governments, and the 
increasing environmental problems and measures being taken to address the problems make this 
area a perfect site for studying the local people’s current perceptions, values, attitudes and 
concerns towards the natural environment. The fact that the villagers grapple with issues of 
access to the mountain forests and forest resources, water, problems of land for agriculture, and 
the problem of wild animals on a daily basis also made it conducive to understanding how the 
villagers relate to the natural environment, and thus what kind of an environmental ethic 
approach may be relevant for their environmental concerns. The area furthermore was deemed 
appropriate for this study as the peasants are trapped in a challenging environment and 
environmental policies that have set them between the wider international and national demand 
for environmental protection and conservation (in the form of Tanzanian national parks), modern 
and traditional ways of living, and new challenges brought about by the effects of climate 
change. As a further reason, I decided to do this study in this area because I come from the area; 
I grew up there, so I know the place. I did my secondary and high studies school there, thus I 
know the problems facing the area.  
The case study was conducted in Ngarony village in the Siha District; Ng’uni village in the Hai 
District; Mweka, Maua and Lyasongoro villages in Moshi Rural District; and Mengwe Juu and 
Maharo villages in Rombo District. All these villages represent the main ecological and sub-
cultures of the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro that stretch from the western 
part (Siha District) through the central part (Moshi Rural District) to the eastern part (Rombo) 
(see the attached map below). 
 
 




Figure 2: Location of study villages and the Half Mile Forestry Strip 
Source: GIS Laboratory, UDSM (2018). 
1.3.2 Data collection and analysis 
It is established that “a subject such as human versus nature relationship lends itself well to open 
or semi-structured interviews as the core research method” (De Groot, Drenthen & De Groot, 
2011). For this reason, I employed both open-ended and semi-structured qualitative interviews of 
one to two hours in length, which were conducted in Kiswahili, a language understood by the 
majority of the interviewees. Individual interviews and casual conversations or informal 
discussions were held with villagers and various other stakeholders in the respective areas to 
understand people’s beliefs, attitudes and values with respect to the natural environment. Focus 
group discussions with six to eight people were also held in each village and participant 
observation was employed to supplement the interviews. The aim of the interviews and 
conversations included, among other things, to learn from the critical dialogues already occurring 
in the community and make it explicit, especially by listening closely to the stories told by the 
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villagers with a view to understand their current beliefs, values and attitudes towards nature, and 
empathetically questioning these values and assumptions (Forester, 1999:20).  
The interviews and methods for data collection were designed following an environmental 
pragmatist methodology in that they were formulated in such a way as to allow the inhabitants of 
Mount Kilimanjaro to speak for themselves. They were aimed in particular to create a space 
within which the silenced and marginalised in these two societies could acquire a voice and 
articulate their experiences, their values and their beliefs on their own terms and in their own 
language. In doing this, the sources and history of struggles and contestations in the societies of 
the inhabitants of Mount Kilimanjaro, in particular struggles with the powerful in society, as well 
as struggles with local, regional and national government structures were studied. The 
assumption was that these struggles and the directions in which they develop, are highly valuable 
indicators of values, beliefs and practices (of the powerful) that are experienced as threatening, 
but also of values, beliefs and practices (of the weak)
3
 that are put under threat and perhaps 
require a certain space (or re-interpretation) to promote and enhance healthy interaction between 
human beings and nature. 
This is in line with those approaches that emphasise that an environmental ethics that speaks to 
people needs to begin with the daily encounters of people with their immediate environment in 
acknowledging the plurality of values and motives that drive people to relate to the natural 
environment in the way they do (Brown, 2004; O’Neill, Holland & Light, 2008). Many scholars 
today propose that environmental ethics should leave the university walls and be practical as the 
only way to become relevant and persuasive to the common people (Norton, 1984; Light, 2002; 
Brown, 2004; Kelbessa, 2014). For example, Brown emphasizes the importance of 
environmental ethics becoming more practical by observing that, “…we need an environmental 
ethics literature that is much more applied to particular issues than it has been so far” (Brown 
2004, as quoted in Kelbessa, 2014:52). As I see it, this is the only way we can capture what some 
scholars call ‘the broad human scale of values’ which gives us a wider spectrum for 
understanding the myriad reasons and motivations that drive people to interact and relate with 
nature the way they do. In other words, the methodology I followed in this case study was 
                                                          
3
 I am aware of the fact that societal struggles cannot be reconstructed neatly in simple, dichotomous terms, but 
are complex and multi-layered; and often entail a number of stakeholders with a wide variety of relationships 
among one another. This was duly taken into consideration in my study, as outlined in my methodology.  
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pragmatic because it sought to uncover, not what the philosophers (both the advocates of western 
and of African approaches) say we should find, but what is actually there in experience – the 
local people’s concrete environmental concerns and what really could persuade them to protect 
the natural environment. 
To achieve this end, the interviewees were purposively selected, and the following groups were 
targeted: the elderly (village and clan elders/the sages), to sift from them past and current values 
and beliefs; peasants, to understand their concerns regarding their daily interactions with the 
natural environment (the land, forests, water, livestock, wild animals, etc.); women, to get a 
gender perspective on their perceptions and attitudes towards nature, as well as division of 
benefits and burdens in the community; the youth, to get the current generation’s attitudes 
towards nature; local government officials, for a government’s perspective; conservationists, for 
a professional’s perspective; NGOs, for an activists’ perspective;  religious institutions, for a 
spiritual perspective; business people, for a user’s or developer’s perspective; (petty)traders, for 
an understanding of how their activities bear on the environment; (local) academics, to sift from 
them how they see things now and what should be done; and the marginalised, that is, the very 
poor, the very old and the disabled, to understand the challenges they face in their interactions 
with the natural environment, especially concerning access to and use of the natural environment 
(resources).  
My focus in the interviews was more on appropriate data sources than on the number of 
participants, which is why the participants were purposively selected (Fetterman, 2010). A total 
of 40 people participated in the interviews and informal discussions. Discussions and interviews 
with five focus groups were also held. These included a focus group of ward councillors, village 
leaders, district environmental and game officers, a group of women, and a group of traditional 
leaders.  The selection of the number of participants in this study naturally was not arbitrary, but 
was informed by an observation that most related qualitative studies like this one use an average 
of thirty to fifty participants (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). 
The criteria used for selecting the people to be interviewed and have conversations with 
depended on the kind of information I wanted and was also dictated by the kind of responses I 
received from previous interviews or discussions. For example, some responses needed follow 
up for confirmation from other sources. Thus, the interviews and conversations continued until I 
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was satisfied that the information gathered “had paid sufficient attention” to the issues being 
raised and discussed, and that they answered my research objectives fully (Press, 2005:157). In 
other words, the criterion I used to determine whether the interviews and conversation had paid 
sufficient attention to the issues being raised required reaching a “saturation point”, i.e. when no 
new information emerged from the interviews.   
A notebook was used to record data from the interviews and conversations. A sound recorder 
was also used whenever permission was granted to make a recording, and all sound recordings 
were later transcribed. Data analysis was done simultaneously, right from the data collection 
stage in the field. Themes and patterns were identified from the data and put into coherent 
categories that corresponded to the objectives of the study. Where appropriate, verbatim 
quotations or illustrative quotes were used to support claims made under each theme.  
1.3.3 Assumptions and points of departure 
This study was guided by the following assumptions: Firstly, western environmental ethics has 
over-emphasised the notion of intrinsic value and nature protection for its own sake. The notion 
of the intrinsic value of nature was conceived under one reading, namely, nature should be left 
totally alone. Environmental philosophers believed that, if the intrinsic value of nature could be 
established, the moral justification for leaving nature totally alone could have been found. I argue 
that the notion of intrinsic value of nature thus construed may not be relevant to developing 
countries, and to the African context in particular, where most people’s livelihood and survival 
needs depend entirely on the use of forest resources (Guha, 1989). It is estimated that 90 percent 
of the world’s poorest people, most of who are in Africa, rely on forest resources for part of their 
survival (Greig, Hulme & Turner, 2007). So, for reasons that will become even more apparent in 
the rest of the dissertation, I argue that an ethic that denies the local people access to their 
immediate natural resources cannot succeed to persuade them to protect the resources. 
Secondly, the current scholarship on African environmental ethics has taken a mistaken 
direction, namely, too much exhortation of a pristine or ideal (African) past at the expense of the 
current realities and experiences in Africa. The African alternative approach may be said to be an 
attempt to re-appropriate the past in the present (Fleming, 2007; Ojomo, 2011). This approach 
emphasises reviving traditional beliefs and practices as a solution to current environmental 
problems in Africa. The approach has been too idealistic and romantic, thereby largely divorcing 
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it from the current realities and the poor people’s actual daily practical environmental concerns 
and challenges. I argue in this dissertation that a more practical approach that is responsive to the 
current African context and environmental problems such as those on the slopes of mountain 
Kilimanjaro might help raise people’s awareness about nature protection and hence persuade 
them to protect it. 
Thirdly, contrary to the claim that pre-colonial Africans and in particular those living on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro possessed an environmental ethics that helped to protect the 
environment, I assumed that the pre-colonial Chagga did not possess an environmental 
awareness or ethics of the kind being advocated by many eastern and African environmental 
philosophers. Thus environmental ethics needs to be nurtured or inculcated among them, just like 
among everybody else in the world. This is to say that our African cultural beliefs and values 
need to be “environmentalised” or rather be re-directed towards environmental concerns instead 
of romanticising them. In other words, people need to be made environmentally conscious, 
instead of assuming that they were already so in pre-colonial Africa, as some Africanist scholars 
seem to maintain.   
Fourthly, unlike Rolston (1996) who sees humanity today as faced with two options, namely 
either saving the little remaining wild nature or feeding the hungry, in which case he prefers as a 
last resort saving nature first,
4
 following Robin Attfield (1998) and Andrew Brennan (1998), I 
argue that the question perhaps should not be an either/or issue, but rather finding ways that may 
enable people to feed themselves and protect nature at the same time.     
Lastly, I assumed that environmental pragmatism – especially because of its emphasis on paying 
attention to context, real life experiences and pluralism, that is, by being sensitive to the 
multitude of values that drive people’s motives for nature protection – could contribute to 
building an approach that might be more appropriate to a context like that on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Carefully articulated, this approach, which is more of a proposal for an iterative 
process than prescribing a specific “content” for an environmental ethic, could help to inform 
                                                          
4
 Rolston argues that nature should not be sacrificed while keeping in place all of the unwise decisions driving 
people up against the fences protecting wild nature in the first place. He in fact argues that, despite the fact the 
there are millions of people who go hungry throughout the world, many people still give priority to less significant 
things, for example building huge state-of-the-art Olympic stadiums. So he would argue that it is not always 
actually true that people will give priority to feeding the hungry (see, Rolston 1996 and 1998). Nonetheless, 
Rolston casts the problem as a simple dichotomy, which I challenge in this study.  
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better environmental management and conservation practices and policies that might allow the 
flourishing of both humans and nature; unlike the current approaches that focus more on 
divorcing or distancing humans from the natural environment and resources on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro.    
1.2 Ethical Issues 
This study was classified as posing a medium ethical risk since it involved human ‘subjects’5 and 
thus was subjected to a full ethical clearance procedure (see, the attached ethical clearance letter, 
and the “Informed Consent Form” in the appendix). Major ethical research questions that this 
could evoke include how to approach the poor and the marginalised; how to handle sensitive 
information such as rape, corruption, and harassment (which in fact emerged as themes in my 
interviews and focus group discussions); and also, how to protect and conceal the identity of 
some of the participants. However, these ethical risks could easily be mitigated by implementing 
appropriate measures. For example, before the interviews, I explained the purpose of the research 
clearly to the interviewees and thus sought their consent to participate in the study. Because of 
the sensitivity of some information in this study, anonymity and confidentiality was guaranteed 
to the participants and they were thus encouraged to express themselves freely. Furthermore, 
since the interviews involved the very poor people and the marginalized, I took care to approach 
and treat them with empathy and in a sensitive manner.  
To follow from this introductory chapter, I now turn to addressing the research questions. In the 
following chapter, I address the first research question of this study, which entails examining the 
inherent problematic of mainstream environmental ethics in relation to the African context. I also 
examine the alternatives given, with particular focus on environmental pragmatism and adaptive 
management. 
 
                                                          
5
 I am aware that the use of the term human subjects in research is discouraged in the social sciences and 
humanities today because it creates the impression of a researcher as an active person who asks the questions and 
mines the information, and the interviewee (which is also discouraged) as the passive person, the receiver, the 
respondent, the subject who is experimented upon. So the ‘interviewee’ is not a subject nor an informant, but a 
participant in the research process. I use the term ‘subject’ here only for the sake of convenience.   




 EXAMINING MAINSTREAM ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS IN RELATION TO 
THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I introduce the mainstream approaches to environmental ethics and their 
historical context. I support the argument that mainstream environmental ethics approaches have 
focused too much on academic debates on anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric values in 
nature with little focus on real environmental problems.  I argue that this focus on abstract 
academic debates has caused environmental ethics to fail to win over the common people, not 
just in Africa but worldwide. Not only that, but I also show that mainstream environmental ethics 
has remained culturally embedded and hence less applicable to a non-western context. I argue 
that all of the above have resulted in environmental ethics lacking the persuasive power needed 
to motivate people to act in environmentally sustainable ways, especially in Africa.  Africa faces 
many environmental problems that directly affect the wellbeing of the people, which may require 
a more urgent and practical response.  I support those who argue that we need to look beyond the 
polarised debates between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in environmental ethics 
and find a more pragmatic approach that can help us to address real environmental problems.   
In this chapter, therefore, after the brief introduction of the emergence, historical context and the 
main trends of environmental ethics, and their problematic, I defend an environmental pragmatist 
approach as a more suitable approach to addressing environmental problems in Africa today. In 
the rest of the dissertation, I show through my case study, how this environmental pragmatic 
approach could help to resolve environmental challenges around Mount Kilimanjaro.     
2.2 The emergence of environmental ethics 
Retracing how environmental ethics emerged and factors that led to its emergence will give us 
the gist of why mainstream environmental ethics, despite its claim of universality, is embedded 
in the western worldview and value systems just like all other ethical systems originating from 
the west, and thus ignores the wider global context and other culturally embedded value systems. 
All of this makes mainstream environmental ethics less applicable, especially in an African 
environment. I will argue further that the conditions such as the Industrial Revolution with its 
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attendant pollution, mining, massive forest clearance, and land drainage (Taliafero, 2003) within 
which environmental ethics that created environmental awareness among the western population 
emerged cannot be paralleled in Africa because such conditions have never been present in 
Africa. The talk of environmental ethics in Africa should therefore be different. It should be 
motivated by different reasons. In other words, I argue that arguments to support environmental 
preservation in Africa should be different from the conventional arguments that are usually 
advanced in mainstream environmental ethics.    
2.2.1 A brief historical background 
Various writers as far back as the time of the pre-Socratics have philosophised about nature. 
However, as earlier alluded to, serious concerns about the natural environment, or rather, 
normative reflection on the relations between human beings and their environment has only been 
undertaken in recent times. As mentioned earlier “philosophers have been more pre-occupied 
with moral, political and social philosophy of the social environment rather than the natural 
environment” for a long time (see Robin Attfield & Andrew Belsey, 1994:1). Typically, moral 
thinking has been restricted to the realm of humanity only, excluding everything else. Dominant 
conventional moral theories such as virtue-based, utilitarian, and contractarian or rights-based 
theories have been more concerned with relations among human beings. This tendency is also 
referred to as normative anthropocentrism, which refers to restricting our moral estimations to 
the realm of humanity only.  Let us see, in some more detail, how anthropocentricism came to be 
a dominant worldview, especially in the West, and why environmental philosophers challenge 
this worldview. 
Most philosophers throughout the ages, notably since the earlier Roman and Greek civilizations, 
have emphasised the central role and the unique status of humanity in the universe. It is 
worthwhile noting that, although many of the earlier Greek and Roman gods were nature deities, 
or else, that Greek and Roman religions were animistic, scholars note that the Greeks and 
Romans did not pay sufficient attention to nature or the implications of their animistic religions 
in relation to nature. It has been noted, for example, that “deforestation took place on a major 
scale, first in Italy, then in outer provinces. Wildlife, exotic animals especially, were killed, in 
part to fuel the famous Roman circuses” (Ferkiss, 1993:9) since the time of the Romans. So, over 
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this time, nature and its integrity were taken for granted. Nature seem to have had no function 
other than serving human interests/wants and desires.  
Philosophers like Aristotle emphasised the special place of humans in the hierarchy of being in 
what came to be called the “Great Chain of Being” or the “ladder of nature” roughly ranging 
from the bottom of the ladder in this order: matter, plants, animals, humans, angels, and God at 
the apex. For Aristotle, the irrational (matter, plants, animals) existed for the rational, that is 
human beings. So rationality only belonged to human beings and higher beings such as Angels 
and God, of course.  In Politics, as quoted in VanDeVeer & Pierce (2003: 32), Aristotle asserted 
that:  
Plants are for the sake of animals, and ... the other animals are for the sake of human beings, 
domestic ones both for using and eating, and most but not all wild ones for food and other kind of 
support, so that clothes and other tools may be got from them. If then nature makes nothing 
incomplete or pointless, it must have made all of them for the sake of human beings.    
However, Aristotle’s assertion that everything that is in the world (under human beings in the 
ladder/hierarchy of nature) was made for the sake of human beings does not mean that humanity 
has an unlimited moral right to use nature as they wish, in spite of him arguing that human 
beings by possession of rationality are far superior to animals, plants and other beings down the 
great chain of being. However, by positing that humans are superior to the rest of nature by 
virtue of their rationality, Aristotle could have pioneered the destructive anthropocentric thinking 
and human arrogance with regard to nature that came to pervade the western society for 
centuries. 
Likewise, the Judeo-Christian tradition, which traces its origin from Greek and Roman tradition 
and philosophy, has also been seen as emphasising the supremacy of human beings over nature. 
Going one step further in his assessment, Lynn White (1994) claimed that Judeo-Christian 
tradition fostered or reinforced human arrogance toward nature. He argued that the modern 
period in the western world which was characterised by high advances in science and technology 
that, in turn, led to massive exploitation of nature, was largely facilitated by the Christian attitude 
towards nature. Passmore supports these claims by observing that, in the traditional Christian and 
Greek cosmology, “there was no risk of sacrilege in felling a tree or killing an animal” 
(Passmore, 1995:132). In supporting White, other scholars have noted that Christianity itself 
forbids its followers to identify God, the Creator with his creation, “since God is transcendent, he 
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cannot be said to dwell in any spot on earth in an ontological sense” (Hughes & Swan, 
1998:164). Such doctrine was supposedly aimed at discouraging animistic beliefs in nature 
deities, and pantheistic beliefs, but with unfavourable implications for the natural environment. 
Thus construed, Judeo Christian tradition is, therefore, considered to foster unfavourable 
attitudes towards the environment. It will be noted later that modern environmental ethics 
celebrates the pre-industrial attitudes of being close to nature through seeing nature as an 
embodiment of spirits and deities. So, in some way, it would seem that environmental ethics is at 
loggerheads with traditional Christianity.  
However, it cannot be claimed that western attitudes towards the non-human world, particularly 
those of the Judeo-Christian tradition, were completely anthropocentric in the sense that they 
were devoid of any ecological orientation or consciousness. Scholars such as Jeanne Kay (1998) 
and Robin Attfield (2001) have shown that the Judeo-Christian tradition itself, despite the 
criticism advanced by Lynn White (1967), has some ecological orientation. For example, it has 
been pointed out that “the manifestation of God in a variety of natural settings in the Bible 
suggests a more nature oriented Bible” (Kay, 1998: 215). Some people have also interpreted 
man’s role in the world as assigned by God in Genesis as one of stewardship. Man is seen as the 
caretaker of the world or the Viceroy of God, who must then “order creation and use it with 
sobriety, moderation and thankfulness” (Attfield, 2001:105). Lloyd H. Steffen (1992), Peter 
Harrison (1999) and Robin Attfield (2001), have also emphasised the role of man as a Viceroy of 
God to take care of His creation by noting that God’s directive to man to have dominion over 
nature does not imply that man should dominate nature, but rather that man should see himself as 
a steward or a caretaker of the world. Stewardship has thus emerged as a leading trend in 
Christian environmental ethics (see also Glacken, 1967).  
So, an ecologically enlightened Christianity, as mentioned above in relation to stewardship, 
could be of much help if given appropriate emphasis in areas with similar conditions like those 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro where Christian traditions are entrenched. I come back to 
this proposal in the last chapter of this dissertation.   
Apart from the Judeo-Christian tradition, the superiority of humans over nature is further said to 
have been cemented in people’s worldviews during the time of the Enlightenment (Taliaferro, 
2003). This was marked by the Scientific Revolution in the sixteenth century which is said to 
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have been responsible for shaping people’s view of the world and consequently their relationship 
with nature. The Scientific Revolution had a profound impact on western thought or philosophy. 
The discoveries made in astronomy, physics and medicine led people to believe that nature in 
principle was fully knowable and could therefore be tamed for the benefit of humankind 
(Taliaferro, 2003). In this period, there was a complete change in the worldview; from 
understanding nature in mythical, religious and superstitious terms in ancient and medieval times 
to a secular, human-centred perspective. It was a shift that led to a scientific, materialistic, and 
atomistic understanding of nature (Matthews & Pratt, 2001). Man and nature were seen as 
separate entities, with nature conceived, as Newton observed, of a collection of discrete parts 
(atoms) interacting with one another in a law-like manner that can be discovered by science and 
described in mathematical language (Taliaferro, 2003). A dichotomous, objectivist, and 
mechanistic view of reality thus came to be the dominant worldview.  
To use the words of the well-known African philosopher Geoffrey Tangwa, the mechanistic view 
of the world was associated with the assumption that “all knowledge was unqualifiedly good, 
that nature is in principle at least, completely knowable and controllable and that the universe 
was something that ought to be explored, subdued, dominated and exploited” (Tangwa, 
2004:390). Nature was seen as a machine, a passive object separate from man that is open for 
unlimited exploitation as far as human technological capacities may allow (Taliaferro, 2003). 
Such, essentially, is what is referred to as a mechanistic, dichotomous and objectivist conception 
of nature that characterised much of the western worldview for a long time, culminating into 
what has been termed the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian worldview (Callicott, 1996). 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626), one of the prominent figures in this time period, for example, 
advocated the use of science and technology to transform nature and control it for human 
interests. René Descartes, another prominent figure, for his part, likewise saw everything apart 
from the human mind as mere machines that could be manipulated for human interests. He 
stressed the rational capacity of man to transform nature through science and technology. This 
arose from Descartes’ understanding of reality in dichotomous terms: mind (the immaterial 
thing) and body (the material thing) that is mindless. For him, nature was a mere object (material 
thing) which had to be subdued and mastered by science and technology. This thinking has 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
dominated western science for a long time resulting in both good and devastating effects on the 
environment (Passmore, 1995).  
However, in the Age of Reason or the Enlightenment period, a philosophical trend that opposed 
to the values of the Enlightenment and generally known as Romanticism developed (see 
Matthews & Pratt, 2001:461-477). Beginning Europe in late the 18
th
 century, Romanticism was a 
broad socio-cultural and intellectual (philosophical) movement that swept across the western 
world, emphasising paying attention to feelings, emotions and subjectivity and the primacy of 
the individual (Matthews & Pratt, 2001). It essentially was an artistic, literary, musical and 
intellectual movement. In reaction to Rationalism and Classism and, in general, the socio-
political values of the Age of Enlightenment, particularly the scientific rationalisation of nature, 
Romanticism glorified everything that was unbounded and untamed (Matthews & Pratt, 
2001:461). Romanticism’s reverence for nature was also motivated by a desire to escape from 
the effects of the Industrial Revolution, which had devastating consequences for the physical and 
natural environment, especially in the countryside in Europe. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), a nature lover born in Switzerland, is considered the father 
of romanticism or Romantic’s patron saint. He glorified that which was natural, immediate and 
close to the senses. Rousseau enjoyed taking a walk in unspoiled nature or wilderness. That is 
why he is considered a romantic primitivist because he advocated a simple lifestyle, a return to 
and living in harmony with nature (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 2003).  
The Romantics thus objected to the primacy given to reason and science in understanding the 
mystery of nature. For the Romantics, humans should not try to conquer nature but should 
cooperate with it in the process of evolving, enjoying her wonders and the sublime (Passmore, 
1974:34). The Romantics saw nature “as home, as mother, as healer and as teacher and 
inspiration; nature was alive and not passive” (Kelbessa, 2011:51).   
In general one may say the Romantics’ attitude towards nature was reminiscent of the ancient or 
pre-industrial animistic attitudes towards nature. It also foresaw the postmodern worldview 
which presupposes some pre-industrial attitudes towards nature, namely living close to and in 
harmony with nature. Romanticism, however, never became the mainstream or dominant 
worldview driving modernity forward towards the industrialised, globalised society that it led to. 
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Romanticism, on the contrary, rather continued in the margins of modernising western society, 
offering fundamental critique on it as it developed, and in this sense prefiguring and in some 
cases becoming an inspiration for what later emerged as environmental ethics. 
With this said, the emergence of environmental ethics can thus be seen as part of a wider 
intellectual movement in which the earlier dominant western worldview “the modernist 
worldview” (that is the Baconian-Cartesian-Newtonian scientific worldview), which has been 
blamed for the current environmental crisis, is being replaced by a new worldview, “the 
postmodernist worldview” pioneered by people like Aldo Leopold, Albert Einstein and Charles 
Darwin (see Callicott, 1996:8). This new worldview has challenged the former worldview by 
arguing that nature should not be seen as static, deterministic, atomistic and mechanistic, as 
previously thought, but rather should be construed as being more organismic, dynamic, and 
constantly evolving, and that all its aspects are thus interconnected, interrelated and integrated in 
a complex whole. Taken to its full implications, this new worldview will emphasise that 
uncertainties, complexity and flux are the norm (Cilliers & Spurrett 1999); which means that 
nature is much more resistant to control, domination and management contrary to the belief of 
most modernists.  According to Callicott (1996:9), this new worldview might be referred to as 
the Darwinian-Einsteinian-Leopoldian worldview. Environmental ethics emerged from within 
this worldview, which is basically an attempt to correct the ecologically insensitive Baconian-
Cartesian-Newtonian legacy. This new worldview emphasises that humans should see 
themselves as part of nature, and not as above or master of nature. Alternatively, environmental 
ethics claim that we do not live apart from nature, and that we are not superior to nature, but 
rather that we co-evolve with nature and depend on it for our continued survival. Accordingly, 
we should see nature as our companion without which we cannot continue in the life process. It 
is us (humans) who depend on nature, and not vice versa. And as such we must respect nature.  
To conclude this sub-section: The Darwinian-Einsteinian-Leopoldian worldview or the 
organismic worldview is actually what environmental ethics is attempting to advocate. It has 
comprised an attempt to find ways to persuade humans that we are part of nature and not masters 
of nature or superior to nature. That is why concepts such as the intrinsic value of nature formed 
a large part of the academic debates on environmental ethics.  
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However, as I mentioned earlier, these efforts, important and valid as they are, have been overly 
embedded in western cultural perspectives and concerns. Non-western perspectives and concerns 
do not seem to have been given much attention. As a consequence, mainstream environmental 
ethics has lacked global appeal.  In what follows, I show in some detail why mainstream 
environmental ethics has failed to appeal to wider global environmental concerns, particularly in 
Africa. I do that by showing how environmental ethics emerged and the factors behind its 
emergence. This will further substantiate the claim that mainstream environmental ethics has 
been too embedded in the cultural perspectives and concerns of western society. 
2.2.2 The beginning of academic scholarship in environmental ethics 
I hinted earlier that, prior to the emergence of environmental ethics, it was a common practice to 
conceptualise environmental problems in solely political, economic and technological terms or, 
alternatively, from, “a technical template approach” (Dudley, Higgins-Zogib & Mansourian, 
2006). However, some philosophers came to see the environmental crisis as essentially a result 
of a crisis of worldview and values (Eckersley, 1992). It became apparent, therefore, that “a 
purely technical template approach to environmental challenges can overlook the attitudes and 
values that underlie human behaviour, ultimately resulting in environmental degradation” 
(Dudley et al., 2006). That is to say, philosophers came to see the environmental crisis as a moral 
issue. Since then, philosophers have seen it as the first and foremost task to establish justification 
for granting moral status to the non-human world as a way to challenge what was seen as an 
environmentally unfavourable anthropocentric worldview. 
Environmental ethics emerged from within this context as a new sub-discipline of ethics in the 
early 1970s. This is also the time when serious academic scholarship involved with 
environmental ethics began. Increasing environmental awareness and movements in the 1960s, 
however, have been singled out as among the forces that led to the emergence of environmental 
ethics (McShane, 2009).
6
 The environmental ethics scholarship wheel began to roll when papers 
                                                          
6
 In fact environmental awareness and these movements received mass support, for example, in America, because 
the American society was very politically active at the time. There was much activism and political movement to 
challenge the status quo. These included civil rights movements fighting for equal rights for all (Martin Luther King, 
one of the famous civil rights activists of all times, emerged here). Others include the counter-establishment 
movement of the Hippies that included protests against the Vietnam War, the transformation of universities, black 
consciousness, a "return to nature/flower power”, women’s movements, and gay rights movements. It is, 
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and journals specifically dedicated to environmental ethics began to appear. Among these 
journals is included Environmental Ethics. This journal is based in the USA and it was first 
published in 1979.  Later on, in 1992, another journal dedicated to environmental ethics, namely 
Environmental Values was launched. This journal was the first British-based journal in this field.  
The emergence of scholarship on environmental ethics is said to have been further driven by 
some individual works of some people, such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, first published in 
1962, and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, published in 1968. The Silent Spring warned of 
the devastating effects that pesticides such as DDT were having on living organisms and the 
environment in general. The Population Bomb, as the title suggests, warned of the dangers of the 
spiralling human population to the planet’s dwindling resources. These works commanded 
widespread readership among academia and the public and thus helped a great in deal in raising 
environmental consciousness among the general public in the West. Two very influential papers 
that presented academic discussions on environmental problems in the West and beyond also 
appeared. These papers include Gareth Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), and 
“The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis” the famous article by Lynn White (1967), in 
which he blames Judeo-Christian traditions for contributing to the current ecological crisis.  
Meanwhile, an essay by Aldo Leopold in his A Sand County Almanac, called “The Land Ethic” 
(1949) was also gaining wide currency. There were also events that spearheaded the birth of 
environmental ethics such as “Earth Day” in 1970. Earth Day was an initiative founded by U.S 
Senator from Wisconsin, Gaylord Nelson. He was concerned about the massive oil spill in Santa 
Barbara, and also moved by a student anti-war movement, in 1969. Nelson felt that these events 
were a perfect platform to launch an environmental public awareness campaign (see, Dunlap & 
Mertig, 1992). So, it is easy to see why it was not difficult for the environmental movement to 
gain public support; the citizenry were already sensitised to the importance of challenging the 
traditional/conventional practices and ways of life, let alone the fact that people by that time 
were experiencing massive pollution and severe environmental degradation together with 
wilderness and species loss due to intensive industrial activities (Nash, 1990; Dunlap & Mertig, 
1992). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
therefore, within all these movements that environmentalism kicked in. (For more on this, see, for example, Nash, 
1990; and Dunlap & Mertig, 1992.) 
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The philosophical aspects of environmental problems were highlighted in all such scholarship 
and events, thus setting the stage for a philosophical search for answers to the environmental 
crisis.
7
Thus, articulating an ethic of the environment was seen as an important tool that could 
help to influence peoples’ attitudes and values towards environmental protection, because 
conventional ethical systems did not extend beyond the human world.  
Now, when we examine the way environmental ethics emerged and the direction it has taken, 
one may discover two main hidden underlying forces and motivations that characterised its early 
days. The first one was to avert the threat of pollution caused by accelerating population growth 
and industrial activities, and the second one was to avert or thwart the threat of the rapid 
disappearance of wild areas, or the wilderness areas and the wild animals inhabiting them, and 
areas of natural beauty. If we examine the works that spearheaded the emergence of 
environmental ethics mentioned above, for example, the Tragedy of the Commons (1968), The 
Population Bomb (1968), and later works such as Rolston’s article "Feeding People versus 
Saving Nature?"(1996), we see clearly that the authors mourn the loss of wilderness areas or 
diminishing wild places on the planet because of rapid population growth, especially in 
developing countries. So, from the beginning, environmental ethics was more concerned with, as 
Brennan (1998:307) puts it, “the celebration of wilderness and the enumeration of reasons for its 
preservation”.  
As I demonstrate in the rest of this chapter, and for that matter also in the rest of this dissertation, 
an environmental ethic that has to seek justification for the protection of the wilderness as its 
core mission is a narrow, western, cultural and philosophical concern; and, if confined to these 
concerns, it results in environmental ethics lacking relevance in African and other non-western 
contexts. As I also argue, that this is partly because the African concept of wilderness, for 
example, is quite different from that of the west (see, Burnett & Wa Kang’Ethe, 1994; Guha, 
1989).  From an African perspective, therefore, an environmental ethics that focuses on saving 
                                                          
7
 It must be remembered here that, prior to the climax of environmental awareness movements in 1960s,  John 
Muir (1838-1914),  a naturalist and a preservationist also known as ‘the patron saint’ of American 
environmentalists had already contributed immensely to environmentalism through his numerous publications 
and activities geared towards environmental preservation. Another naturalist and philosopher who contributed to 
the environmental awareness movement was Hendry David Thoreau (1817-1862) who actually was a philosopher 
of nature. His work, unlike that of Muir, was academic more than activism but had a strong influence on the 
environmental movement and environmental philosophy (see, for example, Reynolds, 2011). 
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nature and wilderness areas for their own sake has weak persuasive power outside its original 
western academic context.  
It thus may be argued that much of the work on environmental ethics has focused on finding 
justification for the preservation of wild areas and other natural creatures around the world, and 
as I show below, this mission took the form of establishing the intrinsic value of nature, or a non-
anthropocentric ethic. As such, mainstream environmental ethics generally understood the 
intrinsic value of nature as the value that nature has in and of itself, regardless of any value 
nature could have for humans. Accordingly, and again speaking generally, this led to an ethics of 
leaving nature totally alone. As such, environmental ethics conventionally emerged as an ethic of 
non-interference in natural or wild places. This, in turn, ushered in a heated and protracted 
academic debate on whether environmental ethics should be anthropocentric or non-
anthropocentric. This narrow theoretical focus left out much that could have been of great 
practical relevance to the world and the African context. As alluded to earlier, much of these 
debates did not take into account non-western perspectives and concerns. The anthropocentric vs. 
the non-anthropocentric debate, furthermore, polarises the views and misses the approaches that 
could build the bridge between these two, almost opposite, positions. 
One may argue, however, that the non-western views were ignored because there were not 
enough voices in the field of environmental ethics from other cultural contexts, including Africa. 
My response to this argument would be that the whole approach to environmental ethics was 
culturally exclusive, and this was caused by the western universalism that claims to be global but 
fails to recognise its own cultural “embeddedness”.  
A brief general discussion below of some aspects of mainstream environmental ethics shows 
why much of its policy implications, such as non-interference in nature or leaving nature totally 
alone, create problems if "applied" to the lives and environmental concerns of African people 
today.  
2.3 Major views in mainstream environmental ethics 
In the initial phases of the emergence of environmental ethics, articulating a non-anthropocentric 
ethic was seen as the only way the interests of nature could be taken care of fully. Environmental 
philosophers thus began to seek justification for attributing intrinsic value, i.e. moral status, to 
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the non-human world. The philosophical bone of contention here concerned what the appropriate 
criterion for extending moral status to the non-human world should be. Different views were 
advanced in this regard. Some maintained that sentience (i.e. consciousness or the ability to feel 
pain or pleasure) is the appropriate criterion, while others found it in "being a subject of a life", 
"the mere fact of being alive”. Others argued that "life as a whole, including the whole set of 
ecological relationships and conditions forming the preconditions and life support system of life 
in general" should be the criterion for moral considerability. The following is a brief overview of 
some of those debates/views. (For a more detailed discussion of these views, see also, 
DesJardins, 2001). 
2.3.1 Sentientism as a criterion for a non-anthropocentric ethic 
One of the first attempts to articulate non-anthropocentric ethics was to extend the conventional 
ethical theories to cover nonhuman animals or sentient beings. Terms such as pathocentrism, 
which comes from the Greek word pathos, meaning pain or suffering, have variably been used. 
However, the term sentientism, which involves the capacity to experience pain or pleasure, is 
commonly used. 
Classical Utilitarianism pioneered by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873) seems to have set the stage for extending moral status to non-human animals. In criticising 
Kant’s moral theory for restricting moral status to rational human beings only, Utilitarianism 
argued that strict application of the Kantian moral theory may also exclude some humans, for 
example, those who, for one reason or another, can no longer exercise their rationality, such as 
those who are mentally challenged or those in a coma or even infants. Instead, utilitarianism 
extends moral considerability to any sentient (conscious) being, that is, any being that is capable 
of experiencing pain/suffering or pleasure. According to Jeremy Bentham (1789:17.283, as 
quoted in O’Neill et al., 2008:96), “the question is not, can they reason or can they talk? But, can 
they suffer?” Meaning that pleasure is good and pain is bad regardless of what being is 
experiencing it (O’Neill et al., 2008). So, for the classical utilitarian, the capacity to experience 
pleasure or pain was seen as the appropriate criterion for ascribing moral status. Utilitarians 
claim that there are many human beings or persons who are no longer rational but it would be 
considered immoral to treat them as mere things. Thus construed, utilitarianism offers us an 
egalitarian principle at the level of sentience as the criterion for moral considerability. All 
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creatures that are capable of experiencing pleasure or pain should therefore be accorded moral 
status. 
Peter Singer, an ardent defender of animal liberation, took utilitarian principles a step further by 
arguing that “a being deserves moral consideration if and only if it can meaningfully be said to 
have interests of its own” and that “[a] moral agent is one who gives equal consideration to the 
interests of all affected by some action” (O’Neill, et al., 2008:97). By equal consideration of 
interests, it does not mean that sentient beings should be treated equally, but rather their same 
interests should be considered equally (Singer, 1986). For example, since a pig, just like a human 
being, has an interest in avoiding suffering, the interests of both in avoiding suffering or pain 
should be considered equally. Thus, according to Singer, only humans and nonhuman animals or 
sentient beings can have interests of their own. This means that non-sentient beings like trees, 
stones, etc. are not morally considerable because they cannot be said to have interests or a good 
of their own. Singer’s theory is based on two assumptions: the first one is that the interests of 
sentient beings should be equally considered; and the second one, which is based on the 
utilitarian principle, is that we are obliged to bring about the maximum possible degree of 
interest-satisfaction. In other words, for Singer, it might be justified to sacrifice the interests of 
some individuals if that will bring about maximum interest-satisfaction for others.  
Singer’s theory, and classical utilitarianism (which basically are consequentialist) in general, 
have been counter-criticised by Tom Regan and Kantians on the ground that utilitarianism allows 
or gives room for the possibility of “the treatment of beings as means to some greater total good 
such as increasing total welfare” (O’Neill, et al.,  2008: 98). They argue, to the contrary, that 
Kantian moral theory, if extended to non-human entities, has a far greater potential for the 
protection of the non-human entities than utilitarianism, especially because Kant’s moral theory 
is deontological or rights based. Thus, once it can be established that living entities other than 
humans have inherent value and hence have certain rights, it becomes wrong to inflict intentional 
suffering on them, even if that leads to total greater welfare or maximisation of interests 
(O’Neill, et al., 2008).  
Tom Regan thus argues from a deontological perspective or a rights view that moral 
considerability should be accorded to “all beings that are ‘subject-of-a life’, that is, those beings 
with beliefs, desires, perception, memory, emotions, a sense of future and the ability to initiate 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
27 
 
action, and psychological identity overtime” (see Regan, 1983/2004, Ch. 7). Regan gives a more 
expansive account of personhood in indicating that what makes a being a person is that they are 
“experiencing subjects of a life, that is, they are conscious creatures that have individual welfare 
that is important to them regardless of their usefulness to others” (Engel, 2008). Alternatively, 
unlike Singer, Regan argues that there are moral limits to what we can do to an experiencing 
subject of a life. The implication of this is that a consistent application of the categorical Kantian 
imperative requires that people respect all experiencing subjects of a life, whether they are 
human or nonhuman, as inherently valuable, and never treat them as mere means. Thus, Regan’s 
theory is superior to Singer’s in that his approach imposes moral limits on the treatment of 
entities regardless of the overall consequences, while Singer’s theory may allow for the sacrifice 
of the interests of some individuals for the greater interests-satisfaction of others (Cochrane, 
2008).  
However, an ethics based on sentience has been accused of being too biased to animals, 
completely leaving out the plant kingdom. They are also charged of being overly individualistic 
when it comes to practical policy issues of protecting or preserving species and 
wilderness/habitats and ecosystems. There are instances where certain animals become so 
numerous that they become a threat to the integrity of the ecosystems, in which case, prudence 
dictates to kill some of these animals. Sentientism will not allow this because all sentient beings 
have equal moral worth. Some scholars have even questioned whether sentientism/animal ethics 
is an environmental ethics at all because of its narrow focus on animals (Callicott, 1980; Sagoff, 
1984). Furthermore, others scholars, like VanDeVeer & Pierce (2003) have  noted that the 
implications of animal ethics may interfere with natural processes; for example, the prey-
predator relationship, because strict application of the principle implies that we ought to save a 
deer, for instance, from being preyed upon by  a lion or a mouse from being eaten by a cat.  
Now, the very fact that environmental ethics began from a pre-occupation with granting moral 
status to animals is one of the indications of its western cultural bias. Concern for the rights of 
animals presupposes some higher level of altruistic thinking where most people no longer worry 
about basic survival needs. Further, sentientism, particularly animal ethics, implies that killing 
animals for human consumption is unethical. Looked at from an African perspective if put into 
practice, animals ethics thus construed would deny most poor Africans their major source of 
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protein or food, unlike their western counterparts most of whom may have the luxury of options. 
Africans use both domestic and wild animals for food. Therefore, this type of ethic would be 
unlikely to find support among Africans, in particular peasants who are directly dependent on 
nature for their survival and wellbeing. Furthermore, the talk of animal rights or animal 
liberation is something that may be difficult to understand among most Africans who in most 
cases see animals (wild animals particularly) as a threat to their lives and wellbeing (Songorwa, 
1999; Mhlanga, 2001; Sifuna, 2010). I understand that other societies, even in the west, have the 
same problem with dangerous wild animals threatening people’s security and property (viz. 
wolves and bears), but the difference regarding Africa is that western societies have more 
financial and technological capacity to deal with these problem animals than their African 
counterparts. In fact, in some African societies, as is evident later in the case study, many people 
believe that it is they who need to be liberated from the threat of wild animals rather than the 
animals being protected from humans. Indeed, in many parts of Africa, wild animals do still have 
the power to wreak havoc on people’s lives and property because many people in Africa live 
close to wildlife areas with very rudimentary self defense tools.
8
 
2.3.2 Biocentricism as a criterion of non-anthropocentric ethics 
Another attempt to articulate a non-anthropocentric ethic was to extend moral status beyond 
animals to all living organisms. This is called bio-centric ethics. One of the very first scholars 
who attempted to do this was Albert Schweitzer. Schweitzer (1923) sought to extend Kantian 
ethics to all living organisms. This is also referred to as an ethic of reverence-for-life. Dwelling 
on the post-Kantian metaphysics of Arthur Schopenhauer, Schweitzer (1923) argued that all 
living things have a ‘will to live’ and that this ‘will to live’ should not be extinguished. 
Schweitzer is known for his famous phrase: “I am life that desires to live as part and parcel of 
life which desires to live” (Schweitzer, 1956, as quoted in Msafiri, 2007:73). According to 
Schweitzer, close examination of animals and how they strive to protect their young ones and 
themselves, gives one that deep feeling or insight that animals, just like human persons, also 
have a will to live. For Schweitzer, this led to the conclusion that all life, not just human life, 
                                                          
8
 It is usually assumed that human technological capacity has shifted the power from being powerless before 
dangerous wild animals, such as elephants and lions, to having the capacity to protect ourselves from these 
animals and even manipulate them as we like. But this is only true for some highly developed countries. Most 
other countries, especially in the developing world, have very little capacity to deal with problem wild animals, as 
the case study of the Chagga testifies (Lotter, 2008). 
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should be respected. In other words, Schweitzer argues that all life should be respected and 
revered because everything that has life strives to survive. It has been observed, however, that, 
while living organisms strive to survive, it is another question whether they ‘will’ to live, 
because ‘to will’ something presupposes some form of consciousness, which is absent in most 
living things (Cochrane, 2008).  
Another scholar who advocated a bio-centric ethics is Paul Taylor. Arguing from a Kantian 
deontological perspective, Taylor developed an egalitarian bio-centric ethics or a life-centred 
environmental ethics in the attempt to synthesise Singer and Schweitzer’s positions. Taylor 
(1986) avers that all livings things are “teleological centres of life’, that is, they have a good of 
their own that they strive to fulfil. All living things have an interest in their own survival and 
wellbeing whether they are aware of it or not. They all strive to flourish. Thus, according to 
Taylor, if all living things have a good of their own, they possess inherent worth (i.e. worth 
regardless of whether humans value them in any way or not), and thus deserve equal moral 
consideration. Taylor’s theory, it has been observed, thus commits us to species impartiality. 
Taylor renders the Kantian rational autonomy and the natural autonomy of all living things 
analogous by pointing out that, just as we respect the rational autonomy of persons, we should 
also respect the natural autonomy of all living entities (Elliot, 2003:186).  
As Taylor anticipates possible conflict in the application of his strong egalitarian moral theory in 
real life situations, he develops rules and principles to be adjudicated in situations of conflict of 
interests between humans and nonhuman entities. These principles call upon us to consider basic 
and non-basic needs of human and non-human entities where the basic interests of whichever 
entity should be given priority, all things being equal; except in matters of human self-defence.  
However, Taylor’s principles are said to be contradictory and they fail in certain situations in real 
life. For example, it has been observed that “in situations in real life where some non-basic 
human interests outweigh some basic non-human interests, Taylor’s principles break down” 
(French, 1995:57). For example, there are certain things that have become a part and parcel of 
human culture without which people cannot live their normal lives, yet in Taylor’s view, they 
could be considered non-basic. These include electricity, roads, furniture, vehicles, etc. All these 
amenities cause substantial damage to living things in the process of acquiring them. Further, 
what may be considered a basic human interest to a western community may be considered to be 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
 
a non-basic interest or a luxury to an African community. To address this problem, as I argue 
later in this chapter, a bottom up, case by case approach that is sensitive to the particularities of a 
place may be more appropriate. 
In addition many view Taylor’s and other bio-centric theories as deficient because they seem to 
place excessive burdens and self-sacrifice on human beings, so much so that humans could not 
live their lives if these theories were actually put into practice. Taylor’s position has indeed been 
characterised as “misanthropic”. Nevertheless, in the attempt to avoid this problem, Taylor 
introduced a principle of self-defence “to allow that human interests can over-ride the interests of 
other living things where significant human goods are at stake” (Taylor, 1986:70).9 However, 
some people question whether privileging human beings over other non-humans in certain 
situations is not tantamount to going back to the anthropocentrism that biocentrism seeks to 
avoid.   
Furthermore, the problem I see with these principles is that these principles become less useful, 
for example, in areas where there is so much poverty and people depend entirely on the natural 
environment for their survival and livelihood needs, as in most parts of Africa. This is because, 
with so much poverty in the context of Africa, the survival needs of many people might in many 
instances outweigh the interests of other living things, regardless of how significant those 
interests may be. In other words, these principles do not make much sense among the majority of 
the people in Africa who do not have the luxury of options. Taylor's biocentric ethics 
presupposes a society that has proceeded beyond the stage of preoccupation with basic survival 
needs, and one that has the luxury of options, which is not the case in most African countries. 
Taylor’s theory and his principles therefore are not of much use in the African context where 
poverty, which is a daily reality, pushes people to do whatever they can do to survive.   
Taylor’s approach has been criticised, in general, for privileging individuals over ecological 
wholes. It has been argued that this arises from “the piecemeal extensions of the dominant 
[conventional] individualistic approaches to ethics” (Engel, 2008). These conventional ethical 
theories were not meant to be stretched beyond the realm of humans in the first place. To address 
                                                          
9
 Other priority principles to resolve conflicting interests between humans and nonhumans fairly, according to 
Taylor, include the principle of proportionality, the principle of minimum wrong, the principle of distributive justice 
and the principle of restitutive justice. For a more detailed account of these principles, see, Taylor, 1986: 68-78.   
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this problem and other weaknesses of biocentrism or life centred ethics, an ethic that considers 
species, ecosystems and life support systems or holistic ethics was formulated. This approach is 
also termed eco-centric ethics or environmental holism. The extent to which eco-centric ethics 
thus succeeds or not as an effective environmental ethics will be discussed below. 
2.3.3 Eco-centric ethics 
Eco-centric ethics may be understood as the “view that the biosphere as an interconnected whole 
has moral standing” (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 2003:178). As such, eco-centric ethics extends moral 
status to collective entities or ecosystems such as species and wilderness areas rather than to 
individual entities. Eco-centric ethics thus advocates some form of ethical holism (O’Neill, et al., 
2008). Proponents of this school of thought notably include Aldo Leopold, Holmes Rolston III, 
and J. Baird Callicott. Aldo Leopold, who is considered the pioneer of eco-centric ethics, 
summarises his ethics in the following famous and oft-quoted phrase:  
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and the beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (Leopold, 1949:224)   
The notion of community is central to Leopold’s ethic and he defines it as including “the soils, 
waters, plants and animals or collectively: the land” (Leopold, 1949:203).  His Land Ethic was 
largely taken up and elaborated on by Callicott; particularly in one of his famous works The 
Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic emphasising the holistic and non-anthropocentric 
nature of Leopold’s Land Ethic. Callicott sees the land ethic as new and radical compared to 
conventional ethical theories because “[t]he standard model of ethical theory provides no 
possibility whatever for the moral consideration of the wholes – of threatened populations of 
animals and plants, or of biotic communities, or most expansively, of the biosphere in its 
totality” (Callicott, 1987:197). 
Holmes Rolston also defends some form of ethical holism. For Rolston (1989) collective entities 
are themselves direct objects of moral or ethical consideration, so Rolston advocates for an ethic 
“that cares for the species above the individual and for the ecosystem above the species, noting 
that the species is a bigger event than the individual, and the ecosystem is a bigger event than the 
species” (O’Neill, et al., 2008: 105). Rolston does not mean that the individual is not significant, 
but his logic is that to preserve the species is to preserve the individual and to preserve the 
ecosystem is to preserve the species within the ecosystem. So the whole is more important than 
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the individual or the parts that comprise the system. Thus, Rolston and some other advocates of 




O’Neill, et al. (2008) contend, for example, that the move to extend moral status to ‘wholes’ or 
ecosystems, provides reasonable ground for addressing conflicting interests within 
environmental policy. For example, eco-centric ethics is seen as being superior to individualistic 
approaches because it gives room for the preservation of some rare species even at the cost of the 
destruction of individual entities. That is, if the whole is given moral priority over individual 
entities, then it may be justified to cull/kill some animals such as rabbits that may be a threat to 
the health of an ecosystem, whereas the advocates of individualistic approaches such as 
biocentrism and animal ethics claim that it would be morally wrong to sacrifice the interest of 
individuals in favour of the interests of ecosystems or species. Therefore, even if an ecosystem is 
in danger of being destroyed because of overpopulation of, say, elephants, one would not be 
justified in culling some elephants to rescue the collapse of the entire ecosystem because 
individual elephants are morally considerable. That is why eco-centric ethics, granting moral 
status to wholes such as species, ecosystems, populations and land over individual 
organisms/entities is seen to be more meaningful when it comes to practical issues in 
conservation policy than individualistic approaches (see O’Neill, et al., 2008:100-102). 
However, Regan (1983) cautioned that environmental holism or eco-centric ethics taken to its 
logical conclusion may lead to ‘environmental fascism’.  Or, as O’Neill, et al., (2008: 105) put it, 
“[holism] appears to justify human diebacks for the sake of the “summum bonum” – the highest 
good of the biotic community”. This implies that, if the human population, for example, seems to 
endanger the health of the Planet then, according to eco-centric ethics, it may be justified to kill 
or just allow some human beings to die for the sake of the health and integrity of the planet 
Earth.  Rolston himself said explicitly that in a situation where there is a choice between feeding 
the hungry or saving nature, priority should be given to saving nature. Rolston avers that 
“feeding people may be feeding a kind of cancer” (Rolston, 1996:256).11Andrew Brennan 
                                                          
10
 This is what Rolston (1996) seems to imply in his infamous article, “Feeding People versus Saving Nature?”  
11
 Here, of course, Rolston is trying to show the importance of arresting the rate of population growth especially in 
Third World countries to save the little remaining natural resources although the cancer metaphor is clearly very 
harsh, especially when used in reference to poor people. He is also actually accusing the rich nations for their 
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blames Rolston though, for failing to recognise that environmental destruction is driven by forces 
other than poverty, notably by “the politics of international relations, corporations, agencies, 
economic systems which simultaneously drive human impoverishment, disease and 
environmental destruction” (Brennan, 1998:324). Robin Attfield, for his part, says that the 
problem is not about whether to feed people or save nature, but rather about instituting policies 
that “encourage people to both save nature and feed themselves” (Attfield, 1998:299). Rolston’s 
position has also been blamed for being misanthropic, for example when he accuses uncontrolled 
population growth in developing countries as something that should be discouraged by doing 
away with all aid to the poor, which acts as incentive to unbridled breeding. For Rolston, the 
poor will always be with us and thus doing things that encourage their continued reproduction is 
like feeding a cancer.  
Further misanthropic implications that may result from eco-centric ethics include, for example, 
justifying letting HIV decimate the population of the poor countries even if the world today has 
the capacity to find a cure and manufacturing or creating deadly viruses such as Ebola or Zika to 
help reduce the population of poor countries. Even the apparent lack of serious efforts by 
developed countries to help to eradicate world hunger and poverty raises eyebrows as to whether 
this is not a plot to reduce the population of developing countries because their rate of growth is 
a threat to the integrity of the global environment and hence the current lavish lifestyle enjoyed 
by people in the West.
12
 
Those reservations notwithstanding, this type of holistic environmental ethics might be difficult 
to implement or find support in Africa. This is because, first of all, it was conceptualised from 
within a general intellectual framework of 'hands off nature' (i.e. the framework of the intrinsic 
value of nature.  Secondly, because, if such a holistic ethics were to be implemented without 
refinement, it would be the people in Africa who would suffer the most (from being excluded 
from the very resources they depend upon for their livelihoods). In fact, environmental policies 
informed by this type of environmental ethics would have a devastating impact on those 
dependent on their immediate natural environment for earning a living, therefore it would likely 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hypocrisy where they actually put a lot of resources in things that are of less significance compared to giving 
priority to those things that can protect the environment.  
12
 I understand that many ills in developing countries cannot always be attributed to developed countries. Many of 
the problems of developing countries, African in particular, are also caused by internal structural and governance 
problems such as corruption, mismanagement of resources by the political elite and their allied business people.  
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be vigorously resisted in Africa. Studies abound that provide us with a myriad examples of 
peasants in Africa and elsewhere protesting environmental policies (e.g., total conservation 
policies) that tend to deprive or divorce them from their sources of livelihood, which usually 
derive from their immediate environments and natural resources such as forests, animals, land, 
etc. (see, for example, Sifuna, 2010; Macura, Zorondo-Rodrigues, Grau-Satorras, Demps, Laval, 
Garcia, & Reyes-Garcia, 2011; Vedeld, Jumane, Wapalila & Songorwa, 2012).
13
 
To conclude this section, I have to reiterate that all of the different non-anthropocentric 
approaches discussed above ascribe intrinsic value to the environment, albeit for different 
reasons. Some argue that sentientism (the capacity to experience pain or pleasure) provides 
enough justification for granting moral status, others argue that just being alive provides an 
adequate justification, whereas others argue for extending moral considerability to ecosystems 
and species or wholes rather than to individual entities. The question, however, is: to what extent 
can these approaches be depended upon to resolve practical environmental problems in Africa? 
Alternatively, could these approaches provide practical guidance on how to resolve 
environmental management conflicts that are prevalent in many African countries today?  
What seems apparent, even among western societies, is that the arguments for the intrinsic value 
of nature or non-anthropocentrism are not winning over the common people even in the west 
(Light, 2002; O’Neill, et al., 2008). Thus, if the non-anthropocentric arguments for nature 
protection in their western cultural mantle are not winning the conviction of people even in the 
west, they are not likely to win the conviction of people in Africa either. This means that we 
cannot appeal to them to effectively resolve practical environmental challenges in Africa. 
2.4   A general summary of the weaknesses of mainstream                                          
        environmental ethics 
In this section, I discuss, in general terms, the major weaknesses or problems of mainstream 
environmental ethics showing further why these problems make it less suitable to non-western 
                                                          
13
 Such policies could probably also be resisted by the rich as they also benefit from exploiting nature via business, 
illegal use/smuggling of natural resources, etc. It is not only that the lifestyles of the rich are often much more 
environmentally consuming than those of the poor, but the poor are the ones to experience the first impact of 
environmental problems and environmental policies (see, Hattingh, 2011); but the rich as well as the middle 
classes similarly often resist some policies – say the ban on use of private cars, for example; or saving energy by 
turning off all the air conditioners. 
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concerns. I discuss in some more detail here the problems of western “embeddedness”, 
abstractness, and the problems of deductionism and foundationalism.   
2.4.1 The problem of western “embeddedness” 
I indicated earlier that mainstream environmental ethics has been blamed for being biased 
towards western perspectives and cultural influences. This bias has made earlier articulations of 
environmental ethics more suited to a western context. In other words, I argue that environmental 
ethics has been formulated in such a manner that it cannot adequately address the environmental 
problems experienced by people living in Africa. This is because the cultural circumstances 
within which environmental ethics emerged in the west was mainly influenced by post-industrial 
and post-materialist values that put more emphasis on higher quality of life issues, such as 
protecting the environment for its aesthetic and recreational values, and also for its spiritual 
values or inspiration, as well as for posterity, or simply for its own sake. Kelbessa (2014: 55) 
observes: 
[It] is important to recognize that environmental ethics, as conceived in the ‘developed’ world, is 
often not relevant to peasant farmers and pastoralists in developing countries because they do not 
face the ethical problems discussed in more affluent nations, where people and government have 
more choices.  
Western environmental ethics has been more pre-occupied with things like preservation of 
wilderness, species extinction and animal rights for a long time. These altruistic concerns about 
nature are said to have developed among the western societies because of increasing affluence 
which made people less worried about basic survival needs. The industrial revolution and its 
effects on the countryside also played a significant part. Thus the major concerns of 
environmental ethics seem to have been those that resonate more with the needs of the affluent. 
As Andrew Brennan observes, “[t]he majority of early writers [on environmental ethics] were 
concerned mainly with the diminishing number of wild places of the planet, and environmental 
ethics was conceived largely as a celebration of wilderness and the enumeration of reasons for its 
preservation” (Brennan, 1998:307). This tendency has largely defined the field even to the 
present, with the result that non-western environmental concerns have been sidelined. Conceived 
thus, we should not be surprised to hear people such as Amin (2010:18) say that environmental 
ethics and related calls for nature protection is a new imperialist plot by the West to try and 
“limit access to the planet's resources for their own exclusive benefit”. It is important, then, that 
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environmental ethics rid itself of this suspicion so that it can find support among those in a non-
western context such as Africa and elsewhere by addressing their practical environmental 
concerns, including their livelihood needs, more directly.  
As indicated earlier, mainstream environmental ethics has also been more dominated by 
theoretical debates about what the basis for the justification of nature protection should be; 
debates that have had little impact on and relevance for common people (Light, 2002). Western 
environmental ethics approaches seem to have been efforts towards putting nature first at the 
expense of humans, or to protect nature from human interference. Holmes Rolston says explicitly 
that we may need to sacrifice human interests for the sake of the little remaining natural places 
(Rolston, 1998). He, in other words, proposes an ethics of non-intervention in wild nature, but as 
Brennan (1998: 306) writes: 
[This ethic which implies that] the poor should be kept out of areas of natural variety and 
richness, draws support from an implicit Puritanism which can underwrite an elitist approach to 
the conservation of biodiversity. The combination of ignoring the structures of power while 
remaining enmeshed in Puritan values is particularly dangerous.  
I have already noted how policies that result from this type of ethic of the environment could 
impact negatively on the lives of poor people; for instance by being forcefully displaced from 
their natural homes to make room for National Parks that do not even benefit them (the poor) 
significantly. Thus construed, much in western mainstream environmental ethics approaches has 
been of less relevance to non-western contexts, particularly to the people in Africa. Albeit 
genuine and important, most of the environmental concerns of western societies, as mentioned 
above, are not a priority in most African societies. The priority of most African people, 
especially south of the Sahara, the majority of whom live in abject poverty, is to fulfil their basic 
existential or survival needs, first and foremost through exploiting their immediate natural 
environments. The preoccupation of most of these Africans is with how to find the next day’s 
meal and not with the protection of the environment as such. In other words, preservation of the 
environment for aesthetic and/or recreational purposes, for its own sake or for posterity, which is 




                                                          
14
 By making that claim I do not mean, in any way, that African experiences are homogeneous, but that there are 
trends in Africa, especially south of the Sahara that may allow a rough generalization. 
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This means that environmental ethicists may need to find reasons to justify environmental 
preservation that are also more accommodating of the experiences of people living in non-
western contexts like Africa.  That is why I, building on the main tenets of environmental 
pragmatism in this dissertation, examine the contexts and lived experiences of local people 
through a case study of the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, in order to 
articulate an approach to environmental ethics that reflects the local people’s current concerns 
and perspectives, and hence an approach that is more persuasive and relevant in addressing their 
environmental concerns.    
2.4.2 The problem of abstractness, lack of practical relevance and persuasiveness 
Many scholars today propose that environmental ethics should leave the university walls and 
become practical by shaking off its abstract mantle so as to make itself more relevant to the 
common people, and also be able to influence public policy (Norton, 1984; Light, 2002; 
Kelbessa, 2003; Brown, 2004). Mainstream environmental ethics has been seen as an exchange 
mainly between environmental ethicists at the academic level; it has to a large extent remained 
some kind of theoretical hobby to a small group of academics. Because it remains abstract and 
purely academic, mainstream environmental ethics is accused of even failing to appeal to her 
most important ally, the world of natural-resource management. This is partly due to an 
overemphasis on the abstract metaphysical intrinsic value of nature (Light, 2002). In natural 
resource management circles, decision makers are more concerned with the anthropocentric user 
value of nature than its intrinsic value; planning and policy issues accordingly are made around 
that understanding. The argument here is that, if the appeal to anthropocentric values of nature 
can lead to its protection, then let it be. At the end of the day the aim of all environmentalists is 
to protect nature regardless of the path one chooses, provided such a path is within the acceptable 
legal and moral norms of the community in question (see also, Hattingh, 1999). 
Light (2002:436) writes that the mainstream western environmental ethical theories “appear to be 
more concerned with overcoming human interests than redirecting them toward environmental 
concern”. He further avers that environmental ethics as described above has not “lived up to its 
promise as a field of philosophy attempting to help resolve environmental problems. It is instead 
evolving mostly as a field of intramural philosophical debate” (ibid.). Thus Light (ibid.) argues 
that environmental ethics should address itself more to practical resolution of environmental 
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issues, rather than their philosophical resolution. In the same vein, environmental pragmatist 
Bryan Norton also argues that environmental ethics should move from being an applied 
philosophy to being a practical philosophy. According to Norton (2003: 50): 
[practical philosophy] is more problem-oriented ... It works towards theoretical principles by 
struggling with real cases, appealing to less sweeping rules of thumb that can be argued to be 
appropriate in particular contexts, rather than establishing a universal theory and “applying it” to 
real cases. Practice is prior to theory in the sense that principles are ultimately generated from 
practice, not vice versa. 
Most of the environmental problems experienced in Africa need a more practical approach 
indeed. For example, practical issues of access and use of natural resources are among real 
environmental problems that require specific bottom-up techniques to address them. These 
problems are the major sources of environmental degradation and conflict in Africa that current 
environmental ethics might have a role on addressing (Adams & McShane, 1996; Songorwa, 
1999; Mariki, 2013). As most Africans need the natural environment for their survival and daily 
livelihood needs, a priori ethical theories or principles may, in most cases, lead to policies that 
have implications for limiting access of people to the natural environment leading further to 
conflicts, hence making these policies difficult to implement. 
In fact, the major task of environmental ethics should ultimately be one of persuasion (see, for 
example, Birch & Cobb, 1990; Soper, 2005; Prozesky, 2009). This is more of a practical task 
that needs to begin with the community. So, because of the pressing nature of environmental 
problems like those experienced on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, finding ways to motivate 
people to act may be more important than remaining locked in protracted a priori arguments to 
establish the intrinsic value of nature. That is why scholars today call for a literature on 
environmental ethics that is more practical, relevant to public policy and able to motivate people 
to act (see, for example, Minteer & Manning, 1999; Cafaro, 2001; Light, 2002; Brown, 2004; 
Cafaro, 2011; Minteer, 2011; Kelbessa, 2014). Accordingly, as I show later in this dissertation, 
this objective (of finding ways to motivate people to act) could be achieved better through a 
concrete case study based on a pragmatic environmental approach.   
2.4.3 The problem of deduction and foundationalism 
Another major basic problem of the mainstream environmental ethics approaches discussed 
above is that they are deductive and foundational in nature because they are based on the wrong 
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assumption, namely that “rational ethical reflection should be modelled on the ideal of a 
scientific or logical theory with ethical imperatives and basic theoretical postulates from which 
specific moral injunctions can be derived” (O’Neil et al., 2008:108). It has been argued that this 
deductive approach “loses sight of what moves environmental concern”, and that “it distorts and 
impoverishes our moral language and everyday responses to the world” (O’Neill, et al., 
2008:108). This means that this approach restricts and narrows the scope of the rich vocabulary 
we use daily in our moral valuations. The point being made here is that people, in real life, do 
have many different reasons and motivations for valuing the environment that cannot be captured 
in one deductive value theory, i.e., a non-anthropocentric value theory. 
The thin descriptions employed by the mainstream environmental ethical theories thus fail to 
accommodate the multiple ethical responses that we may owe to different beings at different 
times and in different contexts, and this, in turn, leads to the “thinning and flattening of the moral 
landscape”. O’ Neill, et al., (2008), further note:  
... a defensible approach to environmental ethics has to start from a human scale of values and 
from the rich normative vocabulary that has been bequeathed to us through our human 
engagements with the various environments we inhabit … and not from some generalized and 
underspecified concept of ‘moral concern’.  
This means that we need to appreciate the complexity and plurality of relations within particular 
contexts instead of narrowing and hence impoverishing the multiple and different ways and 
reasons people may have for valuing nature. This is to say, to be able to capture the experiences 
of people living in a non-western context, environmental ethics should recognise the fact that 
humans will have different reasons and motivations to protect nature because of the different 
meanings and importance a particular environment may have for them at a particular time and 
place; and this is where ethical reflection should begin (O’Neill et al., 2008:123-124). Nothing is 
better suited to do this, I argue, than an environmental pragmatic methodology, especially the 
adaptive management approach that Norton endorses. Environmental pragmatism and adaptive 
management emphasises lived experiences as the point of departure for resolving environmental 
problems. It is this very conviction that motivated me to conduct a case study of the people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro to be able to capture the diversity of values and experiences 
in Africa regarding the environment. 
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The following therefore is a brief discussion of environmental pragmatism and its operational 
tool, that is, adaptive management, as proposed by Bryan Norton.  
2.5 Environmental pragmatism 
Environmental pragmatism is one among different alternative approaches that have been 
proposed to correct the earlier mainstream approaches to environmental ethics that were found 
wanting. The other approaches include social ecology and eco-feminism. Social ecology and 
eco-feminism resonate well with the African context, especially because of their emphasis on 
giving a voice to those that are marginalised and oppressed.
15
 Their emphasis on rooting out all 
forms of domination, subordination and social exclusion as a true remedy of our environmental 
problems in the world is of particular appeal to the people of Africa. However, social ecology 
and eco-feminism as alternative approaches to environmental ethics lack a clear and concrete 
methodology for their implementation. I argue that environmental pragmatism and adaptive 
management approach, not only provide us with a methodology to concretise the ideas advanced 
by some social ecologists and eco-feminists, but also incorporate those ideas in their approaches. 
Thus construed, environmental pragmatism is superior to eco-feminism and social ecology. 
2.5.1 A brief overview of philosophical pragmatism 
Environmental pragmatism derives from the philosophy of pragmatism which emphasises the 
practical function of philosophy. To pragmatists, the usefulness of a particular philosophy is 
determined by the extent to which it succeeds in resolving real life problems, or else the 
“problems of men” as followers of Dewey would put it. Pragmatism may be said to have its 
foundations in the works of Charles S. Pierce, William James, John Dewey, George Herbert 
Mead, and Alfred North Whitehead. These philosophers, who may also be called “process” and 
“relational” thinkers, set the stage for the development of pragmatism as a philosophy of action. 
Process thinking, an important implication of philosophical pragmatism, lies well within 
contemporary theories such as field theory, relativity physics, quantum mechanics and 
                                                          
15
 For detailed works on eco-feminism, see, for example, Val Plumwood’s article, “Nature, Self and Gender …” 
appearing in various journals; Karen Warrens’ “The Power of Ecological Feminism” (1990); Ariel Kay Salleh’s work, 
“Deeper than Deep Ecology… (1984); and Vandana Shiva’s “Development as a New Project of Western Patriachy…” 
(1990). Murray Bookchin, on the other hand, is an authority in social ecology. Some of his works on this subject 
matter include, The Ecology of Freedom, published in 1982; and an article “What is Social Ecology?” that appears in 
various journals including the Journal of Environmental Ethics. See references for bibliographic details of these 
works. 
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Darwinism. As such, process thinking calls us “to think in terms of events rather than in terms of 
substances or objects”, that is, reality should be conceived as a continuum rather than discrete 
(Birch & Cobb, 1990:86). Pragmatism accordingly sees reality as a continuum, a process 
dynamically and continuously unfolding as opposed to a conception of reality as static, discrete 
and objective (Parker, 1996). Pragmatism acknowledges the constructed nature of reality and 
morality. Further, Pragmatists sees reality as a complex process of interacting and interconnected 
events that affect each other as opposed to the modernist atomistic conception of reality as 
objective, self-contained, self-sufficient and static (Birch & Cobb, 1990).  
This understanding of reality centres on the pragmatists' conception of truth. Generally speaking, 
pragmatism is built on an epistemology that sees truth as an emergent probability, in that truth is 
not absolute, it is not there to be discovered, but rather emerges in the process of inquiry. People 
co-create truth and meaning in the process of open inquiry. This is emphasised by William James 
in his essays on pragmatism when he writes: “Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made 
true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, 
its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of valid-ation” (James, 1997:114). So truth happens, 
truth is made, it is not discovered. Pragmatists emphasise that truth is that which works in a 
particular context at a particular time; and also that which prevails in the long run (Parker, 1996, 
Norton, 2005). For pragmatists, there is no such a thing as absolute truth; we can never attain 
absolute truth. Pragmatists rather believe that we can always have the best explanation for 
something which is always open to refinement or revision as better explanations and data 
become available. Reality is in constant flux and hence is continuously changing. New realities 
with new problems continuously come into being and this requires that we continuously revisit 
or revise our theories to match new realities. Truth is dynamic and thus tentative.  
 
So, for pragmatists, truth is tentative and context dependent. Truth or knowledge is an open-
ended process of inquiry which is iterative, and self-correcting. That is, truth never is a static 
phenomenon. That is why pragmatists define truth as that which prevails in the long run yet is 
open to revision as new sets of contrary evidence become available. That is to say that what is 
true today and in a particular context may turn out to be false tomorrow upon the rigorous test of 
accumulated experience. Parker (1996:22) puts it thus: “Experience can however at any time 
expose our settled beliefs as false, or reveal an unsatisfactory vagueness or confusion in our 
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concepts. Knowing is therefore an open-ended quest for certainty in our 
understanding.”Pragmatism thus entails a forward-looking philosophy. As such, pragmatists’ 
understanding of truth complements the search for the definition of sustainability, which is an 
important concept in modern environmentalism. Bryan Norton professes that he knows no better 
justification for environmental ethics than that found in the principle of sustainability. He thus 
writes: “In our search for an environmental ethic we will never, I submit, find any environmental 
values or goals more defensible than the sustainability principle” (Norton, 2003:63).Norton 
clarifies his definition of his sustainability principle asserting: 
… policies should be devised to protect as much of nature as possible for the use and enjoyment 
of humans for as long into the future as possible regardless of whether those values are counted 
on one ethical framework or the other.  
 
Pragmatists are also committed to pluralism. By pluralism is meant that there are multiple ways 
of interpreting and knowing the world depending on the dictates of context and experience. It is 
the recognition that our world consists of a multitude of values and different ways of making 
sense of those values. Here pluralists are quick to clarify that pluralism does not entail an 
“anything goes” type of an approach. Light (2002), for example, argues that commitment to 
pluralism does not mean jumping from one theory to another according to the problem at hand or 
the context, it rather is all about appealing to the multiple ways or the multiplicity of perspectives 
in the process of finding a solution to a problem (Light, 2003). Alternatively, it means that 
pluralism goes further than simply saying that different situations call for different interpretations 
but rather maintaining that one and the same problematic situation could be viewed in many 
different ways (also see Brennan, 1992). Alternatively, pluralism stands for the conviction that 
“diverse perspectives grasp the richness of reality in different ways, but must be judged in terms 
of workability” (Parker, 1996:40). This is not relativism either, but rather knowledge and truth 
contextually co-constructed with others.  
 
Pragmatism also emphasises the relational nature of beings or the radical interconnectedness of 
human beings with their environment. It sees entities as being constituted and affected by the 
environments surrounding them. Human beings and their environments affect each other. They 
are inter-relationally connected at all points to each other. Organisms and the world surrounding 
them evolve together and they are integrally connected. Dewey, (1997: 210), for example writes: 
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... the doctrine of organic development means that the living creature is a part of the world, 
sharing its vicissitudes and fortunes, making itself secure in its precarious dependence only as it 
intellectually identifies itself with the things about it, and, forecasting the future consequences of 
what is going on, shapes its own activities accordingly. If the living, experiencing being is an 
intimate participant in the activities of the world to which it belongs, then knowledge is a mode of 
participation, valuable in the degree in which it is effective. It cannot be the idle view of an 
unconcerned spectator.  
 
With this pragmatist understanding of reality and truth as contextual, processual, relational, 
dynamic, transactional, and emergent, flows the pragmatic understanding of ethics and values. 
Pragmatism holds that all value emerges in experience. That is to say, the individual organism’s 
interaction with the environment is the birthplace of value. Thus “the good” is what is 
experienced as good when the organism interacts with the world (Parker, 1996: 25).In pragmatic 
ethics, the rightness or wrongness of an action accordingly is system-dependent, so nothing is 
good or bad in and of itself without reference to its relationships.  
Pragmatic ethics criticises the objective, atomistic conception of intrinsic value, that is, value of 
an entity solely in and of itself without reference to the multiple relationships in which it stands 
to other entities. According to Niebuhr, “value exists only in the context of relationships between 
beings and has no existence apart from relationships. Value is the good-for-ness of beings for 
others in reciprocity, animosity, and mutual aid” (Scoville, 1995:107). Antony Weston makes the 
same point when he asserts that “values must be viewed in their contexts and relations with 
others rather than in isolation” (Weston, 1992:330).  
Pragmatic ethics furthermore rejects a foundationalist understanding of value in that “no set of 
theories of value, no list of virtues, no list of right and duties, no table of laws, no account of the 
good should be expected to serve in every possible situation that we confront” (Parker, 1996:26). 
This is because the world and humans in-the-world are constantly co-evolving and new complex 
realities accordingly come into being continuously along with new moral situations that call for 
the need to develop new ways to comprehend what is right in particular contexts. As such, 
pragmatism has far-reaching implications for environmental ethics, a subject to which I now 
turn. 
2.5.2 The relevance of philosophical pragmatism to environmental ethics 
Environmental pragmatism, as already hinted, “... is a philosophy of action that begins with real-
world problems, not abstract theory-dependent questions regarding what kind of value nature 
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has” (Norton, 2005:10). Environmental pragmatism aims to dissolve the unnecessary dichotomy 
and tension between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism which, according to Norton 
(1992:219) “makes most environmentalists to remain broadly Cartesian in their worldview”. 
Cartesian dualistic thinking is the realist meta-ethical notion of value which is advocated by 
some non-anthropocentrists who seek to attribute objective intrinsic value to non-human entities 
independent of any other relationships these entities may have with the rest of nature, including 
human beings (O’Neill, 2001).  
 
Pragmatists also attempt to solve the problem of whether values should be attributed to 
individuals or the whole system, or to species. According to Parker (1996:46), 
In pragmatism sometimes the system is more important sometimes the individual depending on 
context in which meaningful moral situations emerge and the conflicting claims at stake. Neither 
the individual nor the whole systems are bearers of value but rather value emerges in the 
interactions of individuals. …the value of an individual cannot be understood in isolation from 
the relationships which constitute their ongoing development. 
Individuals accordingly cannot be defined outside their relationship with the rest of the 
environment surrounding them. To exist is to be in relationship. And these relationships among 
organisms and the environment should be understood within the different contexts in which they 
are embedded.  
Acknowledging the idea that different contexts call for different ways of interpreting them 
requires us to embrace the idea of moral pluralism. Environmental pragmatists reject the notion 
of moral monism, that is, the search for a grand ethical theory that can apply to all contexts and 
situations and at all times, to address the global environmental crisis; they adopt a pluralist stance 
towards value. Pragmatists maintain that nature has multiple values that cannot all be captured in 
one theory of environmental ethics (Light & Katz, 1996). 
According to Norton (2005b), we acknowledge that nature has multiple values by committing to 
moral pluralism, and also that humans value nature in multiple ways. That is, nature comprises a 
continuum of values that ranges from use or instrumental values to non-use values such as 
aesthetic and spiritual values. Thus construed, our main question in environmental ethics changes 
from what type of value nature has to how we can protect “as many of the values of nature as 
possible, for the enjoyment of humans for as long into the future as possible regardless of 
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whether those values preserved are counted in one theoretical framework or another” (Norton, 
2005b:364). Here, we see the principle of sustainability indirectly invoked, just to show how the 
concept of sustainability is integral in environmental pragmatism.  But again, according to 
Norton (2005b), the many values nature has can only be captured in particular contexts as they 
emerge in the course of democratic, open ended and iterative processes of inquiry. 
 
Now, to make environmental ethics more practical in the sense of being able to provide practical 
guidance to resolve environmental problems when called upon, Bryan Norton proposes a 
pragmatic, adaptive management approach. I briefly outline the three principles of adaptive 
management below. These principles underlie a process approach that may prove a useful tool 
for addressing practical environmental problems like those experienced on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. 
2.5.3 Adaptive management as an operational tool of environmental pragmatism 
I should mention at the outset that the concept of adaptive management is not new. It has a long 
history that traces back to the philosophical ideas of American pragmatists represented by 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910), as well as Aldo Leopold 
(1887-1948). However, the specific idea of using the adaptive management approach in resource 
management is owed to the seminal works of C.S.Holling (1978), C.J. Walters (1986), and K. 
Lee (1993). 
Traditionally adaptive management has been conceived as the mere monitoring of activities and 
occasionally changing them. It was conceived as the process of “tracking and changing 
management direction in the face of failed policies”. It was also conceived as simply a “trial and 
error” process (Lee, 1993).To the contrary, adaptive management is a systematic learning while 
doing or learning by doing with the aim of improving management decisions by reducing 
uncertainty at the next decision point (Lee, 1993). It is an active learning process where there is 
constant improvement of process itself through iterative dialogues, changing assumptions and 
strategies. It is an on-going process of monitoring progress and revision of goals while giving 
room for a feedback mechanism where new information gained through experience and social 
learning is fed back to the process for better management outcomes (see also, Salasfsky, 
Margoluis & Redford, 2001).  
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Bryan Norton identifies three pillars or operational tools of adaptive management (see, Norton 
2003, and Norton, 2005a). These are learning from experience or experimentalism; identifying 
multiple scales or multi-scalar analysis; and being contextual or localism, that is sensitivity to 
place-based values. These three aspects form the core of Norton’s environmental philosophy that 
culminates in his ethical "method" of Adaptive Management. This “method” is more a strategy 
or approach that enables one to make practical environmental management decisions  in 
particular cases while avoiding imposing ideas on others, because it, as a “method”, is iterative, 
processual and sensitive to particular contexts while remaining open ended and self-corrective 
with community or stakeholder participation as its central operational tool. 
As such adaptive management facilitates social learning through a participatory experimental 
approach. It must be noted that Norton emphasises that his approach to  environmental 
pragmatism does not prescribe a substantive set of metaphysical principles, but only a 
methodology that is capable of bringing environmental ethics down to earth by helping us to 
learn “our way out of uncertainty in particular situations” (Norton, 2005b:364). It is an approach 
of learning by doing. The methodology provides us with decision-making tools to resolve 
difficult environmental challenges in particular contexts. Below is a brief consideration of each 
one of those pillars or principles. 
The first one is experimentalism. This is a commitment to learning our way out of uncertainty 
through experience. It will be recalled that, in pragmatism, all values and knowledge systems 
should be brought under the test of experience to ascertain their viability and workability 
(Norton, 2003). Testing hypotheses with experience is what is referred to as experimentalism or 
the experimental method (Dewey, 1997). Experimentalism is about trial and error reasoning. So, 
learning from experience is seen as vital in any attempt to resolve environmental challenges or in 
devising tools to make difficult environmental management decisions without compromising 
people’s ability to connect with nature. It is a commitment to pursue social learning by testing 
various possible actions and policies in a particular context, i.e., it is a pursuit of social learning 
through experimental adaptation (Norton, 2003). So, through experiencing the real-world 
environmental challenges and devising appropriate ways to address them through experimental 
adaptation, environmental problems could be resolved even if only tentatively. The reader may 
recall that there is no absolute solution to problems but a continuous process of experiential 
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learning which is iterative and open ended in pragmatism. That is why pragmatists pay attention 
to “what is there in experience, and not what this or that philosophy suggests we should find” 
(Parker, 1996:25). 
The second pillar of adaptive management is multi-scalar analysis. By multi-scalar analysis 
Norton (2005a) means that one should not only consider how the consequences of choices 
develop on individual, immediate time scales, but also on wider scales of decades and 
generations, because nature is a complex multi-scalar interaction of parts that change in scale 
over time. According to Norton (2005b), value exists on multiple levels and unfolds over 
different temporal and spatial horizons because they are enmeshed in different dynamics. We 
must learn to “think like a mountain”, Norton maintains, using Aldo Leopold’s metaphor,16 when 
emphasising the need to assess the consequences of an action or a policy in ever widening time 
and spatial scales.  
Summarising the importance of multi-scalar analysis in adaptive management. Norton (2003: 72) 
writes:  
We humans will understand our moral responsibilities only if we understand the consequences of 
our actions as they unfold on multiple scales; and the human community will survive to further 
evolve and adapt only if we learn to achieve individual welfare and justice in the present in ways 
that are less disruptive of the processes, evolving on larger spatio-temporal scales, essential to 
human ecological communities. 
Thus, according to Norton, multi-scalar analysis gives us a way to understand the importance of 
connecting the short-term and the long-term impacts of our actions on the environment. It is a 
                                                          
16
 Aldo Leopold's metaphor of “Thinking like a mountain”, according to Norton (2005: 93), is viewing ourselves and 
our relationship within nature in a higher perspective, i.e. in the long-range perspective of geological time. It is also 
about being able to see our deep interconnectedness with nature. It is to be able to recognize that our actions 
have far reaching consequences on the ecosystem in different time scales, short term, medium term, and long 
term (the geological timeframe). It is to be able to recognize that the ecosystem is synergistic.  Every entity in an 
ecosystem benefits one another. It is being able to think systemically and holistically rather than individually and 
egoistically about nature. All of these insights are succinctly captured in Aldo Leopold's mea culpa in his essay 
"Thinking like a mountain" entailing a sketch of himself as a young man participating in the folly of the "scientific 
management" of a wilderness area based on a perception of it as a static, mechanistic system the elements of 
which could be "managed" like atoms in isolation from one another. In this essay Leopold relates how he helped to 
exterminate wolves and mountain lions under the assumption that there would be more deer to hunt as a result 
without recognizing the impact that action would have on the entire dynamics of the ecosystem of the mountain 
over an extended period of time, including the decimation of a whole deer population after it increased 
disproportionately to the grazing available on the mountain slopes. Leopold says that he committed that foul 
because he had not learnt yet to think like a mountain. That is, he had not yet learnt to see the bigger picture of 
the workings of nature like the mountain that has lived long enough to know the deep secrets of nature.    
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commitment to a method of systems analysis by “examining the systematic consequences of our 
actions within the environment as they play out on different time scales” (Seeliger, 2009:80). 
Multi-scalar analysis therefore helps us to find ways to link short-term needs at a particular time 
to longer-term outcomes over an extended time period (Norton, 2003), thereby enabling us to 
bring a multiplicity of values to converge on a common social goal, that of nature protection. 
The third pillar of adaptive management is contextualism or localism, that is, place sensitivity. 
By contextualism or localism is meant a commitment to examine each problem in its biophysical 
or social context (Norton, 2003).  Being contextual requires that we examine the connection 
between values and the actual state of affairs on the ground to find out whether there is 
compatibility. So, contextualism is about finding local solutions to local problems. It is the 
recognition that how people value nature will be dependent on context, time and space. This 
sounds like leading to some form of relativism. However, it has been argued that contextualism 
or localism does not lead to relativism but rather helps to “consistently look for multiple ways of 
describing the value of any bit of nature that we want to preserve or restore so as to appeal to a 
range of interests both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric alike” (Light, 2003:234). In 
contextualism, emphasis is put on examining the “ways in which people currently perceive their 
situation in particular contexts as a starting point and then working towards common social 
goals” (Norton, 2005a:272).  That is why Norton further emphasises that truth is always locally 
based or contextual. In other words, our obligation as environmental philosophers should not be 
about finding the ultimate truth for all times and places, but about developing practices and 
institutions that are sustainable in a particular place (Norton, 2005b). It is true that global and 
regional systems may influence what happens locally, but these impacts occur in a particular 
place with specific consequences. That is why localism or contextualism requires the 
involvement of all local stakeholders in resolving environmental problems in a particular locality 
through taking reversible actions in the process of negotiating out of uncertainties (Norton, 
2005a). 
2.5.4 The process implications of environmental pragmatism 
One of the most important process implications of environmental pragmatism, according to 
Norton (2005b), is that experience should be the point of departure when environmental policy 
and management practices are to be formulated and implemented. Thus any society or authority 
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needs to take concrete experience into consideration because concrete experience is located 
within a very specific context. It is through experience that we will be able to change or correct 
or readjust our earlier decisions and value commitments to be in line with our objectives and the 
current values of the community. Norton (2005a) argues that experiential learning is the only 
response to uncertainty in science and with regard to disagreements in value.  Through 
experiential learning one will be able to determine whether a course of action is yielding the 
desired results or not. If not, a different path or course of action is sought (Norton, 2005b:365).  
All this is done through conversation and dialogue with each other until consensus is reached 
about the best way for pursuing a certain environmental protection goal. This is not the end. The 
consensus that is reached must be tested by experience, through trial and error. This is what is 
called learning from policy experiments (see Norton 2005a:92).  
Secondly, in order to take that experience seriously, members of the society need to be in 
conversation with one another; environmental managers, policy makers and the community need 
to be in re-iterative dialogue with one another (Norton, 2003). The details of that dialogue will 
include, for example, what policies and what management practices are needed to protect the 
environment and to allow the environment as well as humans to flourish?  
Emphasis is placed on flourishing rather than mere survival because, as many examples from 
Africa can bear out,
17
 survival is an ugly mode of existence. Survival ethics (see Safit, 2013; 
Verharen, et al., 2014) is about ‘me first’ when it comes to the use of limited resources, and ‘I 
will do everything in my power to prevent anybody else from accessing the same’. So the desired 
ethics of the environment that is intended here is not survival ethics only, but rather an ethics of 
flourishing. As I understand it, an ethics of flourishing is a sophisticated but enlightened ethics in 
which we as humans take into account what we need as resources, but also discuss with one 
another what the reasonable limits of consumption could be; where the thresholds of irreversible 
                                                          
17
 From my own experience in Tanzania, especially in the study area, I can witness that many people will exploit 
whatever opportunity comes their way in order to survive because of the uncertainty many people have about 
getting the next day’s meal, or simply because of poverty and hence the lack of reliable sources of income, and 
also because of mismanagement of the little resources there are by those in power and in relatively advantageous 
positions socially, politically and economically; be it in exploiting natural resources such as unlawful overharvesting 
of forest resources or over cultivation around water sources. People do anything lawful or unlawful just to survive. 
Of course some do this out of greed and others out of sheer necessity (see also Ongungbemi, 2004). But a great 
deal of conflict involving human versus wild animal, local people versus national park authorities, and local people 
versus investors also occurs. All these conflicts represent struggles by the local people to access natural resources 
for their livelihood (see, for example, Mabaruka (1996); Songorwa (1999); and Vedeld et al. (2012)). 
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damage should be located; and what should be accepted as safety margins and safe minimum 
standards. This brings us to the third point in process ethics, namely determining the thresholds 
of irreversible damage and safe minimum standards.  
What these thresholds of irreversible damage, safety margins and safe minimum standards are 
can only be determined in context by those involved and affected by those thresholds, margins 
and standards. In the determination of those thresholds, any sound rational management 
approach will leave room for safety (Norton, 2005a). To illustrate, when we make policy 
proposals and eventually choose, say proposal A to implement, it should, according to Norton 
(2005a), be a choice between different possibilities that we arrive at in conversation with the 
community and the goals it wishes to achieve. Whatever we choose must make sense to the 
community participants. So, going along the path of the policy we choose, let us say policy A, 
we determine in dialogue with one another what the targets are that we want to achieve, but we 
also need to identify what the indicators that those targets have been achieved would be. And 
since these targets can only be achieved through a process, and this process has incremental 
milestones in it, they cannot be formulated in theory; they can only be formulated within the 
context of a dialogue with everyone else (see Norton, 2003 and 2005a). 
Another important process implication of environmental pragmatism is community participation. 
Because Norton’s adaptive management ethics calls for communication and cooperation in the 
quest for social learning (Norton, 2005b:31), community participation, which is a crucial element 
in Norton’s understanding of adaptive management, comes into play (see Norton & Steinmann, 
2003; and Norton, 2005a). Community participation does not mean the episodic exchange of 
information between managers and the community at one stage of the process, but rather means 
full community participation throughout the entire process. From identifying the problem to 
decision making to implementation of decisions and development paths agreed to, as well as re-
examining, or revisiting and readjusting goals to see to it that the intended results of 
environmental protection are being achieved (Norton & Steinmann, 2003). Social learning will 
only happen through genuine community participation. 
Community dialogue also requires cooperative interaction of the public and experts in debating 
about the goals and methods of environmental protection. To make this argument more concrete, 
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Norton and Steinmann (2003:533) propose that such a dialogue be facilitated by citizen’s 
advisory committees, thus they write: 
The committee should be inclusive in membership, encouraging participation of representatives 
from all stakeholder groups, including scientists, representatives of government agencies, and so 
forth. What are required of the committee are regular participation and an honest effort to 
understand and solve problems. It is also helpful if the representative stakeholders on the advisory 
committee can maintain regular communication with their constituencies. 
The most important aspects of such process ethics then comprise groups and forums of dialogue, 
and spaces and procedures for dialogue. In that dialogue we formulate targets in such a way that 
we leave room to turn around before we have reached the point of irreversible damage, with 
safety margins, and safe minimum standards. 
To summarise, process ethics requires really taking experiences into account, group dialogues, 
community dialogues, community definition of thresholds, and choice of policies, together with 
laying down targets and thresholds within the parameters of the context that is being discussed. It 
is about defining safety margins, room for safety, room for turning back, timeframes in which 
monitoring takes place, time frames in which the forum and group dialogues come back again to 
determine how we stand with regard to experiences that we have had; and to examine whether 
we are moving towards resolution. We have to retreat from our actions or policy choices if we 
find that we are taking too much from the resources, and come back and rethink the thresholds 
and safety margins we previously set. As such, this is an iterative process of monitoring, thinking 
again about thresholds, targets and safety margins, etc.  
All of this means that the preferences of the community are taken into account in a sophisticated, 
enlightened way, and considered, or rational preferences are used as point of departure and as 
reference, rather than felt preferences (Norton, 1984). According to Norton (2003:272-274) there 
are two kinds of preferences: “short term preferences based on individual preference [i.e., felt 
preferences] and longer term preferences [i.e., considered preferences] or sustainable value that 
emerges from community process”. So, according to Norton, the latter preference should be 
encouraged because it leads to long-term sustainability. If each and every one takes felt 
preferences into consideration it could eventually lead to serious problems. If the community 
considered preferences to be taken into account by the full involvement of the community in the 
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entire process of deliberations about environmental protection, it may lead to better policies, 
better environmental governance and better management practices (Norton, 2003).    
2.5.5 The relevance of environmental pragmatism to this study in general 
Environmental pragmatism emphasises beginning with real-life environmental problems and 
moving from there to finding a workable solution in a particular context. That is why I found it 
more appropriate to examine specific environmental problems on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro and attempt to look for their resolution using the adaptive management approach. 
Environmental pragmatism tells us that real solutions to such problems cannot come from 
applying foundational principles or from deductive environmental ethical theories like those 
discussed in mainstream environmental ethics. It rather requires analysing problems in their local 
and biophysical context with the aim of identifying local solutions to such problems.  We saw 
that a top-down approach may miss the many different ways that the local people value their 
environments and this may lead to imposing our own values on people, which usually does not 
bring forth the desired results. I therefore expected Norton’s process ethics to help shed light on 
why environmental management practices have been failing on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
and what policy and management practices need to change, as well as what new environmental 
protection approaches in keeping with environmental pragmatism are needed in order to reverse 
the deteriorating environmental conditions on the mountain slopes. Alternatively, to determine 
how people can learn to live sustainably within their local context without having to sacrifice too 
much. 
I also hoped to determine how conflict resulting from access and use of resources on the 
mountain slopes could be addressed so that the needs of both the local people and environmental 
protection are not compromised. How should social learning and democratic participation be 
carried out within the area so that these kinds of conflicts and opposing interests could be dealt 
with without harm to both the local people and the natural environment? 
Another important contribution that I expected Norton’s pragmatic method to offer in relation to 
my case study was related to how cultural pride could be restored on the mountain slopes by 
linking the mountain resources with the local people’s culture. That is, how could  Norton’s 
method of environmental pragmatism help in restoring that pride by rehabilitating the place-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
based values on the mountain slopes that seem to have disappeared because of divorcing or 
distancing the local people from the mountain and its surroundings.   
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an attempt to examine the scholarship on mainstream environmental 
ethics and its relevance to Africa. I showed that many of the debates and theorisations on 
mainstream environmental ethics have largely been embedded in western perspectives and 
cultural influences, and hence fail to fully accommodate non-western concerns and perspectives. 
I showed also that mainstream environmental ethics has tended to be too abstract and hence 
contribute little insight into how to resolve concrete practical environmental problems, especially 
in an African context. Mainstream environmental ethics has been blamed for being more oriented 
towards academic debates within the narrow circle of environmental ethicists, hence failing to 
have an impact on or persuasive power with common people, environmental managers and 
policy makers alike. I have presented Norton’s environmental pragmatism as a possible viable 
alternative to the mainstream approaches in environmental ethics. It has been my argument that 
environmental pragmatism could be an appropriate approach to environmental ethics in an 
African context because it provides a methodology that is capable of bringing about genuine 
participation of the local community in decisions affecting their environment. In this way, 
environmental pragmatism and adaptive management approach give room for all voices to be 
heard; the rich and the poor alike, those with power and those without power, scientists and lay 
people, men and women alike. It is in this sense that I consider this approach to be superior to all 
other previous approaches.  
In the following chapter, I consider alternatives to environmental ethics coming from African 
perspectives. I will show that even these African alternatives fail for almost the same reasons as 
the earlier approaches to environmental ethics in that they remain theoretical with little practical 
import when called upon to provide guidance on how to resolve current environmental 
challenges on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. They are also deductive, top-down approaches 
and are foundational in terms of theory building, which is contrary to the spirit of pragmatism 
and adaptive management ethics. 




 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS FROM 
AFRICAN PERPSECTIVES 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that mainstream environmental ethics is culturally embedded in 
western perspectives and concerns. As such, mainstream environmental ethics has taken on 
board little of non-western experiences. On top of that I have argued that much of mainstream 
environmental ethics has been too abstract and academic and hence contributes little to providing 
practical guidance on how to address concrete environmental problems, most especially in an 
African context. However, some scholars have endeavoured to articulate an indigenous African 
environmental ethics with the intention of bringing African perspectives to environmental ethics 
and also making it relevant to Africa.     
This chapter presents what such an indigenous African environmental ethics could entail and 
what its strengths and weaknesses are in addressing the concrete real-life environmental 
problems that Africans experience today. The chapter also presents an attempt to examine the 
extent to which we can rely on traditional African environmental ethics to provide us with 
practical guidance on how to resolve environmental problems such as those experienced on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. In this chapter, I particularly focus on the works of two advocates 
of traditional African environmental ethics, namely Felix Munyaradzi Murove, a Zimbabwean 
scholar, and Workineh Kelbessa, an Ethiopian scholar. Both have written what could be 
considered ground-breaking works on environmental ethics from an African perspective. I 
discuss the assumptions and argumentation of their approaches to African environmental ethics, 
but also their shortcomings, especially when considered against a context like that which 
concerns the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. I have selected these two scholars because their 
arguments represent the arguments of most other advocates of African environmental ethics in 
that they all appeal to traditional African worldviews as their point of departure and argue that 
some aspects of these worldviews point to an inherent environmental ethics in traditional African 
societies. The two scholars also differ in that, while Kelbessa, for example, concentrates on 
showing how traditional beliefs, practices and governance structures could be appealed to as a 
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source of an indigenous African environmental ethics, Murove focuses on conceptual analysis of 
some traditional African concepts such as Ubuntu (humanness) and Ukama (relatedness) to show 
that these two concepts could actually form the basis of an African environmental ethics. As 
mentioned above, most articulations of African environmental ethics fall in either of these two 
different approaches: one appealing to traditional beliefs and practices, and the other grounded in 
conceptual analysis. Sometimes, however, these two approaches are blended or overlap. Thus, it 
sometimes becomes difficult to separate one approach from the other, yet they have important 
differences.  
I do not discuss these approaches exhaustively, however, but mainly focus on their 
persuasiveness and practical relevance in resolving environmental management and policy issues 
such as those that emerged in my case study. So, my major question here is: Can these 
approaches provide us with guidance on how to deal with practical environmental challenges 
such as those on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro? On grounds that are fully demonstrated in the 
rest of this study, I argue, with special reference to Kilimanjaro, that these approaches to African 
environmental ethics, even if they have done ground-breaking work in demonstrating alternative 
ways to think about environmental ethics, still do not help much when it comes to dealing with 
practical or concrete environmental problems in Africa today. 
I begin this chapter with a general overview of what constitutes African environmental ethics 
focusing on the background, rationale and the general foundations on which much of the African 
environmental ethics is built. Then, I consider two specific approaches to African environmental 
ethics, i.e., Murove's and Kelbessa’s approaches respectively, and show why they, in spite of 
their many strengths, still fail to provide us with practical guidance on how to resolve 
environmental problems such as those encountered on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Finally, 
I consider some criticisms to these approaches and indigenous environmental ethics in general, 
making use in this regard of insights drawn from environmental pragmatism, while making the 
general point that not only traditional worldviews, but also contemporary experiences and world-
views currently supported in Africa should be taken into account when thinking about an 
environmental ethics with practical implications that can actually persuade people and influence 
their behaviour.  
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3.2 General overview 
In this section, I trace the background, rationale and foundations of African environmental ethics. 
What I present in this section serves as a precursor to my critique of traditional African 
environmental ethics that follows later in this chapter.   
3.2.1 The background and rationale for traditional African environmental ethics 
I should start by noting that those who write on traditional African environmental ethics usually 
use some traditional African worldviews from certain ethnic groups to make a 
generalisationabout the whole of Africa. However, these scholars acknowledge that different 
African ethnic groups have different beliefs and cultural practices or worldviews, but, as 
Kelbessa notes, “Although there are many African worldviews, there are commonalities 
justifying the concept of a generic African worldview” (Kelbessa, 2014:32). Likewise, Behrens 
(2014: 65) writes: 
I use  the phrase “African thought” [to mean] … the philosophical and the religious ideas of the 
indigenous people of the sub-Saharan Africa … I do not claim that a single worldview is shared 
by these peoples, but I believe, with most African Philosophers,  that there are common themes to 
be found. 
 
Despite the caution given by these scholars, there remains a sense in which they think they can 
generalisetheir articulations of African environmental ethics, especially when they talk of the 
presence of common elements in African culture and thought. However, as I showed in Chapter 
2, environmental pragmatism usually prefers to take each context in its own right by beginning 
with concrete lived experiences going up. Although it is true that there are many things that 
African cultures share in common, their experiences of environmental problems in their 
particular locales is certainly different. It is in this spirit that I evaluate traditional African 
environmental ethics in this chapter. 
 
I have mentioned, in Chapter 2, that the necessity for articulating an African environmental 
ethics or an environmental ethics from African perspectives emerged as an effort to correct what 
was experienced as a western bias in mainstream environmental ethics. Mainstream 
environmental ethics was seen as being exclusively informed by western perspectives and 
cultural influences which made it less relevant to the African context. So, the need to bring 
African perspectives into mainstream environmental ethics was obvious. Some African scholars 
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who saw the necessity of articulating a specific African environmental ethics include, among 
others, Ongungbemi (1994), Tangwa (2006), Kelbessa (2005), Murove (2009), Ojomo (2011) 
Behrens, (2010), and Kelbessa (2011, 2014, and 2015). In these works, traditional African 
thinking and worldviews have been employed to explicate or defend what is presented to be a 
unique African environmental ethics.  Thus, most advocates of African environmental ethics 
have pre-occupied themselves with the task of demonstrating that western perspectives do not 
have a monopoly of knowledge about nature and the environment in general. As such, African 
environmental ethics has typically been an attempt to prove that traditional Africans have had an 
environmental ethics that helped them to co-exist in harmony and peace with nature. At the same 
time, African environmental ethics has been an attempt to show that traditional African cultures 
possess an environmental ethics resonant with the kind that is being advocated today, claiming in 
addition that that ethic is being destroyed by modern development.  
 Workineh Kelbessa, for example, says that “…modern education, market forces, foreign 
religions, poverty and government policies have eroded the indigenous environmental ethic in 
Oromia and other parts of the world” (Kelbessa, 2011:172). He thus emphasises the need to 
revive or rehabilitate an indigenous environmental ethic. Mogobe Ramose, on the other hand, 
says that “deep-rooted materialistic culture and the technological advancement continues to re-
affirm the need to restore Ubuntu because, more than ever before, humanity is faced with the 
threat of catastrophic ecological disaster” (Ramose, 2009:312). The assumption here is that 
traditional African cultures possess an environmental ethics that needs to be rehabilitated or 
restored.  
However, on grounds that are fully demonstrated in the rest of my study, I argue that, while pre-
colonial African thinking and worldviews led to the protection of some aspects of nature, this did 
not result from an explicitly articulated environmental consciousness or an ethics present in these 
cultures, and that the current African context and the corresponding environmental challenges 
call for a more practical approach that is capable of resolving some environmental challenges 
now. 
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3.2.2 Foundations of traditional African environmental ethics 
I must mention from the outset, however, that the emergence of African environmental ethics 
seems to be a continuation of the ‘Africanist project’18 by which some African scholars have 
been attempting, quite correctly, to dispel the colonial notion that African thought/culture is 
devoid of useful ideas to contribute to environmental ethics discourse and development in 
general. African environmental ethicists to the contrary show that there is implicit environmental 
ethics in the traditional African worldviews which could be useful to the ongoing debates on 
environmental ethics. However, this Africanist project, as we shall see, has had an impact on the 
kind of African environmental ethics that has been formulated and its efficacy in helping to 
resolve concrete environmental problems in Africa.  
As mentioned earlier, most articulations of African environmental ethics are founded on 
traditional African worldviews or thought. Kelbessa (2014: 39), for example, says; 
[D]ifferent cultural groups in African have their own indigenous environmental ethics through 
which they govern their relationship to the natural environment, [and thus] indigenous 
environmental ethics is based on the worldview of a particular society and the ethical views of 
individual thinkers.  
In brief, the traditional/indigenous African worldviews are seen to have the following general 
characteristics: a sense of kinship with nature; the need for supernatural intervention in human 
affairs; the presence of beings of spiritual forces and power superior to humans; the capacity of 
human beings to enter into relationship with a benevolent spirit world; an acute sense of the 
afterlife, usually expressed in a belief in and respect for ancestors; and an absence of a 
dichotomy between the physical and the spiritual (see Balcomb, 2006:242-243).    
                                                          
18
 The Africanist project or Pan-Africanism which has its roots in the Negritude Movement has been a movement or 
project that seeks to restore Africa’s past glory or, put simply, a movement that seeks to glorify “Africannness” in 
the attempt to restore the African cultural pride that was apparently killed or undermined by colonialism. The 
colonialists corrupted the African person’s mind by glorifying whatever is European and despising whatever is 
African by using terms such as savage, barbaric, primitive, uncultured, uncouth, pagan, uncivil, superstitious, and 
other such demeaning labels. European scholars and philosophers such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel and Levy Bruhl, who are known to have made demeaning remarks about Africa and the rationality 
of Africans (see, for example, Kelbessa, 2015) have been in the spotlight in much of the works written by Africanist 
scholars in defense of the African/ Black race. Such Africanist scholars include Cheick Anta Diop with his ground 
breaking work, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality, published in 1974 that, although predating the 
Pan Africanist Movement, has become a point of departure or a basis of much scholarly work on the Africanist 
project. Others include Ali Mazrui with his famous work, The Africans: A Triple Heritage, published in 1986. A more 
recent work that may also be considered a continuation of the Africanist project is the work by Souleymane Bachir 
Diagne, Ink of the Scholars: A Reflection on Philosophy in Africa, published in 2016 by CODESRIA.  
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It is this African worldview or philosophy that some other scholars such as Godfrey Tangwa 
describe as one that sets a slim boundary “between plants, animals, and inanimate things, 
between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the communal and the individual” 
(Tangwa, 2004:389). It must be noted here that it is usually said that religion and other aspects of 
life cannot be separated in traditional Africa (Mbiti, 1990). Religion is seen as pervasively linked 
with every aspect of people’s daily life (Mbiti, 1990; Bediako, 1995; Gyeke, 1997). This means 
that the African religions and the African “culture” or worldviews are intertwined. That is, 
religion and other aspects of culture cannot be separated from one another like it is with western 
religion (Christianity) where there is a clear demarcation between religion and other aspects of 
people’s lives.  
So, for the African (the traditional African at least) it is claimed, the universe is a religious 
universe. It is further observed that the African does not make a distinction between the physical 
and the spiritual, the profane and the sacred. According to Magesa (1997:52), “the [African] 
universe is perceived as an organic whole... [and] humans maintain the bond between the visible 
and invisible spheres of the universe”. All aspects of life have to do with religion. This means 
that African life is inconceivable without religion. According to Mbiti (1990:1), “religion 
permeates into all departments of life so fully that it is not easy or possible always to isolate it”. 
In other words, it is usually claimed that, in the African context, cosmology and beliefs are 
intricately intertwined with natural phenomena and the environment to the extent that things like 
“wind, thunder, rain, lightening, night, day, moon, sun, stars, and so on may become amenable to 
control through the cosmology of the African people” (Olupona, 2006:261). In Africa, it is 
believed, for example, that humans can transform into animals or plants or even into forces such 
as the wind (Tangwa, 2004).  
Construed thus, it is claimed, Africans see everything in nature as being united and 
interconnected and that this way of conceiving reality or the universe leads to “the holistic 
understanding of reality, namely, that all aspects of the universe such as animals, plants, rivers, 
and mountains have a religious significance and must be treated with respect” (Beyers, 2010:1). 
Along these lines it has been further argued that “the spiritual bond between humans, animals 
and plants may have led some Europeans to designate the African religion as totemistic” (Mbiti, 
1990:10). It is for the reasons given above that land, water bodies, animals, and vegetation (trees 
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and forests) in relation to African religions feature most in discussions of African environmental 
ethics (see, for example, Burnett & Wa Kang’Ethe, 1994; Gitau, 2000; Mkenda, 2010; Kelbessa, 
2011; Sewe-K’Ahenda, Nduku & Weldon, 2014). These aspects of the environment are possibly 
more regularly discussed in the literature because they are things that people in Africa interact 
with on a daily basis and they were/are used as mediums to communicate with the supernatural. 
Also more important is that traditional African religions, especially rituals and observances, are 
practised around these aspects of the environment. Apart from the natural entities discussed 
above, most natural phenomena such as rain, wind, floods, drought, earthquakes, locusts, 
tornadoes, and so on, may also be considered among the constituents of the environment in the 
African context (Olupona, 2006). And all these aspects are believed to have supernatural powers.  
According to Tempels (1959) and Mbiti (1990), traditional Africans see mountains, trees, rivers, 
and different animals as representations or embodiment of deities or spirits; as such, most of 
these natural objects are seen as divine, sacred, and are given due reverence (Mbiti, 1990). 
According to Tempels, nature is permeated with ‘vital forces’ for Africans (Tempels, 1959). And 
these vital forces have the power of influencing events for the better or worse in the world. In 
traditional Africa, it is said, “people hold that the spirits dwell in the woods, bush, forest, rivers, 
mountains, or just around the villages” (Mbiti, 1990:74). This, in turn, requires that these objects 
are approached with care. Clobus claims that because of the ontological relationship between 
traditional Africans and the physical/natural environment, one may indeed say, “the physical 
surrounding is experienced as an extension of the body” (1992:172). Once again, the aim here is 
to emphasise the close bond between humans and the non-human world in African worldviews.  
Msafiri (2007:83) writes that “African religious traditions and cultures have deep respect for and 
affection for the whole of creation ... and thus could provide alternative paradigms for the 
worsening eco-crisis”.  Furthermore, it is usually claimed that the presence of nature narratives in 
traditional African religious beliefs, taboos, proverbs, myths and legends makes this African 
worldview a more favourable ground for nurturing an environmental ethics compared with the 
western worldview (see, for example, Mutwa, 1996; Tangwa, 2004; Murove, 2009; Chemhuru & 
Masaka, 2010; Mkenda, 2010; Kelbessa, 2011; Eneji et al., 2012; Sussy et al., 2012). This, it is 
claimed, results in African cultures and cosmology being closely tied with the natural 
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environment, more so than in other places, at least in the western world, thus making African 
worldviews more suited than the western world view in general to help protect the environment.  
Now, an inference may be made from the above exposition, as follows: Since traditional African 
worldviews or religions led to the treatment of some natural objects such as trees, wild animals, 
mountains, springs, etc. with reverence and respect, and since this reverence led to the 
preservation and conservation of some aspects of the natural environment, the traditional African 
worldviews or religions engendered a greater sense of ecological responsibility or an 
environmental awareness which could be a basis for an African environmental ethics. While this 
inference is valid, I show later that there is a reason to shed some doubt on some of the premises 
accepted to support this conclusion, and thus the strength of this conclusion itself is put in 
question.  
In brief then, to summarise this sub-section: the traditional African metaphysical and ontological 
relationship between humans, the natural world and ancestral spirits forms the basis for most of 
the arguments for those advocating or defending an African environmental ethics. Many of its 
defenders see the traditional African environmental ethics as being supported by the claim that 
traditional Africans maintained a harmonious co-existence between humans, the natural world 
and the spirit world. In other words, the claim is that traditional Africans do everything that is 
possible to avoid upsetting this cosmic balance of harmonious co-existence between humans, the 
natural world and the spiritual world by taking a cautious approach to the non-human world. 
Thus, many consider the traditional Africans’ cautious approach to the natural world and hence 
their striving to maintain a harmonious relationship between humans, the natural world and the 
spiritual world as entailing a holistic worldview akin to the one that is being advocated by 
environmentalists today. Such is the foundation on which African environmental ethics is built.  
My concern, though, is as follows: To what extent can indigenous African environmental ethics, 
thus construed, provide practical guidance on how to resolve current African environmental 
problems? How relevant and persuasive can this traditional African environmental ethics be for 
motivating people in Africa to protect nature? Felix Munyaradzi Murove, a Zimbabwean scholar, 
and Workineh Kelbessa, an Ethiopian scholar, are among the ardent defenders of African 
environmental ethics. They attempt to answer these questions posed above in their respective 
versions of African environmental ethics to which I now turn. 
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3.3 Specific approaches to African environmental ethics 
In this section, I briefly present Murove’s and Kelbessa’s versions of African environmental 
ethics and examine their strengths and weaknesses from an environmental pragmatist’s 
perspective and examine the extent to which they can be relied upon to help in resolving current 
African environmental challenges. As I have indicated above, Murove's and Kelbessa’s versions 
of African environmental ethics have been singled out for discussion because they represent two 
slightly different approaches. Murove’s version is more theoretical by focusing on a conceptual 
analysis of traditional African concepts of Ubuntu and Ukama to show that they inform an 
environmental ethic that could help to solve the environmental crisis. Kelbessa, for his part, goes 
beyond pure theoretical analysis to a little more practical approach by appealing to concrete 
traditional Oromo governance structures and institutions for providing a basis for an African 
environmental ethics. However, these two approaches also overlap in many respects depending 
on the angle from which one looks at them. Nevertheless, I consider these two approaches to be 
more or less representative of different formulations of African environmental ethics. I 
intentionally begin with the more theoretical approach and end with the more practical one, as it 
has been the aim of this study to find a more practical, down-to-earth approach that could 
respond to the current African environmental problems. However, I show that both these 
approaches have problems in one way or another in relation to providing practical guidance on 
how to address current environmental concerns in Africa.    
3.3.1 Murove’s conceptual basis for an African environmental ethics 
Traditional African culture has been touted as having the ingredients or possessing “the roots of 
an ethical paradigm” based on the Shona concepts of Ukama and Ubuntu to solve the current 
environmental crisis (Murove, 2009:315).  Ukama and Ubuntu are seen as affirming an ethics of 
interdependence among individual human beings, the community and the wider non-human 
environment. The following is a brief description of the concepts of Ukama and Ubuntu and their 
implications for an environmental ethic.  
3.3.1.1 The concept of Ukama 
The Shona concept Ukama means “being related or belonging to the same family” (Murove, 
2009:316). However, according to Murove, Ukama is not restricted to the human family but 
extends to the non-human community as well. This should follow logically from the traditional 
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African belief that, in African thinking, the boundary between the human and the non-human 
realm is slim or non-existent (Tangwa, 2014). So, Ukama signifies the African understanding of 
reality in terms of relational interdependence (Murove, 2009:316).  
Central to the concept of Ukama is the belief in ancestors. It is said that the goal of traditional 
African religion and other practices is to foster Ukama between the living and the 
dead/ancestors. Murove (2009:317) writes, “... it is in Ukama between the living and their 
ancestors, that immortality of values is found”. Ukama between the living and the ancestors is 
expressed through anamnestic solidarity when ancestors are remembered through ritual practices, 
without which it is believed that harm may befall whoever omits these ritual practices (Gelfand, 
1981; Bujo, 1998). So, through Ukama, the harmony between the past, present and future are 
actualised. It is in this sense that values are said to be immortal because “they promote 
harmonious existence in [sic] between the past, present and future” (Murove, 2009:319).   
As pointed out above, Ukama does not end with human beings but extends to the natural 
environment. According to Murove, this (that is Ukama with nature) is made possible through 
totemic ancestorhood. This suggests that the practice of totemism shows how African people are 
intimately connected to the natural environment.  
Expounding on Murove’s concept of totemism in relation to environmental ethics, Le Grange 
clarifies that “Ukama is advanced through totemic ancestorhood and is a connecting thread of the 
present, past and future and that Ukama does not only mean relatedness at the level of humans 
but also to the natural world” (Le Grange, 2012:333). Phillip Junod (1939: 112) as quoted in Le 
Grange, 2012) explains totemism thus:  
Totemism shows well one characteristic of the Bantu mind: the strong tendency to give a human soul to 
animals, to plants, to nature as such, a tendency which is at the very root of the most beautiful blossoms of 
poetry, a feeling that there is a community of substance between the various forms of life. 
Thus “totemic ancestorhood justifies that there is insoluble solidarity between humanity and the 
natural environment”, which should make African thought a fertile ground for advancing an 
environmental ethic (Murove, 2009:3). This also provides the basis for claims made by scholars 
such as Tangwa (2004) in presenting the traditional African outlook with respect to nature as 
holistic compared to the traditional dichotomous, atomistic view of reality that has defined the 
western worldview for a long time. 
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3.3.1.2 The concept of Ubuntu 
Murove argues that, while Ukama emphasises interdependence, Ubuntu or humanness 
emphasises relatedness with others. He thus contends that “while the Shona word Ukama means 
relatedness and understanding of reality in terms of interdependence, Ubuntu implies that 
humanness is derived from our relatedness with others” (Murove, 2009:315). That means 
humanness is a result of being in Ukama with others. Murove argues further that the ethical 
concerns of Ukama are articulated in the concept of Ubuntu, which advocates that humanness is 
fully realised within the context of harmonious existence with others in the community (Murove, 
2009:330). According to Murove, this harmonious existence with others also implies that human 
wellbeing in general cannot be fully realised outside relatedness with the natural environment. 
The implication is that living morally in traditional Africa includes living in harmony with the 
natural environment. He supports this by saying that, in traditional African moral teaching 
(which was normally imparted through stories, myths and taboos); the natural environment plays 
a central role. He asserts that “the participation of nature in human affairs shows that the essence 
of being human lies in Ukama with nature” (Murove, 2009:324). He thus claims that “humanness 
(Ubuntu) is an expression of interconnectedness between people and between people and the 
physical world” (Le Grange, 2012:334). Ubuntu, in other words, is an expression of Ukama. 
Thus, the concepts of Ubuntu and Ukama support each other in grounding a basis for an 
environmental ethic. Thus understood, humanness (Ubuntu) then is an expression of the 
interconnectedness (Ukama) between people and between people and the non-human world. This 
way of conceiving African environmental ethics is widely shared among other advocates of 
African environmental ethics, including Segun Ongungbemi’s “ethics of nature relatedness” (see 
Ogungbemi, 1994), Geoffrey Tangwa’s “eco-bio-communitarianism” (see Tangwa, 2004), Kevin 
Behrens’ “African relational environmentalism” (see Behrens, 2010; 2014) and Fainos 
Mangena’s “Totemism and spiritualism as the criterion for moral status in the African 
environments” (see Mangena, 2013). All these scholars, like Murove, emphasise the 
interconnectedness, the interdependence and the relationality that exists between human beings 
and the non-human world in the African worldview, which forms the basis for an African 
environmental ethic. 
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3.3.1.3 The implications of Ukama and Ubuntu for environmental ethics 
We see from the exposition above that Ubuntu by itself was considered an insufficient base on 
which to build an environmental ethics. This is because Ubuntu or humanness in essence is a 
human-centred concept. As we saw above, Ubuntu entails that we enhance our humanness 
through our deeper relations with other human beings or the community. Now, because of the 
inadequacy of Ubuntu as concept to ground an environmental ethic, another broader concept, 
Ukama, which means relatedness, was introduced. Ukama is a broader concept and/or 
complements Ubuntu because Ukama is not restricted to the human community (past, present 
and future people), but, according to Murove, extends Ubuntu to the entire cosmos. We saw that 
it is through totemic ancestorhood that we are justified to make that logical move or extension 
from the human world to the non-human world. So, once the words Ubuntu and Ukama are 
compounded, we have promising conceptual resources for an environmental ethic. First, in so far 
as Ubuntu and Ukama have some connotation of the future, it implies that we are obliged to 
protect nature, not just for the good of the present people, but also for future generations. In this 
way, Ukama contributes to the ongoing debates on environmental ethics and future generations. 
Second, the notion of relatedness as embodied in Ukama could be understood as relatedness to 
the entire cosmos, which implies an obligation to protect the whole of nature. It is in this sense 
that Murove and others consider Ubuntu and Ukama to hold promise for an environmental ethic.  
To conclude, Murove’s aim has been to show theoretically that, unlike some claims that African 
thinking does not support an environmental ethic, there are concepts or ideas in the traditional 
African worldview in the form of Ubuntu and Ukama that promise to serve as a basis for an 
environmental ethics. While Murove’s approach does not actually provide us with practical 
guidance for resolving specific environmental problems in particular contexts, he does succeed 
in providing us with a broad theoretical articulation of an environmental ethics from an African 
perspective. He does not really go beyond that. I must emphasise here that Murove’s approach 
does not lead to an African environmental ethics, but is rather more of an environmental ethics 
from an African perspective. I consider Kelbessa’s approach, on the other hand, to be more of an 
African indigenous environmental ethics. This is to say that Kelbessa tries to show that 
traditional African beliefs and practices acted as a sanction against reckless use or treatment of 
some aspects of the natural environment. This helped to protect the environment and it is what is 
referred to by Kelbessa as an indigenous Oromo environmental ethic. Kelbessa, furthermore, 
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argues that this traditional Oromo environmental ethic could actually be revived to help protect 
the environment today. Murove, on the other hand, attempts to show theoretically or 
conceptually that the African philosophy of Ubuntu and Ukama does support environmental 
ethics. Murove's approach is therefore more abstract and theoretical. Alternatively, one may say 
that Murove’s approach is more an attempt to show that traditional African thought is/was not a 
blank slate in terms of providing conceptual resources for an environmental ethic, rather than 
formulating an approach that can persuade people and provide practical guidance on how to 
address environmental problems in present-day Africa.  
In the following section, I present Kelbessa’s approach to African environmental ethics to 
examine the extent to which it can help to persuade people to protect the environment and also 
help to resolve specific practical environmental problems in Africa. As mentioned earlier, my 
approach from Chapter 2 onwards has been to begin with the more theoretical and abstract 
approaches and then continue to the less theoretical and more practical, down-to-earth 
approaches in the attempt to see whether they succeed in providing practical guidance and a 
workable approach to resolve particular or specific pressing environmental problems in Africa.
19
 
3.3.2 Kelbessa’s indigenous African environmental ethics 
The Ethiopian scholar Workineh Kelbessa,
20
 is one of those African scholars who have been on 
the frontline in advocating an indigenous African environmental ethics. I briefly present some 
key ideas in his approach to African environmental ethics and provide a critical assessment in 
relation to its capacity to provide practical guidance to resolve current practical environmental 
                                                          
19
 I consider further criticism of both Murove’s and Kelbessa’s approaches and the notion of a general 
African/indigenous environmental ethics after presenting Kelbessa’s approach hereunder. 
20
 Kelbessa earlier complained that African perspectives had not been given much space in renowned 
environmental ethics journals such as Environmental Ethics and Environmental Values (see Kelbessa, 2005; and 
Kelbessa, 2011). But Kelbessa did not just complain, he also worked hard to see to it that some more work on 
African environmental ethics found their way into these journals.  His efforts bore fruit and some of his works and 
other of scholars writing on African environmental ethics began to appear more regularly in Environmental Ethics 
and Environmental Values.  For example, Kevin Behren’s paper “Exploring African Holism with Respect to the 
Environment” appeared in Environmental Values, 2010, volume 19, issue number 4. Kelbessa’s work, “Can African 
environmental ethics contribute to Environmental Policy in Africa?”  was published in Environmental Ethics, 2014, 
volume 26, issue number 1, and Kevin Behren’s paper, “An African Relational Environmentalism and Moral 
Considerability”, appeared in the same issue. The following year, i.e., 2015, another paper by Kelbessa, ” African 
Environmental Ethics, Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Challenges” appeared in 2015 in volume 37,  issue 
number 4 of Environmental Ethics. So, African perspectives are indeed finding their way in international 
environmental ethics.  
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challenges such as those experienced by people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and 
other places with similar conditions. 
Kelbessa basically takes J. Baird Callicott’s remarks about environmental ethics in Africa as his 
point of departure or, more specifically, as his object of criticism. In his search for conceptual 
resources for an environmental ethics in the indigenous cultures around the world, Callicott 
(1994:158) made the following observation with regard to Africa:  
Africa looms a big blank spot on the world map of indigenous environmental ethics … 
[because] African thought orbits, seemingly, around human interests. Hence one might 
expect to distil from it no more than a weak and indirect environmental ethic, similar to 




Workineh Kelbessa, clearly disenchanted with Callicott’s observation, accused him of 
committing the fallacy of hasty generalisation (Kelbessa, 2011). He thinks that, if Callicott had 
done his homework well, he would have realised that many African ethnic groups possess an 
environmental ethics. Using the Oromo of Ethiopia, Kelbessa claims that “… contrary to 
Callicott’s assumption as given in the quotation above, the Oromo consider not only the 
wellbeing of humans but also other nonhuman creatures” (Kelbessa, 2011:210). Kelbessa 
accordingly set out to prove his case in the rest of his work. 
Kelbessa argues that the Oromo worldview has included an environmental ethic that can serve as 
the basis for a contemporary environmental ethic (Kelbessa, 2011: Preface). Drawing mainly 
from the traditional religion and governance structures of the Oromo, Kelbessa observes that “the 
Oromo of Ethiopia maintain perfect balance between nature and culture; and that religious 
attitudes, values and practices force peasant farmers to revere nature and natural places” 
(Kelbessa, 2011:26). He further contends that Oromo environmental values are encapsulated and 
                                                          
21
 J. Baird Callicott made this claim after researching the Yoruba of Nigeria, the San of Southern Africa, and the 
Balele of the Kongo with the aim of finding conceptual resources for the support for environmental ethics in 
indigenous or traditional African thought (see Callicott, 1994). Callicott, however, did not feel that these cultures 
provide adequate support for an environmental ethics. It must be recalled that Callicott was looking for a non-
anthropocentric foundation for an environmental ethics in the traditional African cultures to no avail. Callicott’s 
conviction, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, has always been that a genuine environmental ethics must necessarily be 
non-anthropocentric.  This might have narrowed the possibility of him seeing other possible options in the African 
context that may well help in the efforts to protect nature. This is where environmental pragmatism becomes 
useful, as I argue in this dissertation. 
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encoded in beliefs about the Supreme Being, sacred trees and animals, and the Qaalluu 
institution
22
 (Kelbessa, 2011:86). Kelbessa furthermore emphasises the need for the 
rehabilitation of indigenous environmental ethics in Africa following the example of the 
traditional religious beliefs and practices of the Oromo of Ethiopia (Kelbessa, 2005; 2011). As he 
sees it, this indigenous environmental ethics has been suppressed by cultural changes caused by 
the expansion of Islam and Christian faiths in these areas. For example, Kelbessa (2011:84) says 
that Muslims and Christians regarded the Qaalluu institution as useless. They even destroyed the 
sacred abdaarii trees saying that these trees belong to the devil. I consider the three aspects 
within which, according to Kelbessa, the Oromo environmental values are encoded in cultural 
beliefs and practices, that is, the belief in the Supreme Being (Waaqa); sacred trees and animals; 
and the Qaalluu institution.  
3.3.2.1 The Belief in the Supreme Being (Waaqa) 
The belief in Waaqa is one of the central notions in Kelbessa’s articulation of indigenous African 
environmental ethics. Waaqa is seen as the creator of everything, animate and inanimate. All 
living things depend on Waaqa (the Supreme Being) for their activities and functioning. Among 
the Oromo, according to Kelbessa, God or Waaqa and the Earth are inseparable. Waaqa is also 
associated with the sky. As Kelbessa avers, “... the Oromo view of the world supports the belief 
that we should see the universe as a single whole – as coherent because Waaqa creates 
everything in the universe” (Kelbessa, 2011:77). Kelbessa also says that the Oromo do not see 
the universe in a dualistic or dichotomous perspective. He says that the Oromo see everything in 
existence as bound together by the belief in Waaqa. The Oromo are expected to live in 
accordance with the cosmic order. Violation of the cosmic order is seen as an offence against 
Waaqa, whose punishment may come in the form of misfortune, such as illness, mishaps and bad 
luck for the offender. In other words, the Oromo worldview is claimed to support a holistic 
worldview akin to the postmodern Leopoldian-Darwinian-Einsteinian world view that is being 
advocated by environmentalists today. This view is also shared by Beyers, who says that the 
close relationship between humans, animals, plants and the non-living world defines the holistic 
African worldview. He claims that, in the African worldview, “humanity is interconnected to all 
                                                          
22
 According to Kelbessa (2011: 79), “The Qaalluu refers to both an institution and leaders who represent the 
institution.  The Qalluu leaders are the most respected and senior persons who are responsible for rituals and 
blessing." For more on the Qalluu, see 3.3.2(b) below. 
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living and non-living entities” that is, there is a “universal interdependence” or a reciprocal 
dependency between humans and the rest of nature and the supernatural (Beyers, 2010:5). Other 
scholars have also supported Kelbessa’s claims by arguing that environmental ethics as it is 
being advocated today finds its home in traditional African worldviews (Tangwa, 2004; Murove, 
2009; Behrens, 2010; Le Grange, 2012). Tangwa (2004: 389)for example, in his theory of 
environmental ethics that he refers to as eco-bio-communitarianism, writes:  
[In the African worldview] there is recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful 
co-existence between earth, plants, animals and humans. ... The distinction between plants, 
animals and inanimate things, between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the 
communal and the individual is a slim and a flexible one. 
So, the belief in Waaqa or the Supreme Being is the foundation on which the holistic view of 
nature among the Oromo is built. This belief plays an important role in the way the Oromo relate 
to nature. Since everything, human beings, non-human beings and supernatural beings are 
believed to be bound together with Waaqa in a harmonious relationship, the Oromo are obliged 
to promote this cosmic harmony by avoiding those things that may disrupt this harmony, 
including breaking the taboos and customs of the Oromo society. Therefore, following Waaqa’s 
directives about how to treat plants, animals and other creatures entails an important source of an 
environmental ethic that could be useful in protecting the environment today among the Oromo.   
In the next sub-section, I show how, according to Kelbessa, observing the Qaalluu institution 
also constitutes an important source of environmental ethics among the Oromo.    
3.3.2.2 The Qaalluu institution 
According to Kelbessa (2011:84), the Qaalluu are the religious leaders of the Oromo society. 
The Qaalluu institution comprises religious leaders who are the custodians of all the institutions 
of the Oromo. The Qaalluu leaders bestow blessings because of their closeness to Waaqa. They 
are seniors in ritual activities. They also arbitrate in cases of conflicting clans. According to 
Kelbessa, the Qaalluu follow a strict code of conduct. They are not allowed to curse, but only 
bless. They do not kill any living thing. Kelbessa sees the Qaalluu institution as having had a 
positive impact on the environment. He, for example, says that the taboo that forbids the Qaalluu 
leaders to eat the meat of certain wild animals enhances the preservation of wild animal species 
(Kelbessa, 2011:85). Kelbessa also says that some individuals in the Oromo society have tried to 
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associate with the Qaalluu leaders by performing similar practices such as avoiding the killing of 
living things and eating certain wild animals (Kelbessa, 2011:84-85). This, according to 
Kelbessa, has fostered an environmental ethic among the Oromo.  However, Kelbessa on the 
other hand contends that “today, it is hardly possible to find elders, leave alone, the Qaalluu 
leaders who are knowledgeable about the Qaalluu institution”. He blames the regime of Haile 
Selassie and also Christianity and Islam for ‘killing’ the Qaalluu institution or the Oromo 
religion in general (Kelbessa, 2011). Haile Selassie’s regime has been blamed, for example, for 
their villagisation and resettlement policy, and also relocation of people from Wollo to Illuabora 
(Kelbessa, 2011:63).The result was that resettled people destroyed sacred trees and forests 
without fear because many of them did not share the beliefs and practices of their hosts. Some of 
the policies of the then government of Ethiopia therefore contributed to the “killing” of some of 
the important traditional institutions of the Oromo. 
For Kelbessa, the Qaalluu institution and the Qaalluu leaders are nevertheless quite important as 
they are the custodians of the beliefs and practices of the Oromo, some of which are quite 
environmentally friendly. That is why Kelbessa argues that these traditional institutions should 
be rehabilitated in one way or another as evidenced in the words in the title of his major work, 
The Rehabilitation of Indigenous African Environmental Ethics, published in2011. 
 In the following section, I show how, according to Kelbessa, certain specific beliefs and 
practices of the Oromo concerning animals and trees amount to an environmental ethic. 
3.3.2.3 Animals and trees 
Workineh Kelbessa also uses the traditional beliefs and practices of the Oromo with regard to 
animals and trees to argue for the presence of an indigenous environmental ethics that helped to 
protect these aspects of nature in this society. I begin with a discussion of his observations about 
the Oromo's view of and practices around animals and then proceed to a discussion of the same 
regarding trees.  
With regard to animals, Kelbessa argues that the Oromo's traditional religion forces peasant 
farmers to respect animals. He says that animals found in sacred places were not killed. 
However, these animals could be killed in places that were not destined as sacred (see Kelbessa, 
2011:113). Furthermore, he observes that, in the Oromo belief system, animals such as a dappled 
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gazelle with a blaze on its forehead, a small white gazelle, animals with one horn, animals which 
have tufts on their backs and those with hairs on their head could not be killed because they are 
religious animals. Others that were not killed, according to Kelbessa, include animals with 
abnormal colour, the colobus monkey, and canaa and arataa who have no English names. The 
result was that these animal species were conserved.   
Kelbessa furthermore indicates that the Oromo practice some kind of totemism, with some clans 
considering certain types of animals as their relatives and thus according such animals a special 
respect. The lion, for example, is said to be a totem for the people of Soboka, of Gadhafa lineage. 
The people of this clan belong to the family of lions and are called Aboosaree. The clan performs 
rituals and offer sacrifices in respect of their totem, the lion, who they expect to reciprocate by 
not attacking the people or their animals. However, it must be noted here that the people of this 
clan make sacrifices of other animals in honour of their totem animal, the lion. This is to say 
animals are sacrificed in honour of other animals. In clans such as the Gona and Sabbo, the 
people revere boffa-snakes and puff adders as their respective symbols. These people usually 
sacrifice a domestic animal and give tallow and butter to the snakes. They revere the snakes as 
their relatives and the snakes, in turn, do not bite them (see Kelbessa, 2011:114).  Kelbessa 
concludes that “the ethically constrained relations of the Oromo with some animals go beyond 
purely selfish motives or practical needs and fear of retribution” (2011:115). He further says that 
the beliefs and practices of the Oromo concerning animals show that they recognise the inherent 
value of animal species. He thus declares that “Oromo indigenous wildlife management if 
carefully revived, can promote diversity of species which is in turn essential to maintain 
biological stability and diversity” (2011:116).  
However, some people have pointed out that only certain species of animals were considered 
sacred and thus preserved, leaving other species free for wanton exploitation in many traditional 
societies (Taringa, 2006; Burnett &Wa Kang’Ethe, 1994). Taringa (2006) says that, if continued 
for long enough, these practices of favouring certain species of animals and not others could 
create some ecological imbalances leading to an abundance of certain species while others go 
extinct. Further, Burnett and Wa Kang’Ethe observe that “[I]n traditional African societies, when 
certain animals appeared at the homestead they were tolerated, if not encouraged. ... In the field, 
they could be killed as readily as any other animals” (1994:157). This means that traditional 
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African attitudes towards animals were somehow discriminative. That is, beliefs and practices 
did not guarantee protection of all species of animals, which is contrary to what environmental 
ethics, and environmentalism in general, advocates.  
The same may be said of the custom of totemism. For example, a certain animal may be a totem 
animal to one clan or an individual person, and a normal animal to another (see Kelbessa, 
2011:114). So, while one clan would protect certain species of animals, other clans could exploit 
them without caring whether they were a totem or not. This is because any one clan or tribe in 
Africa is not obliged to follow the beliefs and practices of another clan or tribe unless one 
happens to be in another clan’s territory (Bourdillon, 1993). Furthermore, one may argue that the 
practice of totemism is only found in some clans or ethnic groups, while that custom does not 
exist in many other African societies.  
With regard to trees/forests/vegetation, Kelbessa argues that trees have a special value in the 
Oromo society because they are associated with Waaqa (God). Oromo religious and cultural 
ceremonies are performed under sacred trees or in groves. Some trees such as the qolloo or the 
Abdaarii are believed to be sacred and powerful spirits are believed to dwell in them. There also 
is a practice of performing prayers and rituals around permanent rivers, big mountains, hills and 
trees. According to Kelbessa, qolloo trees such as hoomii, qilxuu and waddeessa,for example, are 
well protected by the Oromo because they are places of prayer and they are also believed to be 
supernatural. These natural objects are revered and respected by the Oromo. Kelbessa contends, 
however, that “the Oromo are not worshipping the material symbols but the spirits of the 
symbols represented by the trees” (2011:83). This is an important observation because, as I show 
later, the trees and other natural objects are not protected because people recognise their 
ecological value but because they aim at appeasing the ancestral spirits that are believed to reside 
in those natural objects.  
Some other special trees such as the jiila or the korma korbessaa are identified as places for 
sacrifice of a bull and a male goat. Sacred or holy trees can never be felled until special rituals 
and sacrifices are performed. Other extraordinarily big trees such as the red Qilxuu (Sycamore) 
are also respected because they are used for shade for humans and animals. They are not felled 
anyhow. The Oromo also have a tradition of giving the names of big trees to their children and 
clan. Names of trees such as Dambii, Dhiqa, Fulleli, Garse, and Harooressa may be given to 
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children and clans. These trees thus are protected and cannot be cut without the permission of the 
clan head. According to Kelbessa, the Oromo believe that cutting sacred trees annoys the spirits 
and may cause death. Chopping down trees among the Oromo is regulated by Saffuu, a 
traditional code of laws and conduct expected to be adhered to by the Oromo. According to 
Kelbessa, Saffuu imposes a system of ecological checks and balances.  
Kelbessa thus concludes that the Oromo traditional beliefs and practices with regard to trees and 
animals correspond more with what environmental ethicists advocate today than the western 
traditions (modernity) that see trees and forests as purely valuable as economic objects. He 
claims that the Oromo admire forests and trees and even some animals aesthetically and thus 
protect some of these creatures on the grounds of their religious, recreational and aesthetic 
significance (see Kelbessa, 2011:127). So, according to Kelbessa, the traditional attitudes 
towards trees, forests and animals among the Oromo should be carefully examined and be 
revived and promoted as they have the potential of protecting the environment.  
The following is a look at the role of the belief in ancestors as an important anchor in Kelbessa’s 
formulation of indigenous African environmental ethics. In particular, I show the link between 
the belief in ancestors and the protection of some aspects of nature such as trees, animals and 
sacred groves/places and the role of these beliefs in contemporary Africa.  
3.3.2.4 The role of ancestors 
Ancestors also play a key role in Kelbessa’s articulation of African indigenous environmental 
ethics. Kelbessa’s articulation of African environmental ethics presupposes a strong belief in 
ancestors. The respect accorded to various aspects of nature such as totem animals, sacred trees 
and holy places are directly related to veneration of ancestors. African environmental ethics as 
currently articulated by Kelbessa and Murove therefore cannot stand without a strong belief in 
ancestors. This belief is seen as the pillar of African religions and worldviews and their 
corresponding practices (Mbiti, 1990; Stinton, 2004). This is because ancestors are seen as the 
guardians of the moral and social order of the community. The ancestors are seen as “moral 
paragons”. In other ways, observation of the ways of the ancestors and their prohibitions is seen 
as important in maintaining peace and harmony with the cosmic order (i.e., among human 
beings, and between human beings and nonhuman entities). Commenting on the indispensability 
of the belief in ancestors in African morality, Awolalu and Dopamu (1979:27) write:  
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Belief in ancestors supplies sanction for public morality. They are the guardians of traditional 
morality. They, therefore, demand a high sense of respect for the traditional law and custom. The 
living must live as they have lived. It is believed that just as the living parents have power to 
punish disobedience in the youth or dereliction of filial duties so also the neglected or offended 
ancestors can punish their offspring for moral offences, and they can bring disaster upon the 
whole family. 
 
Further, highlighting the importance of the belief in ancestors in African ethics, Benezet Bujo 
and Felix Murove argue that anamnestic solidarity between the living and the ancestors provides 
the basis for an African ethics. Bujo & Murove (2009: 319) thus writes: 
African ethics are articulated in the framework of anamnesis, which involves remembering one’s 
ancestors. ...  Ethical behaviour in the Black African context always involves re-establishing the 
presence of one’s ancestors; for one who takes anamnesis seriously is challenged to confront the 
ethical rules drawn by the ancestors 
In extension, belief in ancestors is seen to be critical in facilitating the protection of the natural 
environment because the natural environment is the medium for communication with the 
ancestral spirits, and it is also the home of ancestral spirits and gods.  
Supporting the appeal to ancestors in articulating African environmental ethics, Kevin Behrens 
(2012) claims that the belief in ancestors is still relevant to Africans and that these beliefs can 
provide us with a basis for protecting the environment as our moral obligation towards the future 
generations. Behrens (2012:181) thus writes:  
When considering the obligations to future generations in African thought a key factor is the 
pervasive belief that the ancestors continue to exert an influence over the lives of their living 
descendants, guiding their behaviour, and even punishing and rewarding them. These beliefs still 
play an important role in African life, across all strata of society. 
So, when some defenders of African environmental ethics refer to the role of ancestors in 
protecting the environment, they not only refer to the distant pre-colonial past, but actually mean 
that, even today, we can appeal to the ancestors in our quest to protect the African environment.  
However, some scholars point out that too much attention to and fear of ancestors has crippled 
the African person in terms of being creative and autonomous, and this cannot help to address 
the challenges that face Africa today (see Wiredu, 1980; and Gyeke, 1997). This is why Gyeke 
1997: 168) counsels rather poignantly that:  
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The post-colonial problems of Africa clearly show that the [belief in] ancestors can no longer be 
helpful. The greatest reverence we, the descendants of the ancestors, can show to them is to let 
them rest in peace.  
For his part, Wiredu goes further in discouraging undue attention paid to the ancestors by 
claiming that the belief in “ancestral spirits and in many other traditional African institutions and 
cultural practices are based on superstition” (Wiredu, 1980). By superstition, Wiredu means, “... 
a rationally unsupported belief in entities of any sort” (Wiredu, 1980:41).23 Wiredu says that 
even some western philosophers could be said to have held superstitious beliefs, for example, 
Plato’s world of forms and Kant’s noumenal world are equally superstitious because they are 
beliefs that cannot be verified. They are believed only to satisfy imagination. So, there should be 
no offence in saying that some traditional African beliefs and practices were based on 
superstition; in fact, this type of superstition has been a common phenomenon in almost all 
primal/tribal or pre-industrial societies throughout the world.  
3.3.3 Conclusion 
In this section, I have been presenting Kelbessa’s version of African environmental ethics. I 
showed that the belief in a Supreme Being (Waaqa); the belief in the Qaalluu institution (‘a 
council’ of senior elders and traditional religious leaders); the taboos and totemic beliefs about 
trees and animals; and the belief in the supernatural power of ancestors with the corresponding 
cultural and ritual practices properly articulated constitute an environmental ethics. I argued that, 
although Kelbessa’s approach is not too theoretical because he focuses on concrete traditional 
practices and beliefs of the Oromo that are favourable to the environment, his overemphasis or 
reliance on traditional institutions and governance structures which are actually not functional 
today, renders the practical import of his approach in the current African context questionable.  
The way I see it, Kelbessa has been doing two things. The first one is to show (which he does 
successfully, at least at the theoretical level just like Murove) that traditional African beliefs and 
cultural practices could be an important source of an environmental ethics and that it is not 
correct to claim that African thought and philosophy has nothing to offer to the theoretical 
                                                          
23
It must be noted here that, for Wiredu, the belief in abstract entities among western philosophers, content wise, 
could be considered just as superstitious as the African beliefs in ancestral spirits; what makes western beliefs or 
‘philosophies’ less superstitious is only that their proponents provide reasoned arguments for their beliefs, unlike 
their African counterparts in traditional African societies (Wiredu, 1980). 
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debates on environmental ethics. The second thing that Kelbessa does is to go a step further and 
show the practical relevance of his approach to environmental ethics. He does this by arguing 
that we can appeal to traditional African beliefs and cultural practices to actually protect the 
environment today. This is where questions arise as to the practicality and relevance of 
traditional African beliefs and institutions in addressing our current environmental problems. 
Some scholars have in fact questioned the “environmentalness” of the indigenous African 
thought or philosophy, doubting whether indigenous African environmental ethics is an 
environmental ethics at all. That is why I join those who say that indigenous traditional 
environmental ethics was not a self-conscious or deliberate environmental ethics. The question 
following from this, a question also acknowledged by Kelbessa, is: Could this latent indigenous 
environmental ethics be made a self-conscious or deliberate environmental ethics? And if so, 
how?  As I indicate later, the answer to this question is that it may be difficult to do that, unless 
we change the way we think of environmental ethics, especially in relation to Africa. But before 
I do that I consider some of the important criticisms regarding indigenous African environmental 
ethics.  
3.4 Some general criticisms on indigenous African environmental ethics 
Before I present these criticisms, I must point out that Murove’s and Kelbessa’s work on African 
environmental ethics could be said to be ground-breaking. I say this because they managed to 
bring African perspectives to international environmental ethics in a way that not many people 
had attempted to do before. Their works are now becoming points of reference for many of those 
writing on African environmental ethics or environmental ethics from African perspectives. They 
succeeded to dispel the notion that African thought has nothing to contribute to the current 
discourse on African environmental ethics for the first time. Because of their works, which have 
now found their way into renowned international environmental ethics journals such as 
Environmental Ethics and Environmental Values and other International journals, the earlier 
complaints that African perspectives had been sidelined on the international stage of 
environmental ethics are no longer relevant.  
However, as I have been arguing throughout this chapter, Murove and Kelbessa only succeeded 
at the theoretical level. They succeeded in contributing insights from African thought and 
worldviews to theoretical environmental ethics, but when it comes to the practical usefulness, 
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and especially as a guide for taking action, these approaches are found wanting. In fact, what 
Murove and Kelbessa have been doing is not very different from what mainstream 
environmental ethicists have been doing, namely to establish an overarching theoretical approach 
to environmental ethics that could be used as a guideline to address the environmental crisis 
around the globe. The only difference is that, in their case, Murove and Kelbessa are doing that 
from an African perspective. As I showed in Chapter 2, though, foundationalist deductive 
approaches to environmental ethics have also not borne the expected fruits, especially at the 
practical policy level from a philosophical pragmatists’ point of view. 
A number of other criticisms (apart from the one just mentioned above) have been raised in 
connection with Murove's and Kelbessa’s approaches and indigenous African environmental 
ethics in general. The first one concerns whether the philosophy of Ubuntu/Ukama and its 
associated values such as communality and sociality of Africans really do support an 
environmental ethics; the second one entails questions regarding the “environmentalness” of the 
indigenous African beliefs and practices, in other words, this criticism is based on the question 
whether what is presented as indigenous African environmental ethics is really an environmental 
ethic. The third criticism is based on the problem of misinterpretation of traditions, and the last 
one that I would like to discuss is based on the problem of discordance between belief/ideology 
and practice/environmental behaviour. I now consider one criticism after the other.  
3.4.1 On Ubuntu and Ukama as sources of African environmental ethics 
One of the criticisms that have been advanced against the philosophy of Ubuntu and Ukama as 
founding concepts of an African environmental ethic includes the argument by a South African 
scholar and animal rights activist, Kai Horsthemke, that: 
Suggestions that Ubuntu requires respect for the environment are fundamentally flawed, since 
Ubuntu is anthropocentric by definition. Thus any attempt to expand Ubuntu to embrace respect 
for environment would have to ground concern for nature in terms of its usefulness to humans. 
(Horsthemke, n.d.:5-6) 
This criticism has been countered by the argument that Ubuntu, in essence, is a concrete 
expression of Ukama, and Ukama logically implies relatedness with the physical world (Murove, 
2009). It has also been noted that the African values of Ubuntu and Ukama should not be 
reduced to the category of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric distinction (Le Grange, 
2012). This is because, it has been argued, “the self, the community and nature are inextricably 
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bound up with one another ... [as such] nurturing the self or caring for other human beings is not 
antagonistic towards caring for other non-human nature” ( Grange, 2012:335).  
 
Other scholars such as Enslin and Horsthemke (2005) see a contradiction or an inherent 
weakness in the principle of Ubuntu and Ukama. Thus they observe that Ubuntu/Ukama is 
contradicted by the many ills, such as corruption, dictatorships and autocratic rule, xenophobia 
and environmental degradation that are rampant on the continent of Africa (Enslin 
&Horsthemke, 2005:67). They are asking, in other words: Where is humanness (Ubuntu) amidst 
all these ills. A further pertinent question that they pose is: has Ubuntu helped to protect the 
African environment in anyway? The answer seems to be negative. Many advocates of African 
environmental ethics (see, for example, Tangwa, 2004; Ramose, 2009; Chemhuru &Masaka, 
2010; Kelbessa, 2011; Ikuenobe, 2014) usually put the blame on colonialism and its effects such 
as capitalism, and foreign religions as the reason for the killing of the spirit of Ubuntu and hence 
the consequent ills mentioned above, coupled with the despoliation of the African environments. 
However, other scholars have shown that even before the advent of colonialism, some African 
traditional practices were not as environmentally friendly as it is claimed and that Africans 
degraded their environments even in pre-colonial times (see, for example, Wiredu, 1994: 
Ongugbemi, 1996; Adams &McShane, 1996). I expound on this a little later.    
 
Further, Mamphela Ramphele, commenting on these celebrated notions of Ubuntu/Ukama 
among Southern African scholars, Ramphele (1995: 15) thus cautions: 
Ubuntu is not unique. It is conceptually and practically associated with a long and profound 
tradition of humanist concern, caring and compassion also prominent in western thought. We 
have to have the humility to acknowledge that we are not inventing unique problems in this 
country, nor are we likely to invent entirely new solutions.   
Moreover, the concept of Ubuntu and its related values such as communality, sociality and 
humanness are viewed as exaggerations of the reality of Africa and the African person. Thus, 
Nyasani (2010:84) observes: 
… it cannot anymore be difficult to detect the fact that Africa’s sociality, mutual compassion and 
tolerance may after all be nothing more than sweet, misplaced and hastily fabricated concepts 
supposedly ascribed to Africans either to please them or  simply to remind them that they are 
racially distinct and different from the mainstream mankind.  … Africans, like all human beings 
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anywhere, are also ruled and governed by the ordinary animal instinct of self-preservation, self-
regard, selfishness and self- survival first and foremost. 
According to Nyasani, therefore, there is nothing extraordinary about Ubuntu and communal 
living in traditional African societies because they just could not help but live that kind of life. 
Circumstances of the time dictated it and these values are not unique to Africa. Elaborating 
further on this, Nyasani (ibid.) avers that “the philosophy of sociality or communality was 
always fostered and nurtured more by the ubiquitous physical dangers and the inability of man to 
manage and safeguard his own fate single-handedly and without resorting to the corporate or 
communal intervention”.   This observation has been claimed to be true in Africa as it has been 
in all traditional rural or tribal cultures all over the world (see, for example, Wiredu, 1980). 
Gaspar Schweigman, a critic of Nyerere’s socialist experiment in Tanzania, particularly the 
villagization project,
24
 corroborates the above claim by noting: 
Under very specific environmental, social, political and economic conditions [where] people are 
isolated and no formal systems of security exist, it is not surprising that people have to rely on the 
family or neighbourhoods for social security. Solidarity between people exists, not because they 
are African, but because they live in very specific conditions. If conditions change, the 
characteristics of human behaviour may change as well. (Schweigman, 2001: 120). 
Schweigman further claims that this sense of Ubuntu and Ukama or community and solidarity 
among Africans existed, and exists even today in some societies, only mainly among close 
relatives within a family or extended family, and not between different households of families in 
a village, or with other villages or clans (Schweigman, 2001).  
Sogolo (1990) makes more or less the same observation when he observes that it was this feeling 
of Ubuntu or family-hood or closeness among those who were related by blood, and not a feeling 
for the human race that made African communalism work in traditional Africa. He furthermore 
claims that this feeling of family or closeness among members of the same family or clan 
became possible because “people worked all their lives in the same locale and among the same 
close relatives” (Sogolo, 1990:167). It has been said therefore that these societies changed 
through the introduction of a money economy, urbanisation, intermarriages and population 
                                                          
24
 For a detailed treatment of the socialist experiment in Tanzania, and in particular the impact of the villagization 
policy on the environment, see, Hyden, 1980;  Legum, 1988;  Havnevik, 1993; Kikula, 1997.  
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increase. Life became more complex and heterogeneous (multicultural), and the importance and 
necessity of communal living and hence Ubuntu diminished (Sogolo, 1990; Bourdillon, 1993).      
Wiredu (1980:29), for his part, says that the “traditional codes of conduct [including the 
communitarian ethos] evolved in the context of less complex societies, in which extensive family 
and neighbourhood connections facilitated the development of a sense of communal fellowship 
and responsibility.  … A milieu which is no more”. Thus it has been observed that although 
certain values, practices and belief systems have been known to work perfectly well in traditional 
Africa, it does not necessarily mean that they can be applicable to contemporary Africa (Nyasani, 
2010).  
In an article in a newspaper, Thabelsi Hoeane warns rather poignantly that:  
Shrouding our problems in romantic idealism wastes much-needed energy on controversial 
concepts like "Ubuntu", the affirmation of humanity that is supposedly a panacea for Africa's 
problems. In reality, it reflects only a developmental stage of human society under communalism. 
(Hoeane, 2003)  
The spirit of Ubuntu and Ukama which facilitated communal living among close relatives in 
traditional Africa is said to be motivated by the universal goals of wellbeing that every human 
aspires for, rather than being a unique African trait. Thus Schweigman (2001:120) maintains: 
If there are basic unchangeable features at the root of a society … such as universal goals of 
physical wellbeing and social wellbeing …, then they are not specifically African but human. All 
other characteristics such as solidarity, humanness and sense of community are the results of 
these universal goals. 
To substantiate the claims that communal living was not a specifically African phenomenon, 
Wiredu (1994) observes that even agrarian societies in medieval and ancient rural Europe 
exhibited a sense of Ubuntu or a communal mode of living akin to the African one. Charles 
Dundas emphasises the same point when he observes: 
A history of primitive England might run much the same course [as African history], and we 
should peruse it with interest. But what we cannot reconstruct from our own remote past we may 
see a reflection of in the lives and histories of other peoples whose days of primitive existence are 
not so remote. (Dundas, 1968:106) 
To conclude, the criticisms above caution us on two basic points. The first one is to remind us 
that what we consider to be a uniquely African way of doing things or African values is not 
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unique to Africa as such. Values such as Ubuntu and communality are common to all pre-
industrial societies. If they did not help, strictly speaking, to protect the environment then, why 
should they do so today? So, we should not be too optimistic about these ideas giving us 
something new to address our current environmental problems. The challenge we face today in 
Africa is, in part, rather to understand how changed circumstances and contemporary social-
political-economic trends put pressure on communities and the livelihoods of families in rural 
and urban areas alike, thereby fundamentally influencing their interactions with, and relatedness 
to their immediate environments.  
The second point is that the presence of Ubuntu/Ukama in our traditional societies did not help to 
salvage the environment as is usually claimed. That is, the “environmentalness” or the broader 
ecological import of Ubuntu/Ukama and other traditional African beliefs and practices as an 
environmental ethics are questionable. Below, I present the second category in which criticisms 
of indigenous African environmental ethics is based, namely, the “environmentalness” of the 
traditional beliefs and practices. 
3.4.2 The “environmentalness” of traditional African beliefs and practices 
I show, below, that some scholars question the extent to which traditional/indigenous African 
beliefs and practices or worldviews constitute an environmental ethics at all. Alternatively, they 
question the extent to which traditional African beliefs and practices actually lead to an 
environmental ethics. They question the environmental consciousness of traditional African 
societies. They question the extent to which the pre-colonial African societies’ ways of life were 
environmentally benign; and whether their religious beliefs and cultural practices engendered an 
ecological awareness among these societies that, in turn, led them to co-exist in peace and 
harmony with nature, as is being claimed.  
These scholars question claims such as those made by Kelbessa who writes that “the Oromo of 
Ethiopia maintain perfect balance between nature and culture and that religious attitudes, values 
and practices force peasant farmers to revere nature and natural places” (Kelbessa, 2011:26). 
They also question the practicality of the calls that are being made to rehabilitate the indigenous 
environmental ethics in Africa based on the traditional religious beliefs and practices of the 
African ethnic groups as in the example of the Oromo of Ethiopia (Kelbessa, 2005; 2011). Some 
scholars likewise question Murove’s assumption that the loss of Ubuntu and Ukama among 
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Africans is the reason for the current environmental problems in Africa and that these values 
need to be restored (Murove, 2009; Ramose, 2009).  Let me now present those cautions one after 
another. 
It has been pointed out that, although traditional religious beliefs, attitudes and cultural practices 
had some environmental benefits, they were nonetheless not environmentally motivated in the 
first place (Adams & McShane, 1996; Kretch III, 1999; Lowe & Paavola, 2005). Thus we are 
cautioned not to assume that indigenous or traditional societies treaded lightly on the earth, and 
that they were some sort of ‘ecological saints’. It has been claimed therefore that indigenous or 
traditional societies all over the world altered the environment, even beyond its capacity to 
regenerate, so as to meet their needs of the time (Adams & McShane, 1996). In The Ecological 
Indian, Kretch III (1999: 98), for example, argues: 
The Industrial Revolution far outpaced what came before and left unprecedented demographic, 
technological, and environmental changes in its wake. In recent years that pace has sped up so 
greatly and the impacts have become so extensive that we tend to forget that pre-industrial 
societies also had environmental effects, and their success in living within a region’s capacity 
might have had more to do with accident than design. As David Lowenthal, a cultural geographer 
remarked, “the acceleration of environmental transformations blinds us to their antiquity". 
In what could have been a response to the claims made by Kelbessa and other advocates of 
indigenous African environmental ethics that the Oromo (African) traditional religion and 
worldview made people co-exist in perfect balance and harmony with nature, in the Myth of Wild 
Africa, Adams & McShane (1996: 34) likewise contend: 
It is tempting, in fact, to romanticize Africans as living in complete harmony with their 
environment, and enforcing cultural sanctions to prevent the overuse of natural resources. But 
such an attitude – reminiscent of the “noble savage” living in a state of nature – goes too far. 
Rural Africans like any people dependent on their immediate environment for their survival, alter 
the environment to meet their needs.  
It has also been claimed that there is evidence to the effect that humans, “since the times of 
hunters and gatherers, caused extinctions of large mammals and widespread changes in various 
parts of the world, Africa included” (Lowe & Paavola, 2005:5).  
Further, Soper (2005: 54) argued: 
… It would be a mistake and anachronistic to suppose that pre-modern culture was greener or 
more ecologically concerned in any contemporary sense with the protection and conservation of 
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the environment. … Even if we find any evidence of particular individuals or groups expressing 
ecological ideas that chime with those of environmentalists today we need to be wary of imputing 
those to their culture at large. These societies were certainly less damaging environmentally 
(largely by reason of their less developed technological capacities). 
Harris (1995:181) likewise cautions that it is an “anachronism” to claim that pre-modern 
societies were ecologically benign and aware in the modern sense.  Philip W. Sutton, a 
sociologist, puts it more blatantly as he writes: 
The idea that people in the previous types of societies lived bucolic lives in happy harmony with 
their natural environment is patently false and bears more than a passing resemblance to the 
biblical story of the human species’ fall from grace. Such a view leads to the equally misleading 
idea that the modern industrial societies are artificial constructions by comparison. The danger of 
this line of thinking is that it might lead us to believe that a return to some previous type of social 
organization would solve all our environmental problems (Sutton, 2007:70). 
This caution serves to call into question the belief among some environmentalists that there 
existed an eco-golden age of peaceful co-existence between humans and nature that current 
people need to emulate. 
It is noted also that, while it is true that traditional African societies developed some quite 
effective indigenous knowledge on how to manage their environment and resources that we 
might envy today, this again cannot be attributed to their having an environmental awareness or 
ethic. To support the notion that traditional ecological knowledge should not be idealised, R. E. 
Johanness gives a specific example of the Pacific Islanders as he says: 
… Although [their] marine environmental knowledge and practices can be exceptionally 
valuable, this is only to be expected of people who have depended so heavily for centuries on 
their marine resources. Moreover, Islanders are not, and never were paragons of environmental 
wisdom and virtue (Johanness, 2003:111). 
According to Johanness, many indigenous peoples have a bad environmental record just like 
many other cultures around the world, the difference being only in their technological capacities 
with which to exploit nature; meaning that low technological endowment implies low impact on 
nature. 
It is true, of course, that some beliefs and practices and the worldview of the traditional Africans 
in general had some ecological or environmental benefits. However,  the ostensible beneficial 
impact of some of the African traditional beliefs and practices regarding the environment were 
an “unintended by-product of an institution designed for other purposes”, and not for conserving 
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nature as such (Adams & McShane, 1996: 102). This implies that their effects on nature 
conservation happened only as “a consequence rather than an objective” (Kideghesho, 2009). 
The main purpose of these beliefs and practices, as has been pointed out, was to maintain a 
harmonious relationship between human beings and the ancestral world which was believed to 
be essential for the day-to-day welfare of communities. So, the purpose of these beliefs and 
practices was more sociological than environmental (see, for example, Wiredu, 1994; Taringa, 
2006; Momen, 2009). 
Now, I give all of the many quotations above as an emphasis to caution against the emerging 
body of literature in African environmental ethics that tends to uncritically glorify the pre-
colonial African values and beliefs in relation to the natural environment. All of these cautions 
and criticisms serve to show that traditional African values, beliefs and practices cannot be a 
panacea for our environmental problems as it is assumed. They further give support to the 
argument that that holding environmentally favourable ideologies and philosophies does not 
necessarily translate into environmental awareness and behaviour. It is my argument therefore 
that, to protect our African environments, we need to look seriously into the actual beliefs and 
practices of people today and build from there, rather than rely on some a priori approach that 
seems to result in ideas that are not applicable in addressing our current environmental concerns. 
As Momen (2009:356) points out, “seeing nature as organic and spiritual and seeing humans 
holistically interconnected with nature can at times be a Western interpolated interpretation of 
African Religion and worldviews”. In the following sub-section, I justify this claim by 
considering, in some detail, the problem of misinterpretation of traditions as another thing that 
may pose difficulties when talking about traditional African environmental ethics. 
3.4.3 The problem of misinterpretation of traditions 
Scholars like Guha (1989), Harris (1995), Sinha, Gururani and Greenberg (1997) and Tomalin 
(2002) argue that traditional/indigenous cultures are misread and misinterpreted in most 
instances, sometimes on purpose to support environmentalists’ goals. According to these 
scholars, however, this may not provide a sustainable solution to the current environmental 
crisis, especially in developing countries. Harris (1995: 181), quoting Huber, warns, for example, 
that "we should, as scholars, be careful not to distort the historical and ethnographic record of 
those [pre-modern] societies in order to strengthen our case". As such, this warning is applicable 
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to both western environmental ethics and most efforts to construct an indigenous African 
environmental ethics in so far as they appeal to the beliefs and practices of traditional societies. I 
showed earlier in Chapter 2 that western environmentalists usually picture the indigenous or 
traditional societies and their ways of life as being environmentally benign, and thus they urge 
western societies and others to emulate the non-western environmental values. Most African 
scholars writing on environmental ethics have also been caught in the same trap; the trap of 
romanticising the beliefs and practices of traditional societies with regard to the environment. 
Expanding on the foregoing caution, Tomalin (2002:15) sees the assumption that pre-modern 
people were ecologically benign or aware as simply an interpretation of tradition. He argues that 
this leads to the distortion of the original meaning and purpose of certain beliefs and practices in 
a culture. Interpretation of tradition, Tomalin argues, is about giving meanings to certain beliefs 
and practices to satisfy a certain cause. This has also been referred to as “mining the traditions 
for what you want from it” (Kaza, 2006:201). Traditional interpretation, on the contrary, usually 
maintains or preserves the original meanings and purpose of certain beliefs and practices in a 
culture (Tomalin, 2002). Tomalin and others thus point out that most western environmentalists 
have been giving an interpretation of the traditions of indigenous or traditional societies’ 
worldviews, and hence, attributing to these traditional societies an environmental consciousness 
or an ethic that is/was actually not there. The same applies to the growing African environmental 
discourse that idealises or glorifies the past (Adams & McShane, 1996; Tomalin, 2002; Taringa, 
2006).  
 Further, according to Johanness (2003), the interpretation of traditions in most cases amounts to 
a selective reading of the evidence or selective use of information by picking only what supports 
one’s cause and disregarding all evidence to the contrary. According to Johanness (2003:110), 
this is some form of “intellectual dishonesty”. The following is a good example of a 
misinterpretation of traditions to fit the environmentalist cause.  
In one of his works, Baird Callicott wrongly claimed that the Chipko
25
 Movement depicts “the 
foundational ideas in Hindu Philosophy” (see Callicott 1997:218), in the sense that it is the 
                                                          
25
 The Chipko or Hug the Tree Movement was a peasant movement against deforestation on the Himalayan 
foothills. This movement resisted the unsustainable demand for timber placed on their land by the growing cities 
and industry (see Guha, 1989; also Guha & Martinez-Alier, 1997). 
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ecological orientation in Hindu Philosophy or religion that led people to protest against the 
butchering of trees by hugging (Chipko) them. And thus, the Chipko Movement has wrongly 
been viewed as “a popular initiative to repudiate modernity and recover tradition” (Sinha, et al., 
1997:67). To the contrary, Sinha (1997) argues that the movement, is basically “a fight for basic 
subsistence that has been denied to them by institutions and policies of the state” and not 
otherwise. It can be concluded therefore that the Chipko Movement carries with it pragmatic and 
symbolic motives more than philosophical and religious motives. 
Another problem that may result from misinterpreting traditions and cultures, or interpreting 
non-western beliefs and practices within the western conception of environmentalism and 
environmental ethics, is that it may result in ideas that are completely strange or alien to the 
receiving culture.  According to Kalland (2000: 327): 
The interpretations of non-western cultures in western environmentalists’ lenses has produced 
environmentalist and animal rights discourses which are quite alien to the donor cosmologies. Not 
only has animal rights discourse—and to a lesser extent the environmentalist discourse—turned 
respect for game animals into ‘intrinsic value’, but also their missionary zeal stands in sharp 
contrast to the contextual approaches of many local peoples. Ironically, then, the environmentalist 
and animal rights discourses at times pose a threat to the life-styles of local people who depend 
on the utilization of animal resources. 
 
The foregoing argument implies that the respect some traditional people showed for game 
animals, for example, is very different from the kind of respect that is being advocated today by 
environmentalists. Confusing the two, therefore, might result in an environmental ethics that is 
foreign to the people concerned, and which may be unlikely to have the persuasive power needed 
to influence a change of attitude with regard to nature protection among the local people. Thus it 
seems that imposing interpretations on traditions and cultures to fit environmentalists’ goals 
might not help to address current environmental problems because, after all, the beliefs and 
values and customs inherent in these traditions and cultures did not, strictly speaking, prevent 
people from degrading the environment in the past. The reason is simple: these beliefs and 
practices were not intended to protect nature. That is why Wiredu (1994:36) correctly maintains 
that, “Historically, neither conventional morality nor even an ethic of reverence for nature … has 
proved to be a panacea for environmental degradation”.  
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All the above reservations again point to the need for articulating a down-to-earth environmental 
ethics relevant to contemporary Africa while avoiding being too romantic about the 
environmental merits of traditional African worldviews.   The problem of putting too much faith 
in the traditional African beliefs and practices as a panacea for our current environmental 
problems may have also arisen from confusing ideology and practice. This criticism alludes to 
what may be called the discordance between ideology/belief and practice, which I discuss in the 
following section, while reiterating my earlier argument that holding a particular favourable 
philosophy about nature does not automatically lead to favourable environmental behaviour.    
3.4.4 Discordance between ideology/belief and practice 
To expound on the claim that there often is discordance in beliefs about nature firmly held by 
people (their worldview or ideology) and their actual environmental behaviour (their actual 
environmental ethic), I begin by giving the following specific examples from Oriental traditions 
which show that “nature worship” does not necessarily lead to the protection of nature; or put 
differently, that treating some aspects of nature as sacred among Oriental cultures did not 
automatically translate into environmental behaviour among the adherents of that culture.  Bryan 
Norton, for example, points out that Hindus took care not to kill insects and other creatures, and 
that this behaviour thus seemed as if it was motivated by an environmental awareness, i.e. that 
the Hindu recognised the intrinsic value of the insects. However, according to Norton (1984), as 
quoted in Kalof and Satterfield (2005:84), “The Hindus and Jains, in proscribing the killing of 
insects, etc., show concern for their own spiritual development rather than for the actual lives of 
those insects”. Now, this is not an environmental ethic in the strict sense of the term (of holding a 
view that is aimed explicitly and directly towards protection of the insects), although, in the 
process, certain insect species are saved as a consequence of a belief held about the spiritual 
development of human beings. 
Another example is that of the sacred river in India called the Ganges. It was assumed by some 
environmentalists that, since the Ganges was considered sacred, people would treat it with 
reverence and avoid acts that may pollute it. As Tomalin (2002:25) to the contrary observes, “the 
belief in the sacredness of goddess Ganga actually seemed to lead people to the conclusion that 
she could look after herself, that there was nothing they could do to either enhance or sully her 
ritual purity”. Research among the pandas (pilgrim priests) along the banks of river Ganges 
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showed that they were not concerned with the physical pollution of the Ganges, as such, but 
rather with her ritual purity (Tomalin, 2002). So, the pandas would not mind throwing rubbish 
and dirt into the river when performing religious rites at the river. This is because they were 
more concerned with avoiding spiritual pollution and not physical pollution. This is another 
instance that shows that holding some aspects of the environment as sacred did not automatically 
translate into nature protection or environmental consciousness, as some environmentalists seem 
to have assumed.   
Moreover, it has been observed that, despite the long tradition of a philosophy or a worldview 
allegedly favourable towards the natural environment among the Chinese (say, Confucianism, 
Taoism and Buddhism), it did not prevent the Chinese from degrading their environment. 
Wiredu reveals that, despite their alleged pro-environmental culture or philosophy, “the Chinese 
used their technological capacity with vim to build large cities (large by modern standards as far 
back as [the] seventeenth century) and manufacture other amenities at a huge cost to [their] 
forests and land” (Wiredu, 1994:34). A recent study conducted in China further concludes that 
most Chinese, just like Africans and Indians, have very limited concern today for the natural 
environment beyond its utility for human health or economic prosperity (Harris, 2005).  
As mentioned earlier, some western environmentalists did actually misinterpret indigenous 
people’s beliefs and practices to support their own cause. The articulations of African 
environmental ethics, particularly as formulated and motivated by Kelbessa and Murove, have 
also moved in the same direction, i.e., depicting African traditional beliefs and cultural practices 
as leading to an environmental awareness or ethic among the people. The problem with these 
interpretations is that they create a distorted or false belief that traditional Africans had some 
kind of a special environmental wisdom that the current generation needs to emulate. According 
to Ali Mazrui, this tendency of longing for a “glorious” and “pristine” past is some kind of a 
nostalgia, or a “cultural myth making” and “false memory” which includes inventing or 
“believing in a past that never was” (Mazrui, 2000:89). This tendency is prevalent among 
‘Africanist’ scholars, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.  
My argument in this regard is that many of the traditional beliefs and practices on which African 
environmental ethics is based were not, strictly speaking, environmentally motivated. The 
conservational benefits of some of these traditional beliefs and practices were only accidental, or 
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one may say, they were unintended consequences of something designed for other purposes. The 
observation of some of these beliefs and practices also led to the conservation or protection of 
only certain aspects of nature, leaving others open for wanton use. Taboos and the practice of 
totemism led to the protection of certain aspects of nature only. Now, if by an environmental 
ethics we mean any belief and/or practice that, consciously or not, may lead to the protection of 
only some aspects of the environment, then traditional African beliefs and practices constitute an 
environmental ethics. However, if by environmental ethics we mean looking for ways to provide 
a protective canopy over the whole of nature, and not just some aspects of it, then indigenous 
traditional African beliefs and practices (or the traditional African worldviews) do not, strictly 
speaking, constitute an environmental ethics. The only thing we could say about these traditional 
African worldviews is that they have some elements that resemble what modern environmental 
ethicists and environmentalists advocate, such as being close to nature, and a holistic view of the 
world. But, as mentioned earlier, these traditional African worldviews did not lead to an overall 
and explicitly held environmental consciousness or an ethic. 
This means that, for the traditional African worldviews to qualify as a real environmental ethics, 
we shall have to find a way of making those traditional beliefs and practices, including taboos 
and the belief in and practice of totemism, not only protect some species of animals and trees or 
forests but all trees and animal species, bearing in mind the livelihoods of people directly or 
indirectly dependent on them. I believe this is difficult to achieve in practice, though, if not 
impossible; which is why I argue that now we need to shift our focus to finding an approach to 
environmental ethics that is capable of addressing the current environmental concerns of the 
people of Africa in practice instead of focusing too much on proving (in theory) the ecological 
worth of traditional African worldviews. So, I argue that it is high time that we reduced the talk 
of an African environmental ethics anchored in African metaphysics and ontology and begin to 
talk about an environmental ethics relevant to the current African context; let us talk of an 
environmental ethics approach that really does work or has practical relevance under the current 
African circumstances. 
I think this change of focus is important because an overemphasis of African environmental 
ethics anchored in traditional African worldviews has the danger of making us end up with ideas 
that are purported to be African but finding that these ideas are actually alien to Africans 
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themselves. This is because traditional African worldviews, as I showed earlier, are sometimes 
interpreted in a manner that fits western environmentalists’ framework with the result of 
attributing meanings to African beliefs and practices not actually originally intended in those 
beliefs and practices. The type of environmental ethics that results from this kind of approach 
can therefore be detached from the daily realities and concerns of people at times.  It is my 
conviction, as I argued in Chapter 2, that an environmental ethic relevant to the current African 
context can be achieved if we adopt an enlightened approach to environmental ethics in the form 
of a pragmatic environmental approach.  
In the following section, I attempt to show that perspectives may emerge that can help us to 
construct the practical environmental ethics that we require to respond in policy and in practice 
to the concrete environmental problems experienced in Africa by many people, including those 
living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, if we understand the current African worldview from 
a pragmatic point of view as a mixture of different worldviews functioning in a multiplicity of 
contexts.  
3.5 Current African worldviews in a pragmatic perspective 
I mentioned in the foregoing section that one important thing that we note from the different 
formulations of African environmental ethics, notably by Murove and Kelbessa, is an 
overemphasis on the traditional African thought or worldview. Yet, we find a mixture of 
different worldviews in contemporary Africa. That is why some scholars have questioned the 
tendency to conceive the African worldview in exclusively traditional terms, disregarding the 
changes that have taken place in Africa (Wiredu, 1980; Taringa, 2006). There has been a 
tendency among some scholars to describe African worldviews in terms of folk or pre-colonial 
African thought, disregarding the current realities in Africa (Wiredu, 1980). For example, when 
some scholars like Murove and Kelbessa talk of African perspectives they usually overemphasise 
the traditional perspectives. It has been counselled, however, that new refined 
cultures/worldviews emerge because values, beliefs and attitudes (a worldview) are dynamic, 
and continuously evolve, adapt and accommodate new values, beliefs and practices in complex 
ways (Field, 1967; Oladipo, 1995) and “no community should be restricted to beliefs and 
practices of a certain time and place” (Du Toit, 1998:15). The question is why should African 
environmental ethics be restricted exclusively to pre-colonial African beliefs and practices or 
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worldviews? Will this help to adequately capture the complexity of the current African 
experiences and hence help to resolve the current practical environmental problems? I think not, 
as I will duly demonstrate by the argument that I am developing, supported by the case study that 
I discuss briefly in the next chapters. 
Wiredu (1980:39), for example, cautions that:  
 … instead of seeing the basic non-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought as 
typifying traditional thought in general, [most scholars] have mistakenly tended to take them as 
defining a peculiarly African way of thinking, with unfortunate effects. 
By referring to non-scientific or pre-scientific thought, Wiredu infers the tendency of ascribing 
the agency of gods and spirits to natural events and phenomena (Wiredu, 1980:39). According to 
Wiredu, Africa finds herself in mixed worldviews from which an appropriate contemporary 
African worldview needs to be discerned.  
This is why Wiredu highlights the urgent need to fashion African philosophies [worldviews] on 
the basis of the plurality and many-sidedness of the contemporary African experience because 
the “traditional conception of things just cannot provide an adequate basis for a contemporary 
African [worldview] philosophy” (Wiredu, 1980:36). Likewise, it follows that the traditional 
African worldviews alone cannot provide an adequate basis for an environmental ethics relevant 
to a diversity of multifaceted, complex and quickly changing contemporary African experiences.    
Wiredu sees the many-sidedness or facets of the contemporary African worldview to be “a 
product of interplay between traditional modes of life, Christian and Islamic customs and ideas 
along with the impact of modern science, technology and industrialization” (Wiredu, 1992:35). 
Wiredu’s foregoing observation is supported more or less by C. W. Du Toit and Karl G. 
Jechoutec. Du Toit (1998:15), for example, observes that Africans live simultaneously in more 
than one worldview. He thus maintains that, “Africa can be typified as simultaneously pre-
modern, modern and post-modern. It is simultaneously pre-scientific (traditional), scientific 
(mainly western) and post-scientific (critical, integrating many worlds)”. Jechoutec (2004:15) 
seems to, more or less, vindicate the multifaceted nature of the contemporary African reality 
when he observes, “[a] worldview that simultaneously embraces secular science, institutional 
religion, traditional spirituality and magic can become the perfect mental platform for 
understanding and enabling the human development process in all its complexity and with all its 
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contradictions [in Africa]”. It is in the same vein that Ali Mazrui developed the notion of a triple 
African heritage, which is a combination of an indigenous heritage, Eurocentric heritage and 
Islamic heritage (Mazrui, 1986). This implies that multiple worldviews are experienced by an 
African person. 
The foregoing observations point to the importance of avoiding restricting or reducing the 
complex contemporary African experience/reality to a solely traditional framework from the 
past. For example, the impact of Christianity, Islam and modern education and technology on the 
contemporary African person should not be taken for granted. We have seen above that the 
articulations of African environmental ethics by Murove and Kelbessa overemphasise the 
traditional African worldviews while ignoring, to a great extent, influences from modern science 
and technology, religions like Christianity and Islam, with their sister modern education. They 
write as if it were possible to separate the African person from the influence of the other 
influences. I argue that this way of articulating environmental ethics is not likely to help to 
resolve the current practical environmental problems in an Africa that subscribes to multiple 
worldviews. Environmental ethics is about persuasion and for this persuasion to succeed, the 
multiple experiences of peoples in contemporary Africa should be appealed to. It is true that 
traditional African worldviews and cultural achievements have, for a long time, been disregarded 
in the global development process; however, we should not romanticise them, particularly in the 
search for solutions to the current complex of environmental problems in Africa. The traditional 
African worldviews are only one aspect of the current multiple and plural African experience. 
Bennaars (1993:26) argues, for example, that: 
Morality in Africa today is highly complex and also highly problematic, as it attempts to cope 
with individual and social needs, with traditional and modern values, with religious and secular 
worldviews, with dogmatism and pluralism, all in one.  
The above quotation further underlines my argument about the plurality or the many sidedness of 
the current African experience that calls for contextualist approaches to address it. So, the 
tendency that is evident in Kelbessa’s and Murove’s works on African environmental ethics of 
overemphasizing traditional African values at the expense of the reality of the current multiple 
and plural African experiences might overlook important aspects of the contemporary African 
worldviews which might be quite helpful in resolving some of our environmental problems. I do 
not intend to mean that the articulation of African environmental ethics on the basis of traditional 
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African worldviews is not important, but my argument is we should avoid romanticising the 
traditional African values and worldviews, and that these values and worldviews should be 
understood as only one aspect of the multiplicity of African experiences. So, an approach that 
allows room for multiple African experiences and values to manifest and evolve is indispensable 
in contemporary Africa. Now, in my view, since multiple worldviews and experiences imply 
multiple values and that all these multiple contemporary African values and experiences must be 
considered in any effective approach to environmental ethics, a pluralist approach to 
environmental ethics is inevitable. In fact, pluralism is precisely what pragmatic philosophy, and 
environmental pragmatism in particular, advocate. That is why I argue that a persuasive 
environmental ethics relevant to Africa must go beyond the experiences of the traditional African 
past to accommodate contemporary African values and experiences. The resulting environmental 
ethics must speak to the people’s current daily experiences in the current setup of Africa. As I 
already said before, environmental pragmatism, and in particular Norton’s methodology of 
Adaptive Management as explained in Chapter 2 is capable of providing us with practical 
guidance on how to resolve urgent African environmental problems as experienced on the slopes 
of Mount Kilimanjaro.  
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
I have shown in this chapter that, generally speaking, those who advocate for an African 
environmental ethics usually base their arguments on traditional African religions and 
worldviews which are claimed to be pro-ecological. According to Kelbessa and Murove, these 
worldviews are said to be supported by traditional African values such as communal life, Ubuntu 
and Ukama, sociality, care and generosity; traditional religious beliefs and ritual practices, 
including reverence of spirits and gods through natural objects such as forests, mountains, trees, 
etc. They are also based on the practices of totemism, veneration of ancestors, observance of 
taboos and other ritual practices that are said to have an environmental import. All these African 
beliefs, values and practices are used to articulate an African environmental ethics that is taken to 
be an alternative to the western mainstream approaches that do not seem to speak to the African 
context.  
I have presented and discussed the cautions that have been advanced against romanticising and 
idealising traditional African worldviews. I showed that some traditional beliefs and customs 
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were very discriminative, favouring certain aspects of nature while leaving others open for 
exploitation. I showed also that there is a selective reading, or even a misinterpretation of 
traditional beliefs and cultural practices so as to support an environmental ethics or 
environmentalists’ cause. I argued that this might result in ideas that are alien to the receiving 
culture.  
I have argued, furthermore, that the conservational benefits of some of the traditional African 
beliefs and cultural practices do not necessarily imply that these societies were environmentally 
or ecologically conscious, because the motives behind these practices were other than 
environmental. I argue that this confusion has been the source of the "romanticisation" of 
traditional African beliefs and cultural practices with regard to the environment, which in turn 
has resulted in approaches to African environmental ethics that are quite removed from the real 
concrete environmental concerns of the people. My argument is that environmental ethics 
relevant to Africa should go beyond mere theoretical reconstruction of traditional African 
worldviews or romanticising the traditional African past, and rather adopt approaches that can 
really persuade people to protect nature and address the practical environmental challenges and 
concerns in the current African context; a context which is a mixture of different worldviews and 
a multiplicity of experiences and hence supports different and sometimes opposing values.   
At the best reading, Murove and Kelbessa’s works are just like mainstream environmental ethics, 
referring to overarching metaphysical principles, or another value set of being close to nature. 
But can that value set of being closer to nature really be revived by going back to traditional 
beliefs and practices? My answer to this question would be no, because Murove’s and Kelbessa’s 
works are based on the assumption of a pristine, unspoiled, and ideal Africa, which really did not 
and does not exist.  
Then what do we learn from Murove’s and Kelbessa’s approaches? They challenge us not only 
to take the concrete experiences of people seriously, but also to take the values that people are 
living by seriously. Although there are still aspects of traditional African beliefs and practices in 
some African societies, these beliefs and practices are not dominant any longer; their supporting 
structures such as chiefs and the governance and legal systems associated with chiefs have 
dwindled. All these make Murove’s and Kelbessa’s and other similar approaches to African 
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environmental ethics less useful when called upon to provide practical guidance on resolving 
practical environmental challenges. 
In the following chapter, I start to examine a concrete specific case study of the people living on 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro to illustrate how Kelbessa's and Murove’s approaches to 
African environmental ethics fall short of adequately addressing such a context, and hence that 
there is a need for a more accommodating approach. The two-fold question that led me in the 
research for the following chapter is this: (a) What could the elements of the traditional culture of 
the Wachagga living on the slopes of Kilimanjaro be that, according to Kelbessa and Murove, 
could form the basis of an environmental ethic of the Wachagga, and (b) would this 
'environmental ethic', if it could be explicated, be persuasive and effective to inspire the 
Wachagga to protect their environment to an extent that goes way beyond the degradation and 
exploitation that are currently experienced in the area. In Chapter 5, following the next, I go into 
more depth regarding the environmental context and realities of the Wachagga, and then I turn to 
my final chapter in which I employ some aspects of environmental pragmatism to show how an 
environmental ethic that is not only practical, but also can help to address environmental 
problems experienced in a context like that of people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
can be articulated.  




 APPLYING AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS APPROACHES IN THE 
CHAGGA CONTEXT 
4.1 Introduction 
Against the background of the previous two chapters consisting of a literature review discussing 
and assessing theoretical positions in environmental ethics, the aim of this chapter is to 
determine whether the approach of Murove and Kelbessa to constructing an African 
environmental ethics based on traditional beliefs and practices observed by Africans could also 
be followed in the context of the Chagga, or generally the people living on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Formulated differently, the question posed in this chapter concerns what the 
environmental ethics of the Chagga would look like if we applied Murove’s and Kelbessa’s 
ethnographic model to the traditional beliefs and practices of the Chagga? Would the traditional 
beliefs and practices of the Chagga give us some guidance on how to resolve the environmental 
problems experienced on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro today? My contention in this regard is 
that, if you apply Murove’s and Kelbessa’s approaches to the Chagga case, you miss the reality 
of what is actually believed and experienced by the Chagga today; you miss the context in which 
they have to engage with their environmental problems; as well as the time frame in which they 
have to do so. You miss the fact that most Chagga have moved away from strictly traditional 
ways of living and that people now live with mixed worldviews and hence possess new hybrid 
values. All these realities require an approach that is able of take all of them into account.   
Several assumptions inherent in the approaches of Murove and Kelbessa, and also in much of 
traditional African environmental ethics approaches were tested against the Chagga case to 
illustrate the inadequacy of these ethnographic approaches when applied to the context of people 
living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. The assumption tested in this chapter is that the belief 
in taboos and totems, the belief in ancestors, the belief in sacred trees and animals, the power of 
religious leaders and traditional institutions, and an appeal to traditional African values such as 
Ukama and Ubuntu, could be a solution for the environmental problems in Africa, and hence for 
the environmental challenges experienced on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro as well.  
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I do this by (a) demonstrating what the results will be (i.e. what the basic environmental ethic is 
that emerges) if the basic assumptions of an African environmental ethics as espoused by 
Murove and Kelbessa are "applied" to what could be described as the traditional beliefs of the 
Wachagga as they exist today, and (b) testing whether this environmental ethic could be 
persuasive and effective in mobilising the Wachagga to address the environmental problems in 
their living context in a robust manner. For the purpose of the (a)-part of this task, I show what 
the traditional beliefs of the Wachagga are with regard to taboos and totems, ancestors, sacred 
trees and animals, the power of religious leaders and traditional institutions, and if and how they 
appeal to traditional African values such as Ukama and Ubuntu, and how this, in theory, could be 
linked to a possible environmental ethic of nature conservation. For the (b)-part of this task I will 
pose the question whether this purported environmental ethic will be credible to the Wachagga, 
given their concrete lived experiences today (as discussed in more depth in Chapter 5), and thus 
whether this environmental ethic would ever be able to do the "work" it is supposed to do, which 
is to provide a persuasive basis for effectively addressing real-life environmental issues as they 
are experienced by the Wachagga.  
However, I must emphasise here again that my aim is not so much to compare the Wachagga and 
the Oromo or Shona traditions and practices in relation to the natural environment, I rather only 
take a different case study in order to critique a position, namely Murove’s and Kelbessa’s 
implicit universalist and foundationalist stance in their approaches to African environmental 
ethics. 
I begin this chapter with a brief description of the case study area. In particular, I present a 
historical overview of the area, the pre-colonial socio-political situation of the Chagga, and their 
general worldview. I then examine traditional Chagga beliefs and attitudes toward nature 
focusing on their attitudes and perceptions towards land, the Mountain, vegetation (trees and 
forests), water and water bodies, and animals.   
The information in this chapter was obtained through conversations with the elderly and clan 
leaders from different villages on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Secondary sources like 
ethnological and anthropological works on the Chagga of Kilimanjaro also contributed much to 
the material in this chapter. My own observations and experiences for the four months of field 
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work in the study area also contributed greatly to the enrichment of the information contained in 
this chapter.  
4.2 Location of the Mountain slopes and a brief historical overview of the 
Chagga 
Mount Kilimanjaro is located on the North-eastern part of Tanzania along the Kenyan boarder. 
Kilimanjaro is the highest mountain in Africa. It is famous for the snow- capped peak despite 
being only three degrees from the equator. Kilimanjaro Mountain has two peaks: the magnificent 
ice-capped Kibo which is the highest point with an approximate height of 5903 meters, and the 
jagged Mawenzi peak, with a double crater, with an approximate height of 5320 meters. Only 
Kibo summit is climbable. Mawenzi is difficult to climb because of its sharp points. The 
imposing splendour and beauty of the mountain, especially the ice-capped Kibo peak, testifies to 
why the inhabitants of the mountain slope revered it in traditional times. For them, Kibo was the 
manifestation of Ruwa, the Chagga name for God. I discuss Kibo more extensively later in this 
chapter.  
The inhabitants of the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are normally referred to as the Wachagga or 
the Chagga. The Chagga, strictly speaking, are not indigenous to the mountain slopes. They are 
immigrants from different areas. Some sources indicate that the mountain slopes were first 
inhabited by sparse groups of indigenous people called Wangasa and Wakonyigo or Wadarimba, 
a dwarf people, who seem to have been harassed away or absorbed by the immigrants through 
interbreeding (Dundas, 1968; Moore & Puritt, 1977). This is perhaps because people who live on 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro arrived there at different times from different areas. It is 
estimated that the different groups that constitute the present day Chagga people began to 
migrate to the mountain slopes between the tenth and twelfth century in the Common Era 
(Moore & Puritt, 1977; Munson, 2013). The Chagga therefore do not have a single ancestry 
because they descend from various tribes. This is exemplified by the presence of different 
dialects from one sub-ethnic group to the other.  Chagga are said to be the descendants of 
Kamba, Taita, Shambaa, Masai, Pare, etc. Charles Dundas
26
 (1968:44) approximated the clans or 
                                                          
26
 Charles Dundas was a colonial administrator in the Chagga country who was sent there by the British colonial 
government immediately after WWI. Dundas was very popular and much loved among the Chagga because of, his 
backing for Chagga coffee interests against strong opposition of settlers, among other things (see Moore, 1977: 
17). Dundas’ account of the traditional Chagga worldviews in his book, Kilimanjaro and its People, represents one 
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tribes that formed the majority of the people who were living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
(the Chagga) at the time as follows. Those of Kamba origin were said to comprise 113 clans; 
those of Taita origin, 106 clans; of Masai origin, 101 clans; of Pare origin, 31 clans; of Shambaa 
origin, 22 clans; of Kahe and Arusha origin, 16 clans; of Kuafi origin, 6 clans; and of Dorobbo 
origin, 2 clans. The Chagga of Kamba, Taita, and Masai origins constitute the largest percentage 
of the total Chagga population and are closer in language and sub-culture than the remaining 
groups. This diversity of origin among the Chagga implies that they lacked a common and 
original ancestral spiritual foundation. That is why Dundas correctly observed that “the history 
and meaning of the tribe has more of a political or national foundation than a spiritual 
significance” (Dundas, 1968:49). One may argue, therefore, that there is no such a tribe as the 
Chagga because of the lack of common ethnic rootedness. However, common beliefs and 
customs have developed among these different tribes or clans so that those people living on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro can qualify as one ethnic group, the Chagga.  The diversity of 
origin, lack of ethnic rootedness or indigenousness in the land of Kilimanjaro, and hence lack of 
a common and original spiritual ancestry, have had a significant impact on the ability of the 
Chagga to  develop specific nature gods and nature spirits and their corresponding elaborate 
cultural ritual practices as present in some other ethnic groups (Dundas, 1968). This has made 
them significantly different from other ethnic groups or tribes in terms of their approach and 
treatment of the natural environment, as I elaborate later on. 
4.3 Socio-cultural and political organization at a glance 
The Chagga may be said to have been agriculturalists cum cattle keepers. Their home garden or 
kihamba (the banana grove) was the primary production unit. Here the Chagga cultivated 
bananas, sweet potatoes, yams, cassava, sugarcane, papaws, pumpkins, squashes and tobacco 
(Moore & Puritt, 1977). Coffee (Arabica) was introduced to the Chagga in the 1890s by 
missionaries (ibid.), and it came to be their main cash crop, responsible for the high level of 
socio-economic development witnessed today among the Chagga.  Bananas provided an 
important crop among the Chagga because it was their staple food. It was also used to make the 
local brew, mbege, which was very important, also for rituals. Mbege and sour milk were among 
the most important elements used in sacrificial rituals. The Chagga houses or huts were built at 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the anthropological works that show a deep understanding, and an authentic and empathic interpretation of 
the traditional ways of life among the Chagga.     
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the centre of the banana grove such that the manure that was obtained from the stall-fed animals 
that were usually kept in the huts could be used easily to renew the banana grove. The Chagga 
also used to defecate in the banana grove, which also helped to add to the renewal of the soil 
through human manure. It must be noted that the banana grove or the home garden, kihamba, 
was permanently cultivated. Land tenure among the Chagga was through inheritance along 
lineage arrangements. The Chagga were patrilineal, so the land was basically parcelled out to 
male members of the family through customary inheritance. According to Chagga custom, the 
father has the duty and responsibility to provide his matured sons with a plot of land. The 
kihamba system of land tenure has thus been blamed for the land degradation and fragmentation 
(Soini, 2005). The head of the household was required by the traditional customs to make sure 
that his sons, when they married, were apportioned a plot from the kihamba to build a house and 
start their own families. This practice led the Chagga to constantly expand their settlements 
towards formerly uninhabited mountain and hill forests, for the purpose of acquiring more land. 
This led to reduction of the mountain forest and a number of wild animal species living in it 
(Moore & Puritt, 1977). Today, most of the wild animals that used to be seen on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro, such as monkeys, elephants, buffaloes, wild pig, buck, squirrel, leopard, and 
hyena have largely disappeared. Only some species of apes/primates, small animals like 
squirrels, and a few elephants
27
 can be seen today.  
Politically, the Chagga originally were divided into small chiefdoms. The Chagga chiefdoms did 
not evolve into kingdoms, but several chiefdoms were annexed at the beginning of the 20
th
 
century to form a big chiefdom under Mangi Marealle, the paramount Chief of the Chagga.  The 
Chagga originally used to call their chief Shaamombe, meaning, he who is blessed with many 
cattle. Later, when the chiefdoms were annexed under one paramount chief, this was changed to 
Mangi, literally, the owner of the country, uruka.  One important point to note about the Chagga 
is that the pre-colonial Chagga rarely enjoyed a long period of peace in their country. There were 
constant wars between one chiefdom and another, and there were also constant wars among 
different clans. As Dundas noted, “One can hardly imagine that there really was a time on 
Kilimanjaro [before the coming of colonialists] when bloodshed was unknown" (1968:54). There 
                                                          
27
 It must be noted that most of the elephants that trouble peasants on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro today do 
usually are not from the mountain forests but rather from the plains. In fact, most of them cross borders from the 
Kenyan game reserve of Amboseli, especially during the dry months. I address the problem of elephants in the next 
chapter. 
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were hostilities and rivalry among the chiefs to the extent that even those who were kinsmen 
killed one another. One of the reasons for this incessant unrest among the Chagga chiefdoms was 
the desire among the chiefs to expand their territories and spheres of influence. Ingenious 
defensive structures such as ditches, some stone walls and large subterranean chambers, where a 
number of families, cattle and food could be kept for months or years, could still be found in 
some places on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. It is interesting to note that wars with 
neighbouring tribes such as the Pare and the Masai were not as frequent as internal wars among 
Chagga chiefdoms themselves. In fact, some chiefs sought assistance from neighbouring clans to 
fight their fellow Chagga chiefs (Dundas, 1968). The motive behind all these wars was to 
strengthen their economic and political power. Even those clans in kinship ties waged war 
among themselves. As Dundas (1968: 49) narrates:  
If two warriors engaged in the general fight became aware that they were clansmen, they 
immediately broke away with expressions of remorse to fight others with whom they had no 
kinship ties. As against this we may compare the conduct of Chiefs who made war on their own 
kith and kin. Thus Chief Rongoma did not hesitate to conquer Marangu and put to death his 
young kinsman Silawe. The struggle for power simply outweighed the sacred ties of clanships.  
Now, at this point of the discussion, it already can be observed that the state of political affairs 
among the Chagga seems to contradict the claims made by some scholars, as we saw in Chapter 
3, that pre-colonial Africans lived in peace and harmony with themselves and with nature. The 
state of affairs among the then traditional Chagga sheds some doubt on the purported unique 
spirit of Ubuntu and Ukama among traditional Africans.  Instead, it supports the argument that 
the traditional Chagga were preoccupied with the selfish economic and political interests of their 
individual clans and tribes to the extent that even sacred covenants or pacts which were 
considered very serious by the Chagga themselves
28
 were nevertheless not observed or respected. 
So, solidarity and care for one another did not go beyond the clan or those related by blood. This 
lends support to Schweigman’s argument (in Chapter 3). The Chagga did not give the same 
status to non-Chagga. They would not marry somebody from another tribe. They only strove to 
protect the individual clans’ land and the individual customs and beliefs of the clan at any cost. 
So the spirit of Ubuntu (humanness) and Ukama (relatedness) among the Chagga did not go 
beyond kith and kin. The further conclusion that I draw from this observation is that it is 
                                                          
28
 These are very serious covenants among warring chiefs, for example, they would make a covenant to stop 
invading each other which, in some cases, involved burying alive a girl and a boy at the border between the 
chiefdoms (see Dundas, 1968: 70).   
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unrealistic and impractical to extend the concepts of Ubuntu and Ukama to the natural 
environment as far as the Chagga context is concerned. 
4.4 The socio-economic and religious characteristics of the people 
The Chagga people form one of the most industrious tribes found in Tanzania and the area 
surrounding the mountain slopes is one of the most developed parts in Tanzania. Coffee which 
was introduced in the Kilimanjaro region by Christian Missionaries in 19
th
 century is responsible 
for the region’s relative wealth. This region at one time had the highest number of secondary 
schools in the country, so the Chagga are among the most educated ethnic groups in Tanzania. 
The Chagga are also known all over the country as business people and entrepreneurs. They are 
seen as a people who are hungry for success. Most of the Chagga people today are scattered 
throughout the country working in government or private organizations or in self-employment. 
Shortage of land and the collapse of coffee prices have been singled out as the reason for most of 
the youth and middle-aged Chagga to migrate to towns and other areas. It is interesting, however, 
that most of the Chagga must return home at Christmas time or for other festivities to re-unite 
with their relatives and ancestors because of their attachment to their territories. Even if they 
permanently settled outside Kilimanjaro, most Chagga, will have a good modern block house 
back home to which they often return for a re-union with their ancestors through sacrificial 
rituals and it is in this time of Christian festivities that most relatives who have not seen each 
other for a long time meet and social issues such as conflict in the family are resolved. Because 
of their attachment to the ancestral lands, it is also unusual for a deceased Chagga to be buried 
away from their ancestral lands. Most Chagga will transport the bodies of their deceased 
relatives back home to be laid to rest in the ancestral banana grove. So, some Chagga even today 
have great attachment to the banana grove. When things do not go well they will always return 
from wherever they are to their home village to seek blessing from their parents and ancestors.    
As indicated earlier, the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro present one of the most densely populated 
areas in Tanzania. The highlands, at an altitude of around 2000m, have an average population 
density of 600 people per square kilometre whereas the intermediate zone (altitude of around 
1500m or less) has an average population density of 250 people per square kilometre. The 
mountain slopes receives an average rainfall of 1500-2000mm per annum, whereas the lowlands 
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receive around 500mm per annum. Temperatures range from 15 to 30 degrees centigrade in the 
mountainous area whereas it ranges from 30 to 40 degrees centigrade in the lowlands/plains.    
Of the total area on the mountain slopes only 48.7 percent comprises arable land. On average 
most people who live on the highlands own only 0.5 ha of land (the kihamba). Here, coffee and 
bananas are intercropped with trees to provide the shade necessary for the thriving of coffee. 
However, some of the plots have been subdivided among the family’s sons to the extent that 
most of them are only big enough for a house and a few banana plants. On the plains, the average 
size of land per household is 1.5 ha and it is called shamba. When you visit some parts of the 
Chagga land, like Rombo, an administrative district on the eastern side part of the mountain 
slopes, you see women
29
 carrying hoes and baskets walking from their banana groves from the 
highland to their shambas on the plains every morning and coming back carrying either firewood 
or grass or grains on their heads in the evening. The distance to the shambas on the lowlands 
ranges from three to six kilometres. It is on the plains (lowlands) that people cultivate seasonal 
crops such as maize, beans, sunflower, groundnuts, and millet. These crops are cultivated using 
the hand hoe, mostly for subsistence. This subsistence farming is mostly rain-dependent with the 
exception of a few areas in Marangu and Kibosho where traditional gravity-fed irrigation, 
mfongo is used, but on a very small scale because of shortage of water for irrigation due to 
drying up of rivers and springs. Much water is also directed to big coffee and horticulture 
plantations run by foreign investors, which deny those villagers living downstream enough water 
for irrigation. The Chagga continue to keep livestock and a household will keep at least three to 
four goats and a cow, on average. Almost every family also keeps some chickens. All these are 
used as a form of insurance to be sold for cash in times of crisis, such as sickness. As I hinted 
earlier, the collapse of the coffee crop, which resulted from, among other things, low prices, lack 
of incentives and subsidies in the form of farm inputs due to the implementation of IMF/World 
                                                          
29
 In some places in Kilimanjaro, especially in the Rombo District, women are the ones who go to the fields, 
shambas, to cultivate while men remain at home, either doing some casual labor or tending the livestock, after 
which they go to the local bars to drink or just wander around idly, waiting for their wives to come back from the 
fields to prepare food for them. In short most Chagga women are like laborers for their husbands and family. The 
burden of work that a village Chagga woman carries on her shoulders for the family is unimaginable. She wakes up 
very early in the morning, prepares breakfast for the husband and children, prepares fodder for the cattle and 
goats, and then walks to the field, almost 3 kilometers away, to work on the farm. In the evening she comes back 
carrying either a load of firewood or grass for the cattle or goats, and then prepares food for the children and her 
husband. Sometimes she also has to fetch water, at a distance from home. Some men are changing nowadays and 
they might help their wives, but much still has to be done to change past habit, especially the belief that men do 
not do work seen as a women’s responsibility, as enumerated above.  
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Bank-imposed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), and the effects of climate change, has 
condemned people who never knew poverty to abject poverty. The result was that they resorted 
to environmentally destructive activities such as clearing the forest for more land to cultivate, 
hence deforestation, and over cultivation on their small plots of land, hence land degradation. 
Many have also resorted to selling trees from their plots and even from the common forest in 
order to make ends meet. All of these changes were a survival strategy or coping mechanism.  
In terms of religious beliefs, more than 90 percent of the Chagga are Christians. The rest are 
Muslims and traditionalists. Christianity was first brought to the Chagga land by European 
Missionaries in early 1890s, the Chagga being one of the very first tribes in Tanzania to be 
christened. Accordingly, Christianity is deeply entrenched in the Chagga way of life. It is said 
that missionaries preferred to settle in Kilimanjaro because of, among other things, its relative 
good cold weather and arable land. This was after many of them died in the coastal regions of 
Zanzibar and Bagamoyo because of malaria. Kilimanjaro was a malaria free zone by then. 
Christianity on the mountain slopes mainly comprises Catholic and Protestant (Lutherans and 
some born again sects) denominations. Some western (Machame) and central parts (Marangu 
and Mwika) of the mountain slopes are mostly Lutheran, whereas the eastern part (Rombo) is 
largely Catholic. This division came about because Catholic and Lutheran Missionaries 
happened to arrive on the Mountain slopes more or less at the same time, i.e. in 1890 and 1893, 
respectively; so they decided to allocate separate areas as exclusive domains for either of them to 
avoid interference and unnecessary conflict. Generally speaking, then, Christianity and modern 
education  has resulted in diminishing a great deal of the traditional religious beliefs and where 
traditional religions are observed, especially in Rombo, they are usually observed privately at 
family level and not at clan (communal) level anymore. This has also led to the ‘desacralisation’ 
of the communal (clan) sacred groves, especially the large sacred trees under which these 
sacrifices were performed. These developments as such shed doubt on prospects of relying on 
the traditional religious beliefs and practices as a foundation for a persuasive environmental ethic 
for the Chagga, as is demonstrated in more detail in the rest of this chapter.  
After having briefly looked at the historical, socio-economic and political background of the 
Chagga as a way of putting things in perspective, I now go back to the main argument of this 
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chapter, that is, what happens when the approaches of Murove and Kelbessa are applied in the 
Chagga context?       
4.5 How the approaches of Murove and Kelbessa fare in the Chagga  
      context 
In this section, I examine how the approaches of Murove and Kelbessa fare when applied to the 
Chagga context. Alternatively, I seek to examine the type of environmental ethics that would 
emerge if the model promoted by Kelbessa and Murove would be applied to the Chagga context.  
It will also help us to see whether the type of environmental ethic that emerges could persuade 
the Chagga to protect the environment today. I examine the themes that appear in Kelbessa’s and 
Murove’s articulation of African environmental ethics as they are conceived among the 
traditional Chagga. Thus I focus on the belief in the Supreme Being, the appeal to traditional 
institutions and religious leaders, the appeal to sacred animals and trees, the appeal to ancestors 
and the appeal to other aspects of nature such as the mountain and the land.  
4.5.1 The belief in the Supreme Being 
The traditional Chagga, like the Oromo of Ethiopia, had the concept of a supreme being, 
although largely vague. He was referred to as Ruwa. Ruwa is also the name for the Sun. 
However, Ruwa was not likely to be God himself because Kibo, the ice-capped peak of Mount 
Kilimanjaro, was also seen as symbolising God. It seems that it was the extraordinary qualities of 
these two entities, the sun and the mountain peak Kibo, which made people see them as signs of 
God, or Ruwa. The Chagga also use the word Ruwa to refer to the sky. Nevertheless, among the 
Chagga, the concept of Ruwa was vague and this Supreme Being seemed to be remote and hence 
had little to do with people’s daily affairs. Sacrifices were offered directly to Ruwa in very rare 
circumstances, like in times of extreme distress. When circumstances thus dictated, a special 
animal sacrifice was offered to Ruwaat noon, because the Chagga believed that Ruwa (the sun) 
was closer to them at midday than at any other time of the day, so it was easy for him to receive 
the sacrifice. It must be noted that only those problems that affected the entire community/clan or 
tribe, such as a prolonged severe drought or an epidemic, warranted Ruwa's intervention through 
the offering of a public sacrifice. It is also interesting to note that the Chagga did not believe that 
the universe was created by Ruwa. They seemed to believe that some aspects of the physical 
universe were always there, while others like the stars and the moon are the children and wife of 
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Ruwa respectively. Regarding the origin of people, the Chagga believe that they were liberated 
or burst out from a mysterious vessel. Other Chagga myths relate that Ruwa burst out people 
from the elephant’s stomach (Dundas, 1968). 
The traditional Chagga gave the following attributes to Ruwa, some of which involve aspects of 
nature. They call him, Ruwa matengera, the one who leads and cares for all his people; Ruwa 
funvu lya mku, meaning ‘God, the mountain of ages’, meaning, Ruwa does not age like the 
mountain; Ruwa molunga soka na mndo, meaning Ruwa, the one who joins different sexes to 
bring about life, the one who is the cause of procreation among humans and animals (Dundas, 
1968). So, although God Ruwa does not usually mingle with the day-to-day affairs of the 
Chagga, he is nevertheless associated with some aspects of nature that are of extra-ordinary 
stature like Mount Kilimanjaro, the sun, and the sky, lightning and thunder.  
Although the Chagga’s concept of God is not as elaborate as that of the Oromo of Ethiopia, the 
Chagga have some kind of holistic view of the universe, in seeing everything as held together by 
God, Ruwa. However, people whom I interviewed did not seem to make a direct connection 
between their belief in Ruwa and environmental or nature protection. In one of my interviews, a 
Chagga sage revealed that the Chagga would pray to God to protect them from the devils that 
were believed to dwell in the frightening dark and huge unending forests, underlining in 
particular terms that there is no direct, self-conscious link between the beliefs in Ruwa and 
protecting nature among the Chagga. As it is clear from this, it is rather the fear associated with 
getting closer to huge forests that traditionally helped to protect natural areas. So, though it has 
some potential, the extent to which the belief in the Supreme Being among the Chagga could be 
translated into a persuasive tool for environmental protection today is difficult to determine, 
firstly because of the weak conceptual link (if any) among the Chagga between their religious 
beliefs and environmental protection and secondly, because of the peripheral role that traditional 
religions play in the lives of the Chagga community today, as I further argue below. 
My contention is thus that, even if there could be a strong conceptual link among the Oromo 
between their religious world-view and environmental protection, as Kelbessa argues, this link 
does not exist among the Chagga of Kilimanjaro. Accordingly, I cannot support the claim that 
the tendency among some African ethnic groups to view the universe as a single whole and in 
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non-dichotomous terms leads to an ecological awareness that could be construed as a self-
consciously articulated environmental ethic.
30
 
4.5.2 Appeal to traditional institutions and traditional religious leaders 
I showed in the previous chapter that Kelbessa also bases his arguments for an indigenous 
environmental ethics on the power of the traditional institutions and religious leaders of the 
Oromo to enforce beliefs and practices that helped to conserve some aspects of nature. In this 
section, I describe the state of traditional institutions and the influence of traditional religious 
leaders among the Chagga to see whether they could be relied upon to help in protecting the 
natural environment on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.  
My interviews with clan leaders revealed that traditional religious leaders among the Chagga 
were indeed the custodians of all beliefs and practices of the community. The Chagga maintained 
a hierarchical relationship with the ancestors through the living, the dead and those to be born. 
So, there was the family head, the clan leaders and the chief. The oldest person in the family was 
also the priest who could make sacrifices to the ancestors. However, the power of sacredness 
pertaining to each individual depended on his relative position to the ancestors. Thus, the chief 
was the most sacred because he was closer to the ancestors than anyone else in his chiefdom, 
then the clan leaders followed, and so on. Of course, the chief was most sacred because he 
directly inherited the position of the founder of the tribe. The interviews further show that the 
elderly were also believed to be closer to the ancestors than other people in the family, and thus 
they were the ones who were consulted first in case of any problem in the immediate family 
because they were believed to have wisdom and knowledge of their traditions and culture. Care 
was taken by the elders and the chief to ensure that the customs and traditions of the society were 
strictly followed by young and old, so as not to anger the ancestors and thus live happy and 
peaceful lives. The religious leaders were the moral custodians of the Chagga community. They 
kept an eye on everything that happened in the family and community and thus rewarded or 
punished an individual, family or clan accordingly. Living a moral life among the Chagga 
therefore consisted in avoiding any acts that may disrupt or upset the cosmic balance or the 
harmony between the living and ancestors. So the Chagga religious leaders and elders made sure 
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 Momen (2009: 256) emphasises that the traditional African worldviews had a more sociological rather than 
environmental and ecological significance. Other significances attached to these worldviews are simply imposed 
interpretations (see Momen, 2009: 356). 
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that beliefs and taboos, for example with regard to sacred places such as the family shrine that 
was usually located in the banana grove, Mbuonyi, or communal clan worship of ancestors that 
took place at the clan temple which was usually under a gigantic fig tree, Itemboni or Kyangeni, 
were respected. The same applied to tabooed animals such as snakes, the owl, and some wild 
animals found at the homesteads that were not supposed to be killed. In a way, the traditional 
institutions and traditional leaders therefore helped to protect some aspects of nature. The 
question, however, is: can these institutions (the authority of traditional leaders and traditional 
institutions) be appealed to today, as Kelbessa claims, to help protect the environment on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro?  
My interviews with people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro indicated that their current 
commitment to traditional beliefs and customs has waned to a great extent and that they do not 
show much interest in them. In fact, my interviews showed that traditional religious leaders and 
their corresponding institutions have played an increasingly peripheral role in the daily life of 
people, unlike in the past.  
In an interview with a middle-aged female village leader in Marangu, she indicated that it is a bit 
difficult to say today that we can use past traditional beliefs and customs to protect the natural 
environment. She gave several reasons for this. The first one was that it was easy for people to 
follow their traditions and customs in the past because people were born and raised in the same 
locale, so it was easier to impart the traditional values and beliefs to the children. Secondly, she 
said that there was not much interaction with other tribes and movements like today. The mixing 
of people and movements has killed that loyalty to the traditional beliefs and customs. Many 
people have moved from their original homes to other places. This is because of the shortage of 
land and for economic reasons. So, she thinks it is difficult to adhere to the traditional beliefs and 
customs today. She further added: 
You will find that your neighbour is a stranger, so there is no way s/he can participate in 
observing beliefs and practices that s/he does not feel obliged to follow. In short, families and 
clans are now fragmented that is why observing these traditional beliefs and customs has 
remained at not just the family level, but also at individual level. You may find that some people 
in the same family observe the rituals and others do not. There is no more common authority to 
enforce them. People no longer find it fashionable to drink the traditional local brew, mbege. 
They now drink modern bottled beers. Drinking mbege today is seen as a sign of poverty and 
backwardness. Furthermore, our children today go to schools far away from home and they come 
back changed completely. They mix up with children from other parts of the country. 
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It therefore appears that most villagers no longer regard their traditional religious leaders and the 
traditional institutions highly. According to an environmental expert in the Kilimanjaro region, 
the call to protect some aspects of the natural environment using the traditional beliefs and 
cultural practices would mean, for example, to restore the traditional institutions that helped to 
protect the trees and forests. He continued, arguing that these institutions functioned because of 
the power of the Chiefs to enforce them in the past. According to him, restoring these 
institutions, even in a reconstructed way, would be difficult because we no longer even have the 
chiefdoms. Chiefdoms have been abolished in Tanzania since 1961, immediately after 
independence. Thus the chiefs are also no longer in existence or recognised even in their own 
communities. He argued further that the chiefs, even if their authority were still recognised, 
would not have much power to enforce adherence to traditions and cultural beliefs and customs 
because their authority, which was usually associated with their closeness to the ancestors 
(founders of the clan/chiefdoms), has, to a large extent, been replaced with modern government 
structures in cases of secular matters such as law and order, and with Christianity in spiritual 
matters. Accordingly, it would not make sense to try to base an environmental ethic for the 
Wachagga on beliefs or institutions that are not largely supported, or not in existence any more.  
In the next section, I focus on traditional beliefs among the Wachagga regarding sacred trees and 
animals, and my question will be whether such beliefs provide us with anything different. 
4.5.3 Appeal to sacred trees and animals 
Kelbessa also uses the attitude of reverence or respect directed at certain trees and animals, as 
presented in the previous chapter, to support his arguments for an indigenous African 
environmental ethics. In this section I investigate whether this approach to constructing an 
indigenous environmental ethics would be viable among the people living on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro. 
4.5.3.1 Appeal to sacred trees 
Just like the Oromo of Ethiopia, the Chagga revealed certain traditional attitudes of reverence 
towards certain species of trees or vegetation. One of the very important sacred plants among the 
Chagga is the dracaena plant (masale). The leaves are a symbol of peace and forgiveness and are 
used in many other rituals (Dundas, 1968:78). The Dracæna was planted around the place on 
which the skulls of the ancestors were buried. This place was thus considered a family shrine and 
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it is here that sacrifices were often offered. This plant was also used for other purposes. It was 
used, for example, as a warning to signify a no-go area. Two dracaena stems with leaves tied 
together planted at the entrance of a hut showed that the place was restricted for entrance by 
unauthorised people (Dundas, 1968:180). Dracaena stems were also used in certain rituals, such 
as in the exhumation of bodies.  It was taboo to strike someone with adracaena stem for it was 
used in burial ceremonies to send people to the spirits. So, this plant was conserved in some way 
because of its religious importance. However, because this tree only grows to the size of a 
matured sugarcane plant (in fact being similar to a sugarcane plant in many respects) it may not 
have much ecological value apart from its religious significance. Thus no conservative initiatives 
were taken to protect the Masale trees. They grew everywhere in abundance. 
Although it is true that dracaena plants (masale) were sacred plants, their sacredness furthermore 
was only relative. They attained sacredness only when used to perform certain sacred rituals. 
Outside of that context they were just plants like other plants. That is why they were also used as 
fences or hedges to mark the boundaries between one family’s banana grove and those of the 
neighbours. They were also used to make the walls of outdoor goat stalls. More still, the stems 
were later used for building pit latrines, especially to support the sand slab that covers the pit. 
These are quite mundane functions. So, this plant had both sacred and mundane functions 
depending on the occasion. I did not learn of any explicit taboos or prohibitions against using the 
dracaena plants for mundane purposes during my interviews. I make this observation because 
some scholars use these plants as an example of a practice that helped to conserve the 
environment without acknowledging their other mundane functions (see, for example, Msafiri, 
2007; Mkenda, 2010). In addition to that, these types of trees are very insignificant ecologically 
because they usually do not grow into big trees compared to other ecologically significant trees 
that are not sacred, and hence wantonly exploited. 
My interviews with some clan leaders revealed that the reason why dracaena plants were 
preferred for rituals over other plants was because the leaves of these plants are naturally 
evergreen and these plants thrive wherever they are grown; even a stem thrown on the ground 
sprouts and grows without needing much care. Its stem is also very hard, so it was usually used 
to make wooden spears. According to the elders, these special characteristics led people to 
believe that the plant had supernatural powers, hence the reason why it was more used than other 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
111 
 
plants in traditional rituals. The sacredness of the dracaena plant therefore did not mean that it 
was not cut down or used for other less sacred purposes.  
So, while it is true that it was a very important religious tree among the Chagga, this does not 
give us sufficient reason to use it as a ground for arguing for an environmental ethic, or an 
important element of such an environmental ethic among the Chagga. In fact, even if all masale 
plants were left intact to this date, their impact on the environment would have been very 
insignificant, because the plants themselves are small and thus have little environmental 
significance compared to many other far more important trees that were not considered sacred 
and hence are exploited freely. 
 
Figure 3: A dracaena (sale/masale) plant 
Source: Researcher, 2014 
Further examination of the beliefs and practices of the Chagga people concerning trees and 
vegetation, may also come across mystical performances related to trees. One of these 
performances concerns a species called Mringa which was commonly used for making beehives. 
Dundas (1968: 276) narrates this performance thus: 
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This tree, which is always the private property of someone and may not be felled by him, is 
spoken of as “man’s sister”, and its felling is treated as giving away of a bride. The owner brings 
offerings of milk, beer, honey, Eleusine and beans. These he formally presents to the tree as a 
dower on the occasion of its marriage and takes his leave after giving his blessing as to a 
daughter. On the following day the tree is felled, the owner leaves his village and is represented 
by a relative delegated to “hand over the sister”. After addressing the tree with comforting words 
like addressing a bride two axes are used. The first axe is laid on the tree by the leader, who asks 
pardon for what he does; representing that poverty has driven him thereto. Next he implores the 
tree to bring him good fortune and exhorts the bees of such and such strangers to leave their home 
and come to his hive. 
On examining the above ritual, we see that there is a sense in which the harvesting of the tree is 
approached with care and concern. However, the deeper meaning of this ritual was not really 
intended to show respect or reverence to the tree as such; it rather seems to be a ritual whose 
appropriate performance was essential for attracting bees. No wonder – at the end of the day, the 
tree was cut down anyway. But of course there is the sense of caution with which the tree is 
treated. But again, cautious treatment should not be the reason for romanticising this practice, 
and it also does not provide grounds for the preservation of the tree. To the contrary, it is a 
practice that may lead to environmental destruction in the long run. 
There are other instances that reveal a mixed attitude towards vegetation. Chief Rengwa of 
Machame who conquered Kibosho is said, for example, to have felled all the bananas plants and 
trees in Kibosho leaving only a huge tree called Murk we Rengwa, one of the largest in Kibosho 
(Dundas, 1968:77). This was one of those sacred big trees in Kibosho that was used for 
communal sacrifices and rituals, and only a few of this type of huge tree can still be seen in the 
Chagga country. 
Among features a person visiting the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro may see even today are some 
gigantic trees found in some areas (see Figure 4, below). The old people say that some of these 
trees were planted to mark boundaries between one chiefdom and another or one clan and 
another. As we saw in the previous chapter, since these trees were unique because of their size, 
they were respected and thus used as temples or sacred groves for traditional public rituals and 
sacrifices. Public sacrifices were offered under these trees. They were like the temples for the 
clan.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
113 
 
Thus these trees were treated with reverence, as shown in the previous chapter, and many myths 
and rituals were associated with these trees. To cut any branch from them was strictly forbidden. 
In the event that a branch fell from the tree, no one was allowed to pick it up for firewood or 
other purposes. These dry branches would be gathered under the tree and would only be used for 
cooking or roasting meat during the clan’s sacrificial rites of slaughtering. There also was a 
belief that it symbolized death when a branch broke from the tree. In such a case, a person from 
one of the families in the direction in which the branch fell would die. To avert this bad omen, a 
sacrifice would have to be offered at the tree immediately. In addition, in the past, it was taboo 
for a man and a woman coming from opposite sides to go past each other under these trees. One 
would stop until the other passed as a show of respect to the spirits that dwell in these trees. 
 
Figure 4: One of the huge religious trees (Trichilia Roka) found in Kilimanjaro 
Source: Researcher, 2014. 
Today most of these trees have lost their religious and cultural significance. They are treated just 
like any other tree. Today, very few people would observe this taboo. A few people, especially 
the old, still see these trees as sacred. Most of the local people no longer award special treatment 
or reverence to these trees apart from believing that they help to bring rain. When asked why 
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they stopped revering these trees, some people point to Christianity as the reason. The reason 
that is usually given is that the church discourages belief in ancestors or mizimu. 
Unlike with the Oromo of Ethiopia, my interviews showed that the villagers now see the trees 
and forests as having economic more than spiritual functions. They do speak of trees as playing a 
role in regulating weather. The villagers associate problems like drought, water shortage, and 
abnormally high temperatures with the reckless harvesting of trees and deforestation. Most of the 
villagers no longer link the trees and forests to supernatural beings. This change of attitude may 
possibly be attributed to the government’s intensive tree planting campaigns and the emphasis on 
economic and weather regulation benefits of trees and forests by some NGOs. Most of the 
villagers who were interviewed showed an awareness of one or two NGOs who worked on 
environmental issues in their villages. Responding to a question on their involvement in 
environmental activities, for example, some women from Sungu Village in Mweka, Kibosho, 
said:  
…we plant trees because they help to bring about coldness … trees make the weather cold … 
they bring rain also. We have groups for planting trees. We are given seedlings by the 
Government or NGOs, we nurture them and we plant them for ourselves or sell them to other 
villagers to plant in their own plots thus earning some income for the group and ourselves. When 
the trees mature we also prune their branches for firewood. Also we harvest poles from these 
trees for building our houses or cattle stalls.  
They also say that people have been cutting trees without planting new ones hence almost 
turning the village into a desert. They further noted that their grandfathers formerly used to plant 
big trees like avocados to shade the coffee plants. But following the collapse of the coffee crop, 
most of these trees have been cut down and sold as firewood or timber, thus contributing to the 
current state of affairs. With regard to forests, the people did not seem to recall any special or 
sacred forests still existing today. They also do not see the role of the forests as serving cultural 
or spiritual functions. When people are asked about the importance of the forests, they usually 
mention things such as provision of firewood, timber, grass or fodder, honey and water (or 
springs). Thus, these interviews clearly showed that people who live on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro at present think very differently about the role of forests and trees in their lives, 
unlike the pre-colonial Chagga who saw forests and trees as also having cultural and spiritual 
functions.  
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In brief, it can be said that, true enough, the reverence towards certain aspects of the environment 
such as sacred trees, as Kelbessa claims, has helped to preserve/conserve them, and some of 
them in fact have remained intact to the present day. However, other trees and plants could be 
butchered wantonly (refer to the example of Chief Rengwa above), which gives support to the 
argument that the cautious approach with which the traditional people treated certain trees and 
vegetation does not imply that they were environmentally conscious. So, in the absence of a 
holistic attitude of respect for trees and forests or vegetation in general, a consistent, explicit and 
coherent environmental ethic that could be used to address environmental issues on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro in the present context becomes hard to articulate on the basis of the 
traditional Chagga attitudes towards trees and vegetation.   
4.5.3.2 Appeal to sacred animals 
Another aspect that Kelbessa uses in his articulation of an indigenous African environmental 
ethics is the argument that the respect or reverence that the Oromo and some other African 
societies show towards certain animals could contribute in building an environmental ethics to 
address the current environmental problems, not just in Ethiopia but also in the rest of Africa. In 
this section, as in the previous one, I examine the extent to which the traditional beliefs and 
attitudes of the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro towards animals could help to 
inform an environmental ethics to protect these creatures today.  
The cultural beliefs and practices of the Chagga reveal a mixed attitude towards wild animals. 
The animals that feature most in Chagga legends, myths and beliefs are the elephant, the jackal 
and the baboon. It is narrated that an elephant that was killed by Horombo cursed him before it 
died, thus: Woe is you Horombo, and the spears of the great shall take your spirit as you have 
taken mine. Furthermore, there was some sort of a belief among the traditional Chagga that 
humans could be turned into wild animals; and also that some wild animals came out of cursed 
human beings. There is a legend, for example, that people refused to give heed to a message 
from Ruwa sent through his messenger so that Ruwa turned them into elephants, and their cattle 
were turned into buffaloes and the like, their sheep became pigs and porcupines and their dogs 
became hyenas and the like (Dundas, 1968:119). In one of the Chagga prayers to Ruwa, the 
name elephant is also attributed to Him. A line from the prayer goes: You, Ruwa, Chief, the 
elephant indeed (Dundas, 1968:146).     
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In another legend, baboons, monkeys, apes and colobus monkeys are said to have been given 
birth to by a woman who was cursed by her grandfather. That is why the Chagga used to call 
baboons and their close kin, such as chimpanzees, “the People of the Forest” or the “Children of 
the Curse”. This somehow confirms the pervasive belief among Africans that humans could be 
incarnated in animals.  
The jackal was also seen among the Chagga to communicate certain message from the ancestral 
spirits. So, in the event that a jackal appeared at the homestead, the head of the household would 
seek a diviner’s interpretation and this would be followed by the offering of a sacrifice. For this 
reason, a jackal was not readily killed when it appeared at the homestead. It would just be chased 
away and a diviner’s advice would be sought immediately to ascertain the reason for the 
appearance of the jackal.    
Wild animals were also considered dangerous. For example, during the interviews it became 
apparent that the reason why the Chagga dreaded to go into the deep forest was not just because 
they feared evil spirits, they also feared dangerous animals like elephants, the lion and the 
leopard., People thus used to wear special Kishongu
31
 rings so that they could spit on the ring 
and pray to an ancestor to avert the danger if they met with a dangerous animal.  
There also were other specific beliefs related to animals that needed to be observed and 
performing cleansing ritual without which one would die or meet misfortune. Some examples of 
such beliefs related to animals include being bitten or struck by a baboon (this is unlucky and 
may cause death); to seeing a python; being wounded by a leopard; loud barking of a jackal close 
to the banana grove; and seeing a flying spur fowl. As these occurrences are rare, so it is believed 
to be a message from the ancestors to indicate that they are not happy with something when they 
do happen. When these events did happen, a diviners’ interpretation would be sought 
immediately and a cleansing ritual performed. 
A ritual involving animals and birds that is worth narrating here was performed during 
circumcision. This was performed at the end of the initiation ceremony when the actual act of 
circumcision had been done and the boys’ wounds had recovered. The ritual was aimed at 
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 These were rings made from the hides of slaughtered animals that every person who participated in the ritual 
wore as a symbol of communion with those who offered the sacrifice. This ring was believed to have protective 
power against evils spirits and dangerous animals. 
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teaching the boys bravery, especially in hunting. The boys were expected to show their hunting 
prowess and their ability to fight dangerous animals, so they would go around the bush hunting 
different animals (although this was only acting, for they would only hunt less dangerous 
animals and birds that were easy to capture, instead of the more dangerous ones). In some 
instances a plant was “hunted” instead of an actual animal. The hunt of the elephant was 
represented by a small dark-colored buck called Sambura, and the hunt of a lion in the form of a 
gazelle known as Sarigha.When it was caught, it is renamed the great lion. Then there was the 
hunt of a leopard disguised as a flower and followed by the hunt of a forest chief represented by 
the Sykes monkey. Lastly, there was the hunt of the king of the bananas, a lemur called Ngagha.  
What is interesting in the foregoing ritual is the final ceremony involving some of the captured 
living creatures. The leader says to Chief, “Take these creatures and liberate them, for these are 
our brothers with whom we have made a blood bond, wherefore we may not harm them” 
(Dundas, 1968:221). Then the Chief would liberate the creatures. Interestingly, while these 
creatures were thus let free unharmed, a spur fowl was killed and the blood licked by all present. 
The point here is that, while this ritual may be interpreted as a show of care to wild animals, its 
deeper aim, again, was to conduct the appropriate procedure for the ritual. The act being 
performed here was only symbolic. The ritual itself signified that the boys were ready for the 
task of hunting and protecting the community from dangerous animals (Dundas, 1968). Showing 
respect to animals thus did not mean that they always avoided killing them. We saw earlier that 
they would normally seek permission from the animal and slaughter it. Depending on the 
circumstances and the purpose of the hunt, if the big wild animals like elephants and buffalo in 
the forests were killed, the most important thing was for the spirit of the animal to be propitiated, 
although this was not a general rule. Otherwise, no special precaution, as far as my research was 
able to find, was taken in hunting or killing wild animals among the Chagga. The Chagga were 
only cautious in the treatment of the wild animals and birds that visited their homestead. Rombo, 
on the eastern side of the Mountain, was known as an elephant trapping area, for example 
(Moore, 1977). Here elephants were hunted in large numbers for their ivory. The Chagga traded 
the Ivory with the Kamba even long before the Arabs and Asians traders from the coast began to 
be involved in the trade with the Chagga around the seventeenth century (Moore, 1977).  
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Other animate creatures that were much feared by the Chagga included the owl (bundi) and the 
snake (python). For example, when the owl cried on the roof of the house or in the banana grove 
at night it marked an occasion for great anxiety in the family because the cry signified that a bad 
thing (such as death, or other misfortunes) would happen in the family. The owl was a bad omen, 
and in many cases it was difficult to ascertain exactly what was going to happen and to whom. 
That is why its appearance at the homestead was followed with immediate consultation of the 
diviner and constant sacrifices to send away the bad omen. The same applied to the python. The 
issue here was that these creatures were not killed but were chased away, while uttering some 
propitiating words, afterwhich the medicine man was called to cleanse the homestead. It is 
important to note, though, that these creatures were killed without a second thought when 
encountered in the bush.  
Many other instances reveal indifference or wanton killing of both domestic and wild animals. In 
the following examples, there is no evidence that the animals’ souls were propitiated before or 
after their killing., Chief Horombo of Rombo country on the eastern side of the mountain slopes, 
for example, received a lot of praise after killing an elephant single-handedly; this act of bravery 
is one of the things that impressed his clansmen who subsequently decided to make him their 
chief (Gutmann, 1926; Dundas, 1968). In addition, Chief Salia is said to have wantonly killed the 
elephants that marauded the Eleusine fields in his territory using his rifle. Furthermore, some 
animal parts were used to make a special concoction called Yande – a magic medicine used very 
often for Chagga rituals. These included, among others, the bones of a certain species of rat, 
elephant and sheep fat, and lizard blood (Dundas, 1968). This means that animals were killed to 
obtain these elements for medicine. On some occasions, even domestic animals like cattle were 
wantonly killed for other reasons than sacrifice. Chief Sina of Kibosho, seeing that he was 
overwhelmed in war, decided to destroy hundreds of his cattle stock so that they would not fall 
into the enemy’s hands (Dundas, 1968:102). Chief Sina, being the custodian of the traditional 
customs and beliefs of his chiefdom, would not have dared to kill the cattle so wantonly if 
animals were really considered sacred. If they were, they could not be wantonly killed or tortured 
as they sometimes were.  
All these examples show an ambivalent attitude towards animals among the Chagga. Sometimes 
they are approached with caution and care, and on another occasion they are wantonly killed. 
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This just explains the reality of the people’s attitudes toward animals contrary to the 
romanticising or exaggerations that are often found in works on African environmental ethics. 
These examples serve to show that sacredness was sometimes conferred on animals depending 
on the circumstances and the function that they expected the animals to perform. Thus, some 
aspects of nature were considered sacred only when they were set apart for a special purpose, 
namely as an animal for sacrifice or as a place for offering sacrifice. That is why we see that 
animals under normal circumstances were treated with indifference.  
The following account of the killing of a ritual animal among the Chagga furthermore serves to 
show that the Chagga were not interested in the suffering of the animal per se, but only on 
observing appropriate prescriptions for killing an animal for sacrifice. The account, as narrated 
by a clan elder in Rombo, goes: 
One of the men hits the cow on the head with a stone to make it collapse, and the men quickly tie 
the legs, put sticks in the nose, and tie the muzzle with banana fibre so that the animal could not 
breathe and would suffocate. It is important that the animal does not make a noise, and it is 
considered a bad sign if it dies quickly.   
Another narration relates that the animal took at least fifteen to twenty minutes to die. So the 
interest of the Chagga 'sacrificer' here is to make sure that the cow does not make a noise. Every 
effort is made to ensure that the cow is properly suffocated. Thus, what was important to the 
Chagga was not the pain or suffering of the animal per se, but following the appropriate 
ritualistic procedures for killing, slaughtering and dispatching it. However, for example, animal 
ethicists nowadays talk of inflicting as little pain as possible during the slaughtering of animals, 
because animals are capable of suffering pain, and an animal also is an ‘experiencing subject of a 
life’ (see  Peter Singer, 1974; Tom Regan, 1983). So, as Singer and Regan see it, it is unethical to 
make animals suffer unnecessarily, and/or to prolong the duration of suffering and death 
unnecessarily. These are the values that environmental ethics seeks to cultivate in the current 
generation, and rightly. This project, however, will only be successful in an African context if we 
are humble enough to accept that our traditional cultures are equally guilty, in the way they 
treated some aspects of nature in their own right.      
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Strictly speaking, the Chagga, furthermore, had no totem
32
 animals, as in some other ethnic 
communities in Africa. No wonder, then, that this concept does not exist in their language. It 
may be recalled here that the presence of totem animals (“totemic ancestorhood”) is among the 
arguments advanced by Tangwa (2004); Kelbessa (2011); Murove (2009); Behrens (2010) and 
some other scholars in support of an indigenous African environmental ethics. The lack of totem 
animals and other specific nature spirits or gods among the Chagga has been attributed to the fact 
that the “history and meaning of the tribe has more of a political or national foundation than a 
spiritual significance” (Dundas, 1968:49). This observation is very important because the 
different types of nature gods and spirits that are found in other African societies, such as the 
Oromo, are not found among the Chagga. Other African societies report spirits such as river 
spirits, mountain spirits, forest spirits, land spirits, and water spirits, or gods of rain, gods of 
fertility, etc. This differentiates the Chagga from some of these other ethnic groups in Africa who 
have been able to develop complex and elaborate spiritual practices with regard to nature. This 
does not imply that the Chagga were not spiritual; my argument is rather that their spirituality did 
not result in complex and elaborate ritual practices in relation to the natural environment as in 
other ethnic groups in Africa.    
The exposition above gives a hint of the Chagga people’s attitude towards animals and other 
animate creatures. Their attitude is one of indifference to both wild and domestic animals. No 
totem animals existed among the Chagga. Only a few taboos or restrictions regarding killing 
certain wild animals existed under certain circumstance. Most wild animals were considered 
dangerous and a nuisance to both humans and their livestock.  Domestic animals were sacred 
only in so far as they served ritualistic functions and were kept mainly for that purpose. These 
observations are contrary to Aidan Msafiri’s claim that “[the taboos and myths of the Chagga] 
and [their] beliefs towards nature promoted an ecologically friendly attitude, particularly towards 
animals” (Msafiri, 2007: 47). Thus, judging from the exposition above, Msafiri’s general 
observation that myths and taboos helped Africans develop due respect for plants, animals and 
all living creatures is an exaggeration. First of all, the Chagga respected only certain plants and 
animals under certain conditions. Secondly, they respected them because they associated them 
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 Totemism may be understood as the practice among some societies of adopting a particular animal species as its 
progenitor, so much so that it becomes taboo to kill a totem animal or to eat some parts of it (see, for example, 
Nyajeka, 1996; Taringa, 2006). 
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with spirits. These two facts reveal a very unbalanced and biased attitude towards nature and 
cannot be said to constitute a viable environmental ethics that can help to protect nature, in 
particular on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.  
This is why I argue that, contrary to the claims made by Kelbessa and Murove and many other 
advocates of African environmental ethics such as Geoffrey Tangwa (2004), Credo Mutwa 
(2006), Msafiri (2007), and Kevin Behrens (2010), the Chagga case shows that not all African 
traditional beliefs and practices support an environmental ethics or can provide adequate 
conceptual resources for an environmental ethics. Furthermore, in the instance of the traditional 
Chagga worldviews seeming to support some kind of environmental protection or nature 
conservation, that support is found to be very discriminative and ambivalent, protecting some 
aspects of nature while leaving others free for destruction. In the next section, I argue that the 
same applies to appeals to other aspects of nature in traditional Chagga beliefs for grounding an 
environmental ethic. 
4.5.4 Appeal to other aspects of nature 
Apart from arguing for an indigenous environmental ethics based on the sacredness of some trees 
and animals, Kelbessa also appeals to the reverence shown to other aspects of nature among the 
Oromo, such as the land, mountains, etc. In the case of the people living on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro, I basically focus on the reverence they showed towards the Mountain. It will be 
recalled that Kelbessa, and even Murove, claimed that this kind of respect towards some aspects 
of nature such as mountains and the land could be rehabilitated among Africans and hence help 
to protect nature – as it allegedly was the case in the past. 
4.5.4.1 Appeal to the Mountain 
As alluded to earlier, Mount Kilimanjaro, especially the ice-capped summit, Kibo, was the centre 
of most of the religious activities of the Chagga. There are legends regarding the formation of the 
Kilimanjaro Mountain and other small hills scattered throughout the region (Dundas, 1968:33-
35). The Mountain, especially the Kibo summit, had great spiritual significance for the Chagga. 
It is believed that the Chagga people never attempted to climb the mountain because of their fear 
of cold weather and the evil spirits believed to dwell deep in the forest and on the Mountain. It is 
narrated, for example, that the chief of Machame at one time sent an expedition to investigate the 
nature of the ice that descended very low above Machame, but only one delegate survived and 
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the rest were believed to be consumed by the cold weather and evil spirits (Dundas, 1968:35). 
This, in those days, made people afraid of getting close to the Mountain forests.  
Other legends tend to personify Kibo and Mawenzi in an attempt to explain why the two peaks 
look as they do. The legend goes thus: One day Mawenzi went to Kibo to ask for embers as 
Mawenzi’s fire had gone out. (This was the custom among Chagga neighbours). Fortunately, 
Kibo had cooked a delicious meal of banana and beans. Mawenzi, having been given embers and 
a mouthful of the food, then played a trick by throwing away the embers and returned to Kibo for 
more so that he would be given more of that delicious food. When Mawenzi tried this trick for 
the third time, Kibo got angry, and vigorously hit Mawenzi on the head with a wooden pestle. 
That is why, the story goes, Mawenzi is jagged and scarred.    
This legend tries to show the significance of the Kibo peak for the people. Mawenzi is given very 
little attention and hardly mentioned in the Chagga prayers and rituals. Charles Dundas explains 
this discriminating attitude regarding Mawenzi in favour of Kibo more succinctly in writing 
“Kibo is to the Chagga people the embodiment of all that is beautiful, eternal and strengthening; 
it is an ill omen only when reddened [more] than usual by the setting sun, in which case it 
portends famine” (Dundas, 1968:38). In some occasions, reference to Kibo was used to show 
honour and to confer blessings on people, especially to chiefs. It constituted a blessing to say, 
“endure like Kibo”, or “as Kibo moves not, so may life not be removed from you” or “as Kibo 
ages not, so may you never be old” (Dundas, 1968:38).  
Medicine men also invoked Kibo in their daily undertakings. The following tribal customs also 
point to the spiritual significance and reverence for Kibo among the Chagga people I reproduce 
these customs as narrated by Dundas 1968: 39): 
… the dead are buried with face turned towards Kibo; the side of the village facing Kibo is the 
honourable side, where the house master is buried, and the villagers assemble for feast and 
councils. He who comes from the direction of Kibo must give greeting first because he comes 
from the fortune bringing side. Filial affection requires that a son should face Kibo whilst 
washing, lest it be said that he thrusts his father into the plain. When meeting superior on the road 
it is customary to pass on the lower side of the road, giving him more honourable side towards 
Kibo.  
The Chagga people furthermore used to perform their prayers facing Kibo and they did this by 
spitting four times in the direction of Kibo. It is interesting to note that Kibo was not considered 
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to be Ruwa (God); despite the reverence bestowed on Kibo, prayers were directed to Ruwa,
33
 but 
were performed facing Kibo. So, it seems that Kibo was to the Chagga what the altar is for 
Christians, or the kiblah for Moslems, if a rough analogy may be used. That is, Kibo was not 
Ruwa himself.  
Now, what is the point in the narratives about Kibo and Mawenzi? The narration shows that the 
mountain had a spiritual function among the Chagga. The reverence and respect directed towards 
Kibo implies that the mountain and its environs were expected to be treated with care and 
sometimes left intact. Again, though, as the narration shows, this reverence was felt exclusively 
for Kibo and not for the mountain as a whole. As I noted earlier, Mawenzi was considered less 
significant, ugly and evil.
34
 So, if people at that time had access to the mountain at all, it is most 
probable that they would treat the environment around Mawenzi with little respect compared to 
Kibo, because of their discrimination against Mawenzi. We see here that one aspect of nature is 
respected while the rest, almost of the same status, is treated with indifference. This seems to be 
the defining characteristics of most traditional African attitudes towards nature in that certain 
beliefs and customs favour the protection of certain aspects of nature but leave others free for 
exploitation.  
In another narration, certain stones called Umbo
35
 were believed to have supernatural powers. 
The stone was referred to as the “Soul” of the Mbokom by the Moshi people. (Moshi was the 
name of a particular clan, and now is the name of the main town on the slopes of Kilimanjaro). 
The Moshi people thought that they, by digging out this stone, would undermine the power of the 
Mbokom people and thus conquer them and end the hostilities between the two clans, but were 
unable to dig to its base. The cases of Kibo and the Umbo stone confirm the pervasive belief 
among traditional Africans that everything animate or inanimate could be possessed of spiritual 
or supernatural powers. This, in turn, confirms earlier claims by people like Tangwa (2004) 
about Africans perceiving a slim boundary between the natural and the supernatural, the physical 
and the spiritual, and hence forming worldviews conducive to nurturing an environmental ethic. 
                                                          
33
 See Dundas (1968: 146), a special prayer to Ruwa who was only consulted in times of great misfortunes and 
difficulties that defied all lesser ancestral spirits and diviners. 
34
 See Dundas (1968: 38). 
35
 Umbo stones, which are conical in shape, were believed to have been brought to the Mbokom area by the Umbo 
people who were said to come in great numbers from Usambara. It is believed that the Umbo people planted 
these stones in some places to mark their camps or as memorials recording their progress (see Dundas, 1924: 41).   
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However, this holistic relationship, as alluded to in Chapter 3, was more sociological than 
ecological. 
4.5.4.2 Appeal to the land 
Like many other tribes in Africa, the Chagga revealed special attachment and relationship to the 
land. This is most probably because they believed the land to be the medium through which to 
communicate and pray to the ancestors. The land was sacred. When offering sacrifices, a little 
milk and local brew, wari, was poured on the land to show communion with the ancestors. The 
ancestors were believed to dwell underneath the land. The land represented the roots of the clan. 
Prayers and sacrifices to the ancestors could not take place outside of the family land or banana 
grove, unless they were public prayers, for which there were special sacred community sites. The 
grove is the family graveyard. The ancestral skulls are assembled where the dracaena
36
 plants 
(sacred plants used by the Chagga for various religious rituals) are planted in the banana grove. 
Family sacrifices were offered here and this spot was considered a family shrine.  
As Dundas (1968: 195) correctly observed: 
…the Chagga speaks and thinks of his grove as his home, a place of intimate and sacred 
associations which he cannot be indifferent to. I make no doubt that it is this which in a large 
measure makes the Chagga more attached to his home and country than is usual among Africans.  
Before planting the grove, a local brew offering, wari wa mbeke, was made to the spirits of those 
who were the first cultivators of the land. In fact this sacrifice was made to ask permission from 
the ancestors or foreign spirits to inhabit or cultivate any new piece of land that was acquired, 
whether inherited or bought.    
Apart from the association of the banana grove with the land, we do not hear of special elaborate 
taboos or beliefs attached to the land per se. In other instances, the Chagga would offer special 
sacrifices before planting traditional beans and Eleusine,
37
 which used on the plains for food and 
rituals. It is also notable that the Chagga have no special gods or spirits explicitly associated with 
the land, as among the Oromo of Ethiopia.         
                                                          
36
 Dracaena leaves (masale) were a symbol of peace and blessing to the Chagga.   
37
 Eleusine is a cereal which is used to make gruel for children, nursing mothers and the youth during circumcision, 
but the most important function of Eleusine is to make wari, the traditional brew without which a ceremony, a 
celebration or a ritual is not complete.  
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My interviews and conversations revealed that land today, is the most valuable asset for the 
people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. It will be recalled that this is a densely 
populated area. Land is owned mostly through inheritance, the kihamba system. Land is the 
major resource that people use to earn a living. The Chagga home garden system thus serves as a 
kind of "supermarket" where most food is grown and obtained, ranging from vegetables, bananas 
(which is the staple), beans and fruit trees. As I showed earlier, Kilimanjaro is a highly populated 
area. This puts pressure on the land and natural resources. Because arable land is shrinking in 
rural Kilimanjaro, most conflicts in these areas are based on the struggle for land ownership. 
Land therefore is an important aspect that defines the natural environment for the people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Most land conflict in this area occurs among the people who 
live near the Kilimanjaro National Park. Land conflict in other places, like Kibosho, occurs 
between villagers and investors in big coffee plantations. Conflicts arise because the government 
apportions large plots of land to investors, thus leaving very little land for the villagers to 
cultivate food crops for their subsistence. Furthermore, the villagers are fighting for the right to 
access the mountain forests to collect firewood and fodder or grass for their livestock, because 
the plots they own today are too small to cater for these needs. 
In the past, land was not sold and it was taboo to do so, but today, just like anywhere else, land 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro has become a commodity. The system of land inheritance, 
the kihamba, furthermore has resulted in land fragmentation, which, in turn, has caused soil 
degradation. The traditions and customs of people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
makes it the responsibility of the head of the family to ensure that each of his sons (not 
daughters, of course), regardless of their number, gets a plot of the land by inheritance (kihamba) 
where he can build his own house and start a family. The sons actually have the right to demand 
this from their father when they reach the age of marriage and this apportionment depends on the 
sequence of the births of sons. The eldest gets a bigger portion, the second, third or fourth get 
smaller portions and sometimes these are away from home on the plains. The last born also 
inherits a bigger portion of land because he is the one who remains on his parents’ premises to 
take care of them in their old age.   
This practice has been blamed for causing land fragmentation and degradation, and is also seen 
as the cause of many instances of land conflict at Kilimanjaro. The land shortage on the 
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mountain slopes has resulted in people resorting to clearing the forests and trees on hills and 
thereby causing soil erosion and drought. Current efforts by the government seek to persuade 
people to move to other areas of the country where land is plentiful.  
This strategy has met some setbacks, however. One of the reasons for these setbacks is that 
people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are so attached to their home lands and will not 
relocate easily. Another setback results from poor or lack of infrastructure at the new places that 
they are expected to live. A district officer in Moshi revealed that the areas where people are 
asked to migrate to have no houses, no roads, no dispensaries, no shops, etc. Moving there means 
starting from scratch. The poor who comprise the target population cannot afford all of these. 
This means that only people who have the means are able to relocate and the poor remain on the 
mountain slopes, depending on the dwindling natural resources and hence themselves and the 
natural environment becoming even poorer. So people today see the land more as a commodity 
and it is increasingly losing its cultural and spiritual functions because of, among other things, 
the population pressure that has resulted in land scarcity. This entails that it would not be feasible 
and practical to base an environmental ethic on the waning traditional Chagga beliefs about land 
to address the current urgent environmental problems on the mountain slopes because these 
beliefs lack consistent nature protection motives, and they just cannot keep up with the current 
scarcity and land pressure on the mountain slopes.  
4.5.5 Appeal to ancestors 
One important thing that is evident throughout Kelbessa and Murove’s articulation of indigenous 
African environmental ethics is a strong appeal to ancestors. To recall, their argument is that the 
respect accorded to ancestral spirits believed to be embodied in natural objects such as animals 
and trees meant that some aspects of nature were conserved. Alternatively, it means that living in 
peace and harmony with ancestors constitutes living in harmony and peace with fellow human 
beings and the rest of the non-human world.  In this section, I examine whether the appeal to 
ancestors could be meaningful enough among the Chagga to promote an environmental ethics of 
protecting nature. 
In their daily encounters, the traditional Chagga were ever preoccupied and worried about 
ancestral spirits. They were careful in everything they did so that they would not upset the 
cosmic balance hinged on reverence due to the ancestral spirits. The spirits were the most 
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revered beings among the Chagga. Everything that the traditional Chagga did or experienced, 
whether planting, building a house, slaughtering, sickness, relations among people, and 
interactions with everything human or nonhuman, ancestral spirits came into the equation in one 
way or another. The belief was that the spirits were capable of bringing wealth or inflicting 
misery upon the family or community, so proper observance of all sacrifices and rituals due to 
the ancestral spirits was the single most important thing among the Chagga.   
Among the traditional Chagga, it was believed that there are family spirits, usually the family 
ancestors, and also clan or terrestrial or chiefly spirits. The chiefly spirits, usually deceased 
founders of the clan or their lineage thus are honoured by every clan member on special 
occasions. When certain spirits wanted sacrifices from humans, they would inflict sickness or 
misfortune on the family concerned, or the community. The family or community would then 
consult a diviner to establish the source of the problem and the type of sacrifice being demanded. 
All activities among the traditional Chagga should therefore be interpreted from the point of 
view of their desire to maintain relations and power with the ancestral spirits, because all life in 
the traditional Chagga community was held together and only made sense in relation to the 
ancestral spirits. Remembering the ancestors through animal sacrifice thus was a very important 
thing. This is true even up to today among some sections of the Chagga community. All other 
things associated with that, be it the protection of the sacred trees or of the groves, were only 
instrumental in attaining the purpose mentioned above.  
It should be noted that the Chagga did not feel obliged to sacrifice to strange spirits, that is, other 
families’ spirits. In fact, a spirit from another family or clan could not demand sacrifices from a 
different family or clan. This point is important vis-à-vis the environment because, while the 
beliefs and practices of one family or clan could have a positive environmental effect, albeit 
unintended, the beliefs and activities of another family or clan could be otherwise. For example, 
while it was a taboo to harvest branches of trees from the sacred tree of one’s own clan, 
somebody from another clan could transgress that taboo without any remorse or fear of 
retribution from the foreign ancestors. Thus the belief in ancestors did not guarantee the 
protection of the environment in its entirety.                    
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The following conversation that I had with some women at the Mamsera market in Rombo 
district shows the extent of the lack of confidence in the role of the ancestors in protecting the 
environment. 
Researcher: How do you relate with your ancestors today? 
Respondent: You mean offering sacrifices to the ancestors? These days, people have abandoned 
those beliefs. Very few people continue to observe them. It is said that if you are found 
performing traditional rituals, they will excommunicate you. They are against it.  
Researcher: Who are those who are against it? 
Respondent: The church. 
Researcher: And what do you say about that? 
Respondent:   We just follow what they say.  
Researcher: How do you follow what they say? 
Respondent 1: Yes, we have abandoned these beliefs and practices. Even if there were good 
ones, will you perform them alone my son? Everybody else is not observing them anymore. For 
example, if I sell the goat that was to be slaughtered for the traditional sacrifice, will I not make 
some money to pay for my children’s school fees? (Another interrupts)… but not everybody has 
abandoned these beliefs and practices completely. Some continue to observe them. 
Researcher: What about you? Do you offer sacrifices to the ancestors? 
Respondent 2: With whom? (Laughter) If you mention such things to the children especially 
those of mine who are now trying to earn a living in town, they will stop sending me some 
remittances. They won’t even come to greet me anymore. 
Researcher: Why do you say so? 
Respondent: They (her sons) say that these things are outdated. They make us poor. 
Researcher: Do other people in this village continue to observe the traditional beliefs and 
practices in relation to the ancestors?  
Respondent: I really don’t know. They used to say if you do not sacrifice to the ancestors it will 
not rain. But how come it rained very well this year as it used to be in the old days? Was there 
any rituals performed to bring the rain? Only God wished and it rained. What if he does not wish, 
it will remain just as dry as it has been. I did not hear of any ritual that was performed to ask for 
the rain! 
Such is the general feeling among most people today on the Kilimanjaro Mountain slopes. This 
largely is a result of the influence of Christianity and modern education. It is not uncommon to 
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hear about fundamentalist Christian groups or sects in the area such as the Catholic and 
Protestant Charismatic Revival Movements urging their followers and even other members of the 
church to desist engagement in acts to do with veneration of ancestors and traditional sacred 
places. They even go to the extent of destroying sacred trees and sacred places. They also 
counsel those who had participated in those acts to ‘repent’ and attend special services to help 
them ‘break’ what they call “the evil bondages” made with the mizimu (ancestral spirits). My 
observation also shows that some people feel safe in taking refuge in the Charismatic movement, 
so as to be relieved from the economically burdensome demands of the ancestors. It is important 
therefore to note here that some villagers would prefer to be relieved of the traditional beliefs and 
customs that seem burdensome, but have some fear of what the consequences of doing that might 
be. The charismatic revival preachers take full advantage of that by convincing them that they 
(the religious leaders) are capable of dissolving the bondage entered into with the mizimu (the 
ancestral spirits). 
So, while it is true that belief in ancestors to some extent continues to wield influence among 
some sections of the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, that influence is not in 
the direction of protecting the environment because people have abandoned most of the 
traditional beliefs and practices with conservational impact. Some people continue to revere the 
ancestors, but this respect is no longer communal but more private.  It is also not unusual among 
the Chagga to find some people within the same family still observing traditional ancestral 
worship practices and other members completely indifferent. The communal reverence of sacred 
places has largely diminished and some of those sacred forests and big trees have even 
disappeared. One therefore cannot appeal to ancestors as a tool to effectively persuade people to 
protect the environment among the Chagga.  
4.6 Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter by noting that traditional Chagga beliefs and attitudes towards nature 
were found to be ambivalent, inconsistent, and contradictory in many respects. At one occasion 
they seem to support environmental protection, while at a different occasion the same beliefs and 
practices seem to be inimical to the environment. Thus, these beliefs and practices could be said 
to provide us with a very weak and indirect theoretical environmental ethic that has little 
relevance to the current urgent practical environmental problems on the slopes of Mount 
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Kilimanjaro.  This chapter thus serves to show that, in my view, ethnographic approaches to 
environmental ethics generally result in no more than a weak and fragmented theoretical 
environmental ethic without much bearing on the real concrete environmental challenges 
experienced in the areas where these beliefs are, or were held. If this is perhaps not true of the 
Oromo, it is indeed true of the Chagga.  
In the following chapter, I show what the concrete environmental challenges and current realities 
of the Chagga living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are in greater depth and indicate, on the 
basis of these realities, what the requirements are (or could be) for an environmental ethics that, 
in this context, may be both persuasive and effective. In the last chapter, Chapter 6, I will attempt 
to propose a way forward towards formulating such an environmental ethic. That is, I will 
endeavour to articulate what kind of environmental ethics might be appropriate to a context such 
as the one on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro; showing, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, why 
environmental pragmatism and adaptive management, which underlie a process ethic, provides a 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CURRENT REALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES ON THE SLOPES 
OF MOUNT KILIMANJARO 
5.1 Introduction 
I have examined the traditional beliefs and cultural practices of the Chagga in light of the 
frameworks proposed by Murove and Kelbessa inChapter 4. The aim was to see if it was 
possible to distil an environmental ethic from these beliefs and cultural practices (or generally, 
worldview) to address the environmental problems on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. I 
demonstrated that the approaches by Murove and Kelbessa fell short when applied in the Chagga 
context. When the general methodology of Murove and Kelbessa was used in an effort to distil 
an environmental ethics from the traditional beliefs and practices of the Chagga, quite a number 
of problems emerged. In particular, these approaches, when applied to the Chagga situation, miss 
the dynamics of current realities and the time frame in which the local people have moved away 
from those traditions. They also miss the current multiplicity of values and experiences of the 
people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
In this chapter I show that these realities/experiences and time frames include power struggles, 
conflict over accessing natural resources, exclusions, new forms of natural resources 
management and their top-down approach, poverty, dependency, Christianity and modernity in 
general. In my analysis of these realities I focus in particular on the lived experiences, as well as 
the concrete context and very real power struggles in which these experiences are embedded. I 
will then use the three pillars of Norton’s process ethics, or adaptive management,38to interpret 
these experiences, contexts and power struggles with a view to paving the way for my last 
chapter which is devoted to a proposal for a practical, contextualised environmental ethics that is 
capable of engaging with the environmental problems of the Chagga as currently manifested. 
Following this approach I hope to show that Norton’s adaptive management and the process 
ethics that is entailed point to a kind of practical ethics that might be more suited to addressing 
                                                          
38
 Norton’s environmental pragmatism is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 where the three pillars of adaptive 
management ethics are discussed. These include commitment to experience and experimentalism, being attentive 
to multiple scales of place and time, and being sensitive to a particular bio-physical condition and the 
corresponding specific values upheld in a particular area. 
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environmental problems on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro than the ethno-philosophical 
approaches proposed by Murove and Kelbessa. 
In essence, this chapter presents a shift from what I see as the ethnographic and “universalist” 
approaches of Murove and Kelbessa to treating specific contexts and time frames as they are 
actually lived today and continue to evolve on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. This calls for a 
process of experiential and experimental learning rather than prior learning, which is in keeping 
with a pragmatist understanding of truth as contextual and dynamic (Norton, 2005). I must 
emphasise, again, that my aim was not so much to compare the Chagga with the Oromo or Shona 
on an ethnographic basis, but rather to take an alternative route by conducting a case study in 
order to move beyond what I understand as Murove’s and Kelbessa’s implicit universalist and 
foundationalist stance in their approaches to African environmental ethics. To do that, I started 
by examining the current situation and how people interact with the environment on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro so as to unveil the concrete environmental challenges and concerns that the 
local people experience. As such, the content of this chapter is based on relevant literature, but 
also on semi-structured interviews that I conducted with key informants about the environmental 
challenges experienced on the slopes of Kilimanjaro.
39
 
5.2 Interactions with the natural environment on the slopes of Mount  
Kilimanjaro 
Before I delve into the actual interaction of the Chagga with their natural environment to 
demonstrate how this relationship is being influenced by current government and management 
practices, economic realities, and human-animal conflicts, I first present the current status of the 
environment on the mountain slopes as local people and experts see it. 
5.2.1 The current state of the environment 
My conversations and interviews with environmental officers and experts from various districts 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro reveal that the growing human population and deforestation 
are among the major environmental concerns on the slopes of the mountain. Discussions with 
environmental experts from the University of Dar es Salaam, notably Prof. Pius Yanda, a climate 
change expert, also revealed that the disappearance of the ice-fields on Mount Kilimanjaro is 
more probably due to the growing population, changes in land use, and deforestation on the 
                                                          
39
  See Chapter 1, Section 1.3 for a more detailed exposition of the methodology that I followed for this case study. 
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slopes rather than climate change. Pius Yanda, therefore, believes that re-forestation on the 
mountain slopes is the most likely solution to the problem. Experts approximate that the ice-
fields on Mount Kilimanjaro, which have been the source of numerous springs and rivers on the 
slopes diminished by 80 percent between 1912 and 2002, and the ice-cap is expected to 
disappear completely by 2020 if the situation on the mountain slopes remains the same (Boko, et 
al., 2007).The Kilimanjaro Regional Government describes the environmental situation on the 
mountain slopes as a crisis. This led to various measures including an official declaration on the 
environmental degradation on the mountain slopes as a crisis accompanied by a complete 
restriction of access and use of a Half-Mile Forestry Strip (HMFS). A restriction on the 
harvesting of forests and trees in other places in the entire Kilimanjaro region was also imposed. 
Not only environmental experts and government officials only, but also villagers, the common or 
lay people, have realised the environmental problems on the mountain slopes. They have their 
own models or indicators to describe the state of the environment on the mountain slopes. Issues 
identified by the villagers as indicators of environmental problems on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro include abnormally high temperatures; drying up of what used to be permanent 
rivers; acute water shortage; the appearance of malaria mosquitoes; erratic rainfall; and recurring 
crop failure.   
5.2.1.1 Abnormally high temperatures 
There is a general perception among villagers that temperatures have become abnormally high 
on the slopes of the mountain. An environmental expert in Moshi reported that the temperatures 
on the slopes of the mountain hit an all-time high at 42˚C for the first time in the history of the 
area in 2012. Normal average temperatures during the hot season range from 25 to 30˚C.Local 
people observed that it was difficult to walk around in Moshi town without a jacket regardless of 
the season in the former times, but people hardly put on jackets nowadays. One interviewee 
observed, “…when you stand at the Moshi town bus stand, you feel the heat coming from 
underground…it is extremely hot. We have never experienced something like this before.” An 
environmental officer from Rombo, one of the Districts on the eastern side of the slopes likened 
the current temperatures of Moshi town with those of Khartoum, Sudan. A villager in Mweka 
lamented: 
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…the snow on the mountain was making this place cool and cold. In those days, when we were 
young, it was extremely cold during the cold season but these days, it does not get very cold. In 
other times, it gets unusually hot. 
A weather expert in Kilimanjaro seemed to differ, however, noting that “the climate has become 
dryer, and hotter in summer and colder in winter”. All in all, the most important thing is that the 
common villager is able to notice that there is something wrong with the weather, and can 
associate that with environmental problems on the mountain slopes. Both experts and lay people, 
generally, believe that temperatures on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro have increased due to 
excessive clearing of forests and trees. So, the need for some environmental ethic that can 
motivate the local people to do something about this state of affairs becomes even more evident. 
5.2.1.2 Drying of rivers and springs and acute water shortage 
Participants in my study noted that most of the rivers in some places on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro have become seasonal and some have dried completely. This has happened mostly 
on the Eastern side of the mountain slope which mainly covers the Rombo district where most 
rivers have dried and some only flow briefly during the rainy season. On the western side where 
some rivers still flow throughout the year, it may be observed that the volume of water in those 
rivers has decreased drastically. This has made it impossible to continue practicing the traditional 
mfongo (furrow) irrigation system and water from the rivers and springs no longer reach the 
farms on the plains. 
It is common to hear people on the streets complaining about the water shortage. According to 
the interviewees, this is a result of the rivers drying or a reduction in the water volume in the 
rivers and springs. Furrows customarily used to channel water from sources on the mountain 
slopes to home gardens for general purposes are mostly dry. An environmental expert in Rombo 
noted that, the volume of water slumped from a typical 12,000 cubic litres per day to 6,000 cubic 
litres per day in 2014 for the first time in the history of the Moshi Municipality. The 
Municipality, like other parts of the mountain slopes, gets its water from melting glaciers and 
springs on the mountain slope, so the decrease of the ice fields is a serious threat to people living 
on the mountain slopes. Some villagers mentioned the excessive cutting of trees around water 
sources as the reason for the acute water shortage. An elderly villager said, “[I]n the past nobody 
would dare to get into the forest and cut down trees at the water sources because it was strictly 
prohibited, but today people do that without remorse.” 
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5.2.1.3 Erratic rainfall and recurring crop failure 
Peasants on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro also mentioned drought or erratic rainfall and crop 
failure as signs indicating environmental problems on the mountain slopes. Farming, the 
economic mainstay on the mountain slopes, is practiced both on the highlands and on the plains 
surrounding the mountain. As noted earlier, coffee and bananas are the main crops grown at 
higher elevations, whereas crops such as maize, beans, millet, groundnuts and sunflowers are 
grown on the rather dryer plains. Farming on the mountain slopes has to rely on rain because 
even in areas where traditional irrigation was possible (some western parts of the mountain 
slope), most of the rivers are dry or have too little water to cater for irrigation and other domestic 
needs of the growing population. Because of the erratic rainfall, peasants, especially on the 
eastern side of the mountain slopes, complained that they have been without a substantial yield 
or harvest from their farms for five or more consecutive seasons. In substantiating villagers’ 
complaints, rainfall data on the mountain slopes show a decreasing trend of between 2.5mm and 
12mm per annum over the last 60 to 100 years (Sébastien, 2012). During periods of drought, it is 
common among the Chagga to pray to God to ask for rain. However, traditional public sacrifices 
to pray for rains are rare these days, according to Chagga elders who were interviewed. 
5.2.1.4 Appearance of malaria mosquitoes 
Another indicator of environmental problems on the mountain slopes, according to the villagers, 
is the appearance of malaria-causing mosquitoes. Malaria mosquitoes have become a problem on 
the highlands for the first time in the history of the area, and villagers have been forced to sleep 
under mosquito nets for the first time. I myself witnessed mosquitoes at night in areas where 
people never knew malaria mosquitoes before. These areas used to be too cold for the 
mosquitoes to survive, but mosquitoes are a common phenomenon now, especially during the 
hot season, and sleeping without a mosquito net is difficult, let alone the increase in the number 
of malaria cases in hospitals. This being something completely new to the people living on the 
mountain slopes, some people, especially the elderly, say this situation is a result of a curse from 
God and ancestors because of misbehaviour; others understand that it is a result of environmental 
degradation, especially because of the clearing of trees and forests. 
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5.2.1.5 Land degradation and fragmentation 
Population growth and the Kihamba system of subdividing family land among sons have resulted 
in degradation and fragmentation of land. Villagers showed me hills that had not been cultivated 
or inhabited formerly, but are heavily cultivated now and settled by some people. The forests on 
these hills thus have been systematically cleared, the land has been left bare, and soil erosion has 
become the norm. Over-cultivation of the small plots of farms on the plains have also rendered 
them infertile, hence resulting in very low crop yields. This has exacerbated poverty, and made 
the villagers ‘encroach’ on the protected forest and also overexploiting the natural environment, 
especially through selling trees from their plots for cash as a coping strategy.  A 40-year-old 
woman interviewee said: 
... we are getting nothing from the farms these days, yet we need to eat, the children need to go to 
school, so we are left with no other option than selling trees from the farms so as to meet those 
needs, which is why you can see that our farms are depleted of trees. 
In a situation like this where poverty is pushing people to engage in acts that are environmentally 
damaging, persuasion may need to be accompanied with finding alternative ways of survival. 
We see from the above that the kind of models or indicators that the local people use to describe 
their environmental problems suggest that we may need to be more pragmatic than theoretical in 
our efforts to find appropriate tools to motivate people to protect nature. We see people here 
talking about environmental problems in both secular and/or quasi-scientific language, and also 
in religious (traditional and modern) terms. Now, in the sub-section that follows, I look briefly at 
what the local people see as the causes of and solutions for the problems. I, in particular, 
examine the nature of causes/reasons and solutions that the local people propose with regard to 
environmental problems. This will give us further clues to what persuasive tools we may have to 
use to motivate the local people to protect the environment on the mountain slopes. 
5.3 Causes of and solutions for the environmental problems 
Regarding the causes or reasons for the environmental problems mentioned above. We may note 
three categories of answers alluded to by villagers. These are: excessive cutting of trees and 
forests; punishment from God; and punishment from ancestors.  However, these answers seem to 
overlap in many instances, in that some people would mention all three as the reasons for the 
environmental problems, but emphasising certain answers/reasons more than others.  
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Experts and educated people (secondary school and above) typically emphasised excessive 
cutting of trees and forests as the reason, while less educated people (primary school level) 
typically emphasised both excessive cutting of trees and forests and punishment from God (many 
being Christians). Regarding the punishment from God, some people said there is too much 
immorality in the society today, something that has made God punish humans for their sins 
through drought and crop failure. In Maharo village, in Rombo District, for example, one of the 
immoralities that people mentioned was the prevalent behaviour of some young mothers in 
throwing away or killing their babies on delivery. Some of the local people believe that this has 
brought a curse on the land from God. Most of the elderly likewise emphasised that people have 
abandoned the ways of the ancestors and of God, and that is why there is environmental 
problems today.  
 It is clear from this that the local people use quasi-scientific terms and religious terms to explain 
the reasons for the environmental problems. As I mentioned in the previous section, this is a 
significant departure from talking about the environment in exclusively traditional religious 
terms to using more mixed terms, which suggests that a mixed or hybrid worldview has become 
part of the local culture. This is to say, the approaches of Murove and Kelbessa alone cannot be 
applied adequately in this context. The situation on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro calls for 
approaches that can accommodate the different ways in which the local people conceive the 
environment. My argument has been that environmental pragmatism, particularly Norton’s 
Adaptive Management ethics, gives us that option, because it is a methodology that allows for 
the unfolding of the multiplicity of values in a given context. 
In the following sub-section, I turn to the concrete challenges that people living on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro experience as they interact with the natural environment by focusing on how 
this interaction is being influenced by current government and management practices, economic 
realities, and human-animal conflicts. Ultimately, I show how Norton’s process ethics, and the 
three pillars of his adaptive management approach in particular, could help in resolving these 
challenges.  
5.4 Current environmental challenges and concerns of the Chagga 
My fieldwork on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro revealed that the current environmental 
challenges and conflicts are related to current management practices, especially regarding access 
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and use of the natural resources, and also to the distribution of benefits accruing from the 
mountain resources to the surrounding villages. These concerns and challenges have also been 
found to affect the local people’s attitudes towards the natural environment. These concerns and 
other environmental problems on the mountain slopes furthermore show that neither the 
mainstream nor the hitherto alternative traditional African environmental ethics approaches 
could adequately address them. An examination of these conflicts and concerns is necessary in 
the effort to remove obstacles that may hinder the work of persuading people to protect nature on 
these slopes.  The nature of these conflicts and concerns embedded in people’s daily interactions 
with nature on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro provide further justification for a practical, 
contextualised approach accounting for a multiplicity of values as more suited to addressing 
them than an appeal to traditional values and practices only. I hereby consider these conflicts 
briefly. 
5.4.1 Challenges/issues arising from management practices 
One of the issues that kept on occurring during interviews with the people living on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro with regard to their daily interaction with nature concerned the restriction 
placed on harvesting and transporting trees and forest products in the Kilimanjaro region, and the 
restrictions on access to the forest issued by the Regional Government and the KINAPA 
management. 
5.4.1.1 Issues/conflicts between villagers and the Regional Government 
My interviews revealed that the strict measures taken by the Regional Government to ban 
harvesting of trees and forest resources in the entire Kilimanjaro region did not augur well for the 
local people and even with some environmental experts in the region. As a result, these measures 
were protested vigorously. 
Village leaders and some environmental experts in the region believe that these restrictions were 
orders that came from a higher authority. The decision to implement the restrictions was reached 
without the full participation of the villagers, the wananchi. Some village leaders claimed that 
they were summoned by the Regional Commissioner (RC) and found that the decision had 
already been taken by the Regional Government. My conversations with some village leaders 
revealed that most villagers believed that their village leaders were bribed, otherwise they would 
not agree to such a poor decision without consulting the villagers. A villager complained: 
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I planted the tree myself, I took care of it myself, and now I need to harvest it, you tell me I am 
not allowed to do that? But, I had a plan with my tree. The government did not help me to plant 
it. How can they forbid me to harvest it?  
Some of the villagers I interviewed were of the opinion that the order was unjust and inhumane 
because most of them used trees as a source of income, especially since the collapse of the coffee 
crop. The villagers sell trees from their plots to get cash to pay for their children’s school 
expenses, or buy household needs such as food, or for medical expenses, let alone building or 
repairing their houses. Complaints by the village leaders indicated that they tried to go back to 
the Regional Commissioner to seek a review of the decision, but were not afforded that 
opportunity. 
 
Figure 5: Women and children selling firewood on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
Source: Researcher, 2014. 
An interview with an environmental expert in Moshi District revealed that the decision to ban the 
harvesting of trees and forest products in the region was the wrong approach, and would not help 
to save the environment from destruction in the long run. He noted that the ban was already 
having a bad effect on the poor. For example, he revealed that his office was overwhelmed by 
the number of people seeking permits to harvest trees from their farms, but that his office no 
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longer had the authority to issue those permits. He cited examples of sick people needing money 
for medical care, those with problems with paying school fees for their children, and others 
complaining of hunger. He explained that while all these people felt that selling trees from their 
farms would relieve their problems, they could not do that because of the ban. 
An environmental officer from Moshi District said that the ban had in fact exacerbated 
environmental destruction and has been a source of bribery. It had become a source of income 
for some unscrupulous individuals. He narrated thus: 
According to a quick research we did recently, the destruction of the environment especially 
cutting down of trees has intensified. This is because, among other things, there are some 
voluntary environmental groups that went to the Regional Commissioner to seek contracts to 
monitor and enforce the order. Some of these groups were given the contracts but ironically they 
have been the very ones encouraging people to destroy the environment. They go around 
collecting bribes from villagers who want to harvest trees. Also this order has encouraged 
corruption at the level of villages and wards. Once people know that even if they come to the 
district offices they won’t get permits, they resort to bribing the leaders at village and ward levels, 
and go ahead to harvest the trees. So, this order has become a good source of income for some 
unscrupulous leaders and a few clever individuals. As a consequence village and district councils 
are no longer receiving revenue from harvesting and transporting trees and forest products. This 
money is going into the pockets of a few corrupt individuals. 
The conflict between the villagers and the Regional Government is an example of the importance 
of involving people in matters that affect their lives. I show, in Chapter 6, how a case like this 
should have been handled by using Norton’s process proposal and adaptive management to attain 
a successful ending without much complaining. The following subsection is an example of a 
more or less similar case but this time involving the villagers and the Kilimanjaro National Park 
Management (KINAPA). Here, we found an even bigger lesson in the complexities of managing 
resources among needy people. 
5.4.1.2 Conflicts between the local people and the Kilimanjaro National Park Authority 
Kilimanjaro National Park Authority (KINAPA) is a semi-autonomous government parastatal 
that oversees and takes care of Mount Kilimanjaro and the surrounding forests on its slopes. It is 
one of the constituent authorities under the umbrella of TANAPA (Tanzania National Parks 
Authority). During the German colonial rule in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) from 1885 to 1919, a 
Half-Mile Forestry Strip (HMFS) intended to serve as a buffer zone that the villagers 
surrounding the mountain could access for their daily needs had been established between the 
protected forest and the local people’s settlements.  Previously, KINAPA would only manage the 
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mountain itself from the ice-cape down to the area just before the main forest. The rest of the 
area from where the main forest begins to the entire area covering the Half-Mile Forestry Strip 
was managed by the central government through the then Ministry of Tourism and Natural 
Resources, the Forest and Bees Division. However, the Half-Mile Forestry Strip was later given 
to the District Council to manage. In this way, the villagers surrounding the forest were given 
direct control of the forest strip. They thus formed Village Environmental Committees and 
established by-laws and regulations on how to manage and use the forest strip. In this way, the 
forest was protected while the villagers benefitted from products such as firewood, grass or 
fodder for their livestock, medicine, and poles for building houses and supporting their banana 
plants. According to the Natural Resources Officer in the Moshi District Council, three quarters 
of the survival needs of people who live on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro come from the 
forests surrounding the mountain slope. Villagers thus claimed that the benefits they were getting 
from the forests previously made them feel that they really owned the forest and this made them 
protect it wholeheartedly.     
However, the government, through KINAPA, claimed back the Half-Mile Forestry Strip in 2005 
for the reason that the District and village councils had failed to manage it well, thereby leading 
to extreme deforestation. Villagers were thenceforth banned from entering the forest for any 
reason whatsoever. This has had a negative impact on people’s attitude towards the forest and the 
National Park in general. The following section consists of extracts from in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions on this topic, presented here in the form of a conversation. This provides 
a detailed presentation of the effect of the total conservation approach adopted by KINAPA, 
famously known as the fences and fines approach, on people’s perceptions and attitudes towards 
KINAPA and the forest at large. KINAPA and the Half-Mile Forestry Strip issue were among 
the dominant themes that emerged in the conversations I had with the people living on the slopes 
of Mount Kilimanjaro. The Kilimanjaro National Park (KINAPA) issue, which is narrated 
hereunder, also serves as an illustration of how theories and policies of environmental protection 
that seek to distance people from access and use of surrounding natural resources are difficult to 
apply among the poor.  
My interviews and experiences on the mountain slopes revealed that the total exclusion of the 
villagers from accessing and using the forest’s resources has engendered an attitude of enmity 
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between KINAPA and the villagers. The villagers’ sense of ownership of the forest and the 
mountain has waned. As a result, and contrary to the expectations of the government and 
KINAPA, destruction of the forest has intensified. An interview with a village chairman in 
Kibosho testified to the same. He said: 
One of the biggest challenges we are experiencing in this village is to be denied access to the 
forest. Most of our needs were coming from the forests. For example, grass for our livestock, 
firewood, poles for building our houses, herbal medicine etc. But today, we can no longer get 
these needs from the forest after KINAPA took over the management of the HMFS from the 
Village and District Councils. 
According to the village leader, KINAPA took control of the HMFS because the villagers and 
District Councils had failed to manage the forest. KINAPA claimed that the destruction of the 
forest had intensified, and thus they wanted to stop the trend. However, the village chairman 
claims that the destruction of the forest had not reached as bad a state as portrayed by KINAPA. 
From my own observations and interpretation of this interview, however, the destruction of the 
environment has increased rather than decreased, even after KINAPA took over its management. 
Interviews and conversations with villagers further showed that the villagers had not received the 
decision very well. As a result, they did not cooperate with KINAPA in taking care of the forest 
and the natural environmental around the park. They, for example, were not particularly happy 
with the decision to introduce foreigners from other areas as guards or park rangers. They 
wondered why KINAPA would entrust something that they had been taking care of to strangers 
who had no attachment to the land. The villagers believed that they knew more about the 
importance of the mountain and its value to them than outsiders.   
A villager said: 
Since they brought people here with weapons and paying them to protect the forest, our weapon 
will be not to cooperate with them. Since, they have entrusted the forest to those they think are 
capable of protecting it, we will show them that they are not capable of doing that without our 
assistance. 
For this reason, the villagers began destroying the forest intentionally to show the 
government/KINAPA that they had taken a wrong decision. The villagers even vowed that they 
would not take any action even if they saw someone vandalising the forest because they wanted 
to show KINAPA that they could not succeed in protecting the forest by employing outsiders 
against the indigenous villagers.  
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Furthermore, interviews and conversations revealed that villagers were entering the forest and 
harvested trees unlawfully to meet their daily needs. This was because the KINAPA no longer 
involved the villagers in managing the forest and the villagers did not benefit from the forests 
anymore. For example, the village leaders explained that the Village Environmental Committees 
that used to work hand-in-hand with KINAPA wherein fact able to identify those who were 
using the forest against the set by-laws and regulations, because they were living with the 
"transgressors" and knew each other closely.  
The decision to exclude villagers from the management of the mountain forests therefore made 
the villagers feel that the forests and the mountain did not belong to them anymore. As a result, 
would not care even when they saw people entering the forest unlawfully. In some cases they 
even set parts of the forest ablase as a means of getting something from KINAPA. A village 
leader narrated thus: 
…as a show of dissatisfaction with how KINAPA is managing the forest and the Mountain, some 
villagers would set ablase parts of the forest. In such instances the KINAPA would usually ask 
the villagers to help in putting it out, so the villagers would use that chance to demand payment 
first before they can help. And in most occasions, the KINAPA would succumb to the villagers’ 
demands. 
This narration shows that the villagers no longer felt that sense of ownership of the resources on 
the mountain slopes. This is why I propose in Chapter 6 that an ethic of the environment in such 
a case must be able to restore the local people’s sense of ownership regarding natural resources 
so as to win support for nature protection. 
5.4.2 Human versus animal conflict 
The interviews also revealed perennial conflict between humans and wildlife on some parts of 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Human versus animal conflict occurs between villagers and 
wildlife on the Kilimanjaro Mountain slopes, especially in Rombo District on the eastern side of 
the mountain. This was also implied in interviews with wildlife officers from Rombo and Moshi 
Districts who said that their main responsibility was to control and combat problem animals that 
encroached on fields and settlements.  Wild animals that invade villagers’ fields and settlements 
include the elephant, mbega (colobus monkey), nyani (the baboon), and kima (the black 
monkey). These animals are seen as a nuisance around the mountain slope for they invade the 
farms of the communities and eat maize and groundnuts. According to a Moshi District Wildlife 
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Officer who was interviewed, some people kill the baboons and eat their flesh in the belief that 
eating it would enhance their manhood. 
The most pronounced conflict is with marauding elephants coming from the Kenyan Amboseli 
and Tsavo game reserves. The Rombo District Wildlife Officer claims that they use guns, 
explosives, and pepper to control or kill the elephants, but these measures are far from adequate 
because the elephants, in most cases, come in numbers of over 300. As a result, the elephants 
overwhelm the wildlife teams from the District Council, and thus continue to destroy crops, 
invade villages, and maim and kill people. He said that his wildlife section managed to kill seven 
elephants that marauded human settlements and farms in 2012, but they were vigorously 
condemned by conservationists.  Meanwhile the villagers who are affected by the elephants want 
to hear nothing but that the elephants are killed because, besides their lives and crops being 
saved, it is also an opportunity for them to get free meat. It is now customary in the area that 
news goes around at the speed of light when elephants are killed, and a crowd of villagers gather 
in a flash, each one with a knife so as to have a portion of meat from the fallen elephant. A 
villager in Rombo district told me that people nearly butchered one another in one instance in the 
scramble for the elephant meat. One could imagine a group of a hundred villagers scrambling for 
meat from one fallen elephant.  
Human-wildlife confrontations also occur along the areas bordering the mountain forest, but here 
the conflict is mostly with primates who invade nearby maize farms. While the villagers 
complain that wild animals are destroying their crops, the Regional Government blames the 
villagers for invading wildlife corridors (Mariki, 2013). However, wild animals have been a 
problem on the mountain slopes and the threat they pose to lives and property is real, so 
something needs to be done to alleviate this problem. Studies show that destruction of life and 
crops by marauding wildlife results in a negative attitude towards them (Walpole & Goodwin, 
2000).  
In the Rombo district, which is the area most affected by marauding elephants, people see the 
government as giving more priority to elephants than to human life and property. A villager 
remarked, “when an elephant is killed the government makes a lot of noise condemning the 
'poachers' but when our crops are raided and people killed we do not see equal efforts to help 
those affected coming from the government”.  
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Thus, because of the costs incurred on the villagers by elephants, and since the villagers do not 
receive any tangible benefit from the presence of these animals in their environments, it is 
difficult for them to understand things like preservation of animals because of their aesthetic 
value and their importance for tourism. It would be difficult for villagers to recognise the 
importance of wild animals besides their use/consumptive value. How could the villagers think 
positively about an animal that maims or kills them and destroys their crops? In fact, most of the 
villagers would rejoice and celebrate if they heard that elephants had been annihilated or 
extinguished, and that they would henceforth live in peace and expect their farms and villages to 
be free of marauding elephants. The answer I kept receiving from the villagers when I asked 
them whether they saw it as important or not to protect wild animals and their habitats could be 
summarised in the following response from a villager from Rombo District: 
... how can we protect animals that are destroying our crops and killing us? We would be happier 
to have an elephant-free Rombo ... we get nothing from these animals apart from the losses [of 
crops and human life] ... Nobody wants these animals around. 
We hereby see that Omond’s earlier observation is still very much the case among the Chagga 
today. The foregoing assertion was also vindicated by one incident regarding the Rombo 
Member of Parliament who received high praise for telling the villagers that they should kill 
elephants wherever they saw them because the government had failed to protect them from the 
elephants. He also vowed to ensure that elephants that invaded his voters’ farms were eradicated 
once and for all. He has become a hero among the people of Rombo and in fact was re-elected in 
Tanzania’s 2015 General Elections. There is reason, therefore, to be concerned that wild animals 
are increasingly seen as a liability rather than an asset among the Chagga. 
Nowadays, people on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro kill wild animals that invade human 
territories without fear of spirits or of transgressing taboos. To make things worse, the tendency 
of eating the flesh of these wild animals is rapidly increasing on the mountain slopes. A wildlife 
officer in Rombo district claimed that there is no one animal that the local people living adjacent 
to the forest do not eat today. Some villagers are already getting used to wild meat as a substitute 
for expensive beef and pork. Animals that have become a source of food or medicine include the 
elephant, some species of monkey like the black monkey, and the baboon. The black monkey 
(kima), for example, is hunted mainly for her fat, which is believed to cure certain forms of skin 
disease in children. Some parts of elephant organs, such as pieces of skin, are believed to have 
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power to drive off bad spirits when kept in the house. So, the belief that animals are the dwelling 
places or embodiment of ancestral spirits and that they should be left intact, no longer is held and 
has been replaced with the belief that some parts of their organs or flesh can be used as 
protection against evil spirits or witchcraft. The problem is that these habits may exacerbate the 
killing of these wild animals and hasten their extinction in the long term. If the habit continues, it 
poses a threat to the long-term survival of these species, so there is a need to articulate a 
conscious ethic of nature relevant to the Chagga to reverse this trend. 
So, concerns or issues that people raise today such as drought, water scarcity and crop failure, 
conflict over access to resources, and human versus animal conflict show that the environment is 
increasingly conceived in terms of its immediate use value rather than its long-term non-use 
value or generally, in pragmatic terms. Thus a more practical approach is needed to address these 
issues. While I acknowledge the importance of nurturing non-use or non-consumptive spiritual 
and cultural values towards nature protection among the Chagga, I argue that this could be better 
achieved by addressing the above concerns based on use value seriously. It is my argument that 
environmental pragmatism, Norton’s version in particular, provides us with the best way to 
doing just that.  
5.5 Using Norton’s three pillars in the Chagga context 
As shown in Chapter 2, some of the conventional western approaches to environmental ethics 
fail when applied in an African context because, among other things, they are informed by 
different worldviews and value frameworks. I also showed in Chapters 3 and 4 that employing 
the traditional African beliefs and cultural practices (traditional African worldviews and value 
frameworks) as the sole foundation of an environmental ethic to resolve environmental 
challenges today (especially, among the Chagga) does not help much.
40
I showed that things such 
as the belief in the power of ancestors, totemism, taboos and “superstition” about the natural 
environment fail the test of time, context and relevance when applied to the current situation on 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. This approach, which is employed by both Murove and 
Kelbessa, is in opposition to a pragmatist’s understanding of truth as contextual/local and 
dynamic. Although one may argue that Murove’s and Kelbessa’s approaches are local, i.e. 
                                                          
40
 This is also discussed at length in Chapter 3 where I referred to the weaknesses of Murove’s and Kelbessa’s 
approaches to environmental ethics.  
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contextual, they however remain embedded in the framework of a traditional past at the expense 
of current realities. These scholars moreover suggest a possibility of universalising their 
approaches, at least throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, in the sense that the traditional African 
beliefs and value framework could help resolve environmental problems in Africa because there 
are common elements in traditional African culture shared across Sub-Saharan Africa. Norton, to 
the contrary, emphasises beginning with real life experiences of the people and hence dealing 
with situations as they present themselves in particular contexts instead of looking for a prior 
general or overarching principles or rules to apply to specific situations (Norton, 2003). So, 
while Murove’s and Kelbessa’s framework of environmental ethics could, perhaps, work for the 
Shona and the Oromo respectively, I have shown that it does not work in the case of the Chagga. 
I showed that the current Chagga situation and the environmental challenges there call for a 
practical, down to earth, bottom-up approach to resolve them. That is why I defend the 
pragmatist’s approach and hence Norton’s process ethics as an alternative way that could help 
address the concrete environmental challenges faced on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.  
I now examine, briefly, the insight that Norton’s environmental pragmatism, especially his 
notion of the three pillars of adaptive management and the process ethics implied, contributes in 
the quest to find an appropriate approach to address the environmental challenges discussed in 
the case study above. 
5.5.1 Experience/ experimentalism 
I explained in Chapter 2 that experimentalism is a central concept in Norton’s adaptive 
management and process ethics. According to Norton, experimentalism is the commitment to use 
experience to reduce uncertainty with regard to the management of environmental resources and 
also in the process of the formation of values (Norton, 2005:3). With regard to my case study, 
experimentalism would mean subjecting all decisions regarding environmental management on 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro to the test of experience as the more reliable source of truth. 
This means that decisions about the environment should be set up as a tentative hypothesis rather 
than as decisions imposed by political authority and experts. Decision outcomes should thus be 
tested and not assumed, and room (or safety margins) need to be allowed for in which a decision 
can be reversed if its outcomes do not meet the intended targets. Currently, as I showed earlier in 
this chapter, environmental management on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro still relies on 
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political authority and experts to dictate how to manage resources on the mountain slopes with 
little allowance for experience to determine the outcome of decisions about environmental 
protection. Furthermore, application of environmental policies on the mountain slopes is not 
designed as an open and tentative process. That is, there is no commitment to use our experience 
to reduce uncertainty, with the result that environmental decisions and policies have been met 
with resistance from the local people and most of these decisions and policies consequently 
failed to bring forth the expected result on the mountain slopes. For example, the ban on 
harvesting trees and the restriction to accessing the Half-Mile Forestry Strip were imposed 
decisions that did not result from an open, iterative consultative process. No mechanisms were 
put in place to constantly revise the decisions and make adjustments when experience required 
so. As seen in the interviews reported in this chapter, the villagers complained that those 
measures and decisions were hurting them, and thus not practical, on a number of occasions, but 
their complaints fell on deaf ears. The politicians and some experts were reluctant to revise their 
earlier decisions, as adaptive management requires, claiming that the villagers were only 
interested in exploiting the mountain resources without thinking about the long-term impact of 
doing so. However, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, the villagers behave as they do, partly 
because they do not feel that the mountain and its surroundings belong to them anymore. They 
have been deprived of that sense of ownership of the environment on the mountain slopes 
because they are not full involved in matters regarding environmental management on the 
mountain slopes. So, participation and involvement of the villagers in decisions and policies with 
regard to the environment on the mountain slopes is necessary to restore that sense of ownership 
for the surrounding villages and so is participation in processes for setting environmental targets 
that need to be met, and monitoring and assessing practical implementation of policy in order to 
determine its measure of success or failure. Thus, according to Norton (2005), full involvement 
of villagers in decisions regarding the environment will result in appropriate and acceptable 
interventions, but appropriate and acceptable interventions require taking context or local 
conditions seriously. I now turn to contextualism or localism. 
5.5.2 Contextualism or localism 
To recapture my explanation in Chapter 2, Norton’s localism means sensitivity to a particular 
biophysical condition or place and the corresponding specific values upheld in a particular area 
(Norton, 2005). Localism requires that the process of decision making should be a consultative 
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process. Thus decisions that are reached without going through a community or political 
validation process have no credibility or reason to be implemented. Community validation 
processes allow emerging values to be tested to see whether they depict local people’s interests 
adequately. To ignore this important step may lead to interventions and approaches to 
environmental ethics that are far removed from people’s real concerns, as in the case of Murove 
and Kelbessa when applied on the Chagga context. So, a consultative process that involves the 
local people, scientists, and other experts will most probably bring results that are acceptable to 
many. Norton, writing with Steinmann, underlines the importance of an inclusive, consultative 
process in environmental management by noting:  
[It] encourages the articulation of multiple values and goals, coupled with a process of ongoing 
discussion, debate, information gathering, and revision of goals... [where] citizens and 
stakeholders should be involved in this ongoing iterative process to build trust and expand 
database (Norton & Steinmann, 2005:535, 536).  
Localism therefore requires some process and structures through which local authorities can 
generate, monitor and revise decisions regarding the environment. In the case of the Chagga, we 
see a serious lack of cooperation and trust between the villagers and the National Park 
authorities, as well as the regional government. The process and structures through which local 
authorities could generate, monitor and revise decisions on environmental management on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, such as the Village Environmental Committees, are no longer 
functional, strictly speaking. All decisions regarding the environment today are made by 
KINAPA and the regional government for the claim that the village committees have failed to 
protect the environment. But this has resulted in more harm to the environment because the local 
people have felt more and more sidelined in issues related to the environment on the mountain 
and its slopes making them lose the sense of care and concern for the environment around the 
mountain. This is why they see the mountain and its surrounding environment as a liability rather 
than an asset. I explain in more details how localism could help resolve environmental 
challenges on the Mountain slopes in Chapter 6. 
5.5.3 Multi-scalar analysis or thinking in multiple scales 
As discussed in Chapter 2, multi-scalar analysis is the recognition that environmental concerns or 
problems unfold on multiples scales of time and place (Norton, 2003:93).Norton distinguishes 
three distinct time periods: a 0 to 5-year time period (in which economic values and processes 
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unfold), a 5 to 200-year time period (in which socio-political values and processes typically 
unfold), and a 200-year to indefinite time period (which represents geological time in which 
ecological values and processes are embedded) (Norton, 2003:68). So, for environmental 
management plans to have a long-term or sustainable effect, all three time periods should be 
considered. The environmental problems on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are associated with 
climate change, forest destruction and soil erosion, all of which manifest themselves, or can have 
effects over very long time periods, even in the geological time-frame of 200 years to infinity, 
while their causes are embedded in the shorter time-frames of socio-political or economic 
processes. However, measures to tackle these problems have been based on short-term plans, that 
is, 0 to 5 years. They have generally been ad-hoc prohibitions that are not tested, and hence do 
not result from thoroughly thought-out deliberations over a long period of time. They are only 
short-term considerations. There have been no long-term sustainable plans on environmental 
conservation. According to Norton (2003), multi-scalar analysis requires that short-term 
considerations should be linked to longer-term outcomes over an extended period. It has been the 
Regional Government and KINAPA’s argument that the villagers’ interest in the natural 
resources of the mountain slopes is only based on short-term considerations such as feeding 
cattle, harvesting trees and food. But, as indicated above, this should be expected because the 
villagers do not feel that the mountain and its environs belong to them anymore as a mountain. 
They only see it as a resource and use any opportunity that comes their way to exploit the 
environment. Any short-term and long-term strategies on protecting the environment on the 
mountain slopes must therefore involve the villagers from the word go, with the understanding 
that while short-term strategies like policing and bans might succeed in the short term, these 
measures may be costly and not very effective in helping to change people’s behaviour and 
attitudes towards the environment in the long term. Understanding environmental problems as 
playing out or unfolding over an extended time period of centuries, may require a change of 
strategy in environmental governance and in communicating "environmental messages", 
including addressing motivational issues and working on people’s attitudes, rather than the 
quick-fix solutions of policing and bans. 
 




This chapter has been about examining the current environmental concerns of the people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro as they interact with it on a daily basis. As it turns out, the 
local people’s real concerns with the natural environment are quite detached or removed from the 
issues that preoccupy theoretical environmental ethics (both western and African). Today, people 
living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro see the natural environment as having a utilitarian or 
use value more than religious or spiritual value. The Chagga no longer see the mountain as 
sacred, nor do they usually see the forest as a place of spiritual significance. Instead, the major 
concerns of the villagers on the mountain slopes now have more to do with the practical issues of 
access to, and use and distribution of benefits from the natural resources on the slopes for their 
immediate existential needs. Protecting the natural environment for its own sake or for non-
consumptive instrumental values such as aesthetic, recreational, scientific, etc. (i.e., as 
conceptualised by a western type of environmental ethics), or for its traditional religious and 
cultural purposes (i.e., as conceptualised by an indigenous type of African environmental ethics) 
seems to be alien to them. It may be said, therefore, that the kind of environmental problems that 
the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro experience today cannot be resolved 
adequately by appeals to either the conventional western environmental ethics or the indigenous 
traditional African environmental ethics, as propounded by people such as Kelbessa and Murove. 
I have argued that indigenous African environmental ethics as advanced by Murove and 
Kelbessa is largely biased towards the traditional past, just like the mainstream environmental 
ethics (intended to be international environmental ethics) is biased towards western perspectives 
and cultural influences. As a result, indigenous African environmental ethics as currently 
formulated lacks that persuasive power necessary for influencing the local people to protect their 
natural environment under the current circumstances. 
In the next chapter, which is the final chapter of this dissertation, I show, in some more detail, 
how Norton’s three pillars of environmental pragmatism and the process ethics that it implies 
could help to address environmental challenges and concerns on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. I will show that, properly applied to the Chagga context, Norton’s approach can 
also address the motivational and attitudinal issues that are evident from the case study. I showed 
in Chapter 2 that motivational and attitudinal issues are also important aspects in the formation 
of an environmental ethic in any society. 




 ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AROUND MOUNT 
KILIMANJARO USING THE ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
6.1 Introduction 
In this last chapter of the dissertation, I show, by using the principles of adaptive management 
and the process guidelines they entail, that the environmental challenges faced on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro basically are problems of management. I do that by discussing the problems 
or weaknesses in the management of the natural environment around the mountain slopes. I show 
that these problems of poor management could be explained by the lack of full involvement or 
participation of the local people and other stakeholders in decisions regarding the management of 
the mountain environment. I also argue that the problem of lack of participation has created a 
further problem of loss of a sense of pride and of ownership of the mountain and its forests, and 
hence the loss of sense of place values. I argue that addressing these problems of participation 
and the loss of the sense of pride and ownership of the mountain, especially restoring the sense 
of place values among the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, is the key to 
resolving environmental challenges there. I show that environmental pragmatism, in particular, 
and the adaptive management process guidelines as proposed by Norton and others could help us 
to address these issues. Let us begin by first discussing how environmental management 
problems on the mountain slopes are problems of participation. 
6.2 Environmental management and the problem of participation 
I should mention at the outset that the problem of participation in development issues, and in 
particular in environmental management issues is not new. It has been researched and talked 
about for decades (see, for example Chambers, 1983; Havnevik, 1993; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; 
Cooke & Kothari, 2001).Yet, problems of participation or full involvement of communities in 
development issues, in particular, environmental management decisions, continue to-date.  My 
concern in this chapter is to show the essence of the problems of participation in environmental 
management on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, and how Norton’s adaptive management 
approach and process ethics implied give us a new way to understand and address such problems 
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of participation and other closely related problems such as loss of sense of place values among 
the people living around the mountain slopes. 
I showed in Chapter 5 that many environmental conflicts on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are 
largely due to management weaknesses. These problems/conflicts could be divided into three 
aspects. The first one is the problem of access and use of forest resources on the mountain 
slopes. The second one concerns the problems of fare sharing of benefits/revenue accruing from 
the tourism industry on the mountain slopes. The third one is the problem of wild animals. The 
problem of wild animals is important because it is also directly related to conservation and 
protection of nature on the mountain slopes. I show, below, how all these problems and concerns 
are problems of participation. 
6.2.1 Access and use of resources as problems of participation 
I showed in Chapter 5 that people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro depend almost 
entirely on the natural environment for their livelihoods. The villagers need to access the forest 
to obtain immediate needs such as firewood, grass and fodder, poles and timber, and medicinal 
herbs. We also saw that the villagers sell whole trees from their small plots, or timber, for cash 
for daily survival needs. On the other hand, the Regional Government and KINAPA have been 
trying to protect the environment by measures that include keeping the villagers as far away as 
possible from the mountain forests using different tactics. Bad environmental decisions and the 
use of draconian rules or orders have made villagers less supportive of environmental protection 
and care, however. It was noted earlier that scholars have warned severally that environmental 
protection policies and regulations that ignore the needs of the local people are doomed to 
failure. In other words, an approach to environmental ethics of nature preservation that does not 
find a balance between the needs of humans and those of nature can hardly succeed.  
The Regional Government’s order to ban harvesting of trees on the villagers’ own farms and the 
restriction to access and use of natural resources from the Half-Mile Forestry Strip on the 
mountain slopes are among the things that show exactly what not to do when you want people to 
participate and develop consciousness and support for environmental protection. The impact of 
those decisions shows us that people cannot be persuaded to change their habits and attitudes 
towards the natural environment by means of coercion. We have seen that the ban in fact resulted 
in even more destruction of the environment as well as other unethical activities such as 
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corruption and theft on the mountain slopes. Adams and McShane (1996:15) put it blatantly that 
“the tendency to ignore the needs of people on the border of national parks betrays a bewildering 
lack of common sense”.   
Adams and McShane (1996: 243) further observed: 
Rural Africans rely on their natural surroundings for their livelihood, and they have always been 
willing to make sacrifices in order to manage it. Ensuring their involvement in taking care of the 
natural environment, however, means taking their needs seriously.  
Villagers on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro show readiness to protect the natural environment 
when they are given alternative sources to meet their needs. Scholars argue that environmental 
consciousness and support for environmental protection may develop among the poor only if 
they feel and see that they have a stake in sacrificing to protect nature. That means that villagers 
around Mount Kilimanjaro will protect the environment if their livelihoods are not compromised 
by doing so. The environmental gospel, as it is preached today, is meaningless to the rural poor if 
their immediate needs are not addressed concurrently. As Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997: xx) 
observed: 
...poor countries and poor individuals are not interested in the mere protection of wild species or 
natural habitats, but do respond to environmental destruction which directly affects their way of 
life and prospects for survival. 
Furthermore, it is argued that to win support for environmental protection among the poor, the 
survival or livelihoods of the local people should simultaneously be taken on board; short of that 
environmental protection efforts will be rendered futile (Adams & McShane, 1996; Guha & 
Martinez-Alier, 1997). The situation on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro shows the contrary, 
namely that environmental protection is given priority and the villagers’ livelihood needs are 
given less consideration. KINAPA protects the environment instead of managing people’s 
interaction with the environment. As a result the local people have been alienated from an 
environment with which they have been connected for years. They feel that they are being 
estranged from the natural resource they had been using for their existential needs for years. The 
ill-treatment they receive from KINAPA guards makes them see the resource around them as a 
curse, not a blessing. The villagers rightly wonder why the natural environment would be valued 
over human dignity. In retaliation, they try to destroy and vandalise the forests whenever the 
opportunity arises. It has been warned that the “lack of attention paid by governments and 
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authorities overseeing natural resources like forests and wild animals to the surrounding local 
communities makes them develop a lasting indifference to the natural resources” (Adams & 
McShane, 1996:xv).  
As I showed in Chapter 5, the villagers are not really responsible for much of the destruction on 
the mountain forest, especially in the Half-Mile Forestry Strip. Business people in collaboration 
with the local and national political elite, rather, are the real culprits through the logging and 
timber business. The needs of the villagers are very modest and they do not pose such a big 
threat to the natural environment. Actions like collecting firewood, grass for fodder, herbal 
medicine, poles for building, etc. are not likely to deplete the forests at such a fast rate. They 
have, in fact, been doing this for decades without much serious harm to the natural environment 
because they had their own regulations and rules that were effective. The fact that poor villagers 
do not afford modern expensive machines and chainsaws that make it easier to harvest large 
numbers of trees and timber in a short period of time means that the depletion of trees and forests 
was made possible by rich, business people, including some local government leaders who run 
sawmills.  Thus, if a few people at the local, national and international level continue to have the 
privilege to benefit from the natural resources at the expense of the poor we should not blame the 
poor when they “encroach” on the protected areas for their survival. It has been noted that poor 
people engage in activities that may degrade the natural environment, not because of ignorance 
or greed, but out of necessity (Sai, 1984).  Therefore, to impose bans and restrictions on the use 
of trees and forest resources on people whose lives to a large extent depend on those resources 
without providing them with alternatives is mind boggling.  
Other scholars have argued that conflict in protected areas due to resource extraction, strict rules 
on forest resource use and access, rude behaviour, harassment by park rangers, all generate 
negative attitudes toward park authorities and the protected area (Ormsby & Kaplin, 2005; 
Allendorf, 2007; Heinen & Shrivastava, 2009; Shibia, 2010; Infield & Namara, 2001).  
In fact, the pace of the destruction of the natural surroundings around Kilimanjaro increased 
during the implementation of the liberalisation policies in Tanzania, that is, from the late 1980s 
onwards. It is at this time “when the social forest slowly slipped out of the control of the 
villagers and was unofficially turned into a commercial forest” (Sébastien, 2010). So, the poor 
villagers are being unfairly accused and thus punished for a problem for which they are not 
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largely responsible. Dialogue and deep engagement with the villagers on issues regarding the 
mountain and the forests would help the responsible authorities to reach a proper and just remedy 
for the problem.    
Now, taking the needs of the people living around the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro seriously 
means involving them fully in decisions regarding management and use of resources on the 
mountain slopes. I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that environmental ethics is about 
persuasion. It is about supplying people with reasons to see the need to protect nature. It is about 
convincing people that nature around the mountain slopes is worth protecting.  How could this 
persuasion be possible if the local people are not fully involved in decisions about management 
of the natural environment around the mountain slopes? How could persuasion be possible when 
the local people have been estranged from the mountain and its forests? How could this 
persuasion be effective among villagers on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro if they see the 
natural environment or resources around them as a curse? It has been established that when 
people are alienated from the natural environment their ability to understand and connect with it 
fades (Adams, et al., 2004). The result is that they can destroy and vandalise the natural 
environment without any sense of guilt or remorse because “after all it belongs to the 
government”. And what belongs to the government is nobody’s property, as the villagers would 
say. 
To conclude the above discussion, I reiterate that the problems of access to the mountain forests 
and related complaints are down to lack of full involvement of the local people in decisions 
regarding to the management and use of the mountain resources. I show later on how this 
problem of participation could be addressed. However, access to the mountain and its forests is 
not the only concern of the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, there is also the 
problem of sharing benefits accruing from tourism on the mountain.  
6.2.2 Equitable sharing of benefits/revenue as a problem of participation 
Equitable sharing of the income accruing from mountain resources was another important issue 
that arose in the case study. It was clear that villagers living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
do not feel that they benefit from the presence of the mountain and the forests around it. 
Although KINAPA claimed that they uphold their “corporate responsibility” through making 
contributions for social services such as assisting in building hospitals, schools and 
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roads/bridges, the villagers do not feel that these things are enough. The villagers want their 
immediately felt needs to be met. The villagers want to see direct and tangible benefits that 
address their needs such as firewood, income, grass and fodder for their livestock, poles for 
building, etc. These are things around which many conflicts with KINAPA are based.  Thus the 
villagers feel that the impact that a school or a dispensary might have on them is minimal 
compared to alternative means to satisfy their immediate livelihood needs instead, for example, 
through providing them with cheaper sources of energy.  On the other hand, KINAPA feels that 
something like a dispensary is more feasible and hence could have more direct tangible impacts 
on the villagers. Note the clash of priorities here because of lack of full involvement of the 
villagers in these kinds of issues.   
The importance of equitable sharing of the benefits accruing from natural resources with people 
living in the proximity of those resources in shaping attitudes and hence finding support for the 
protection of the resources is widely emphasised by scholars (see, for example, Mundanthra & 
Ndhlovu 1992; Adams & McShane, 1996; Ormsby & Kaplin, 2005). However, benefit sharing 
between KINAPA and the surrounding villages leaves a lot to be desired. 
Although KINAPA, true enough, make some contributions like assisting in building schools, 
dispensaries and bridges, most villagers are not happy with these things, and they do not feel that 
these are their priorities. They want benefits that address their immediate needs directly. They 
want to be able to collect firewood, grass, and poles from the forest as well. These are the things 
that matter most to them. So, either the villagers are educated on how to harvest the natural 
resources around them sustainably to fulfil their immediate needs, or they are provided with 
alternatives. They should be made to feel that the mountain and the natural resources around it 
belong to them. Their indifference to the mountain and the forests emphasise that they no longer 
feel that the forest belongs to them. They do not care much whether the surrounding 
environments are destroyed because they do not really feel that they benefit from it. For the 
villagers, to reiterate, the mountain and the surrounding forests have become more of a liability 
than an asset.    
Furthermore, some village leaders said openly that they did not believe that what they receive 
from KINAPA is commensurate with the revenue earned by KINAPA. They complain of lack of 
openness and transparency from the KINAPA management in terms of, for example, the criteria 
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used to support certain villages and not others. Sometimes allocation of funds to the villages is 
said to be made on political grounds and favouritism. The villages with influential politicians are 
favoured. And sometimes “who gets what” is solely based on the goodwill of KINAPA officials 
or “who knows who”. The foregoing claims seem to be supported by the fact that some districts 
are known to have received more fund allocations than others. Not only that, districts that are far 
away (more than 60km), from the mountain forests (and thus do not deserve such a privilege) 
also received funds allocations thanks to the influence of some high profile politicians (Mariki, 
2013). This denies villages that are entitled to those funds their share because they do not have 
the ‘voice and the power’ to demand their deserved share. The Moshi town municipality, which 
is not among the districts adjacent to the mountain forest, also receives the lion’s share of fund 
allocations, again depriving the villages in proximity of the forest their deserved share. As a 
result the villagers destroy the forests and KINAPA invests heavily in policing or patrolling the 
forest, thereby leaving very little money for the villages in a vicious cycle of some sort.  
The problem of giving less consideration to the needs of the villagers surrounding the mountain 
slopes does not seem to be a problem for one KINAPA official who said: 
The main role of KINAPA is conservation, and so the revenue that accrues from the Mountain 
resources should be used for the same purpose. If we generate excess revenue then we may share 
it with the local people … Even if we get a lot of money we use it to maintain the park and the 
industry’s infrastructure as a whole. Things like advertisements, security, and general 
management of the park use a lot of money. So we are usually left with very little money to spend 
on corporate social responsibility. 
So, according to the KINAPA official, an ecologist by profession, the local people are not a 
priority and an integral component of their conservation goals, thus they have to wait for the 
excess revenue from KINAPA. If there is no excess they should forget about it. The foregoing 
remark by the KINAPA official shows also that people’s livelihood needs are not a priority of 
KINAPA. Meanwhile scholars have repeatedly emphasised that conservationists can no longer 
ignore the needs of the local people if they expect their support for environmental protection; 
they must fit the local people into their equations or their conservation efforts are doomed 
(Adams & McShane, 1996). That is why, as I noted earlier, it is emphasised that environmental 
ethics should be about managing people’s interactions with nature; aligning their attitudes and 
values to support environmental protection, rather than protecting nature from people’s 
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interference, as is evident on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. This attitude of keeping people as 
far away as possible from surrounding natural resources is incompatible with the whole idea of 
bottom-up decision-making processes that are central in Norton’s process ethics. This is because, 
if people are not a priority in the efforts to protect the environment on the mountain slopes, 
KINAPA and other authorities will not see the need of full involvement of the villagers in 
management decisions on the mountain slopes. 
I showed in Chapter 5 that most of the revenue from KINAPA goes into paying park rangers and 
guards with very little going into community services and outreach programmes. It has been 
established that only one percent of the staff are specialised in Community Conservation 
Services while sixty-eight percent are in law enforcement (Mariki, 2013). This gives a clue to the 
degree in which KINAPA sees the villagers as a problem that needs to be overcome instead of as 
collaborators in solving the conservation problems on the mountain slopes. Under such 
circumstances, participation of the local community becomes a myth. Infield (1988:45) quite 
rightly laments that: 
If some of the resources spent on policing were used to integrate local communities into the 
environmental protection programmes through better education programmes, public relations and 
packaging of the conservation message, a dramatic change in attitudes – and quite likely in the 
need for such high levels of policing – could be effected.  
Besides that, a big chunk of revenue from KINAPA goes to the central government and 
TANAPA headquarters, leaving an insignificant amount for the surrounding villages and 
communities. For example, only 7.5 percent of the revenue accruing from all Tanzanian National 
Parks and protected areas goes into programmes to support social services for the villages 
surrounding the protected areas (Mariki, 2013). To make things worse, a large part of the 
revenue from tourist activities on the mountain slopes goes into supporting other parks in the 
country that are not generating enough income to run on their own. This has denied the villages 
around Mount Kilimanjaro their fair share of the revenue accruing from the resource. That is 
why they complain that they do not see the benefit of having the mountain and the surrounding 
resources.  
Further still, the villagers also mention the lack of spill-over or trickle-down benefits from 
KINAPA. According to the villagers, the KINAPA workers are mostly strangers who no longer 
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live among the villagers. This means that KINAPA workers no longer contribute to the economy 
of the surrounding villages, for example, through spending some of their income on renting 
houses and buying minor domestic needs like vegetables, milk, etc., from the villagers. Some 
scholars recommend that local people should be employed in the management and running of 
protected areas, and that the park staff should live among the local people (Mbaruka, 1996). 
Bringing workers from outside who do not share local attitudes and customs has potential for 
resistance and negative feelings toward the protected area (Hughes, 2006). This is exactly what 
has happened on the Kilimanjaro Mountain slopes. It is also contributing much to the villagers 
‘loss of the sense of ownership and pride in their resource. As I mentioned earlier, the problem of 
loss of pride and ownership of the mountain resources is another important issue that is directly 
connected to participation. I take this up later on and expound on it in line with Norton’s 
adaptive management ethics and the process guidelines. 
Now, whether some of the claims of the villagers discussed above are true or not, the point is that 
there is a clear problem with lack of full participation of villagers and other stakeholders in 
matters relating to the management of the mountain resources. The above scenario needs to 
change if the villagers are to perceive the mountain and the surrounding natural environment at 
all positively; which is a necessary condition to win their support for the protection of the natural 
resources/environment. How can this state of affairs change? Again, my argument is that the 
requisite and genuine change will come through full involvement of the local people and other 
stakeholders in these matters.  
The issue of participation in decisions regarding the management of the natural environment on 
the mountain slopes does not only relate to the mountain and its forests; the problem of full 
engagement of the villagers on how to deal with problem animals, elephants in particular, is 
another concern.  
6.2.3 The challenge of wild animals as a problem of participation 
I showed in Chapter 5 that there is perennial conflict between humans and wildlife on parts of 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. The human versus animal conflict between villagers and 
wildlife on the mountain slopes, especially in Rombo District to the eastern side of the mountain.  
Most of this is caused by marauding elephants coming from the Kenyan Amboseli and Tsavo 
game reserves. Most of the villagers on the highlands have farms in the plains where their crops 
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such as maize, cassava, millet, groundnuts, sunflower and beans have been targeted by these wild 
animals for years now (Soini, 2005). Human-wildlife confrontations also occur along the areas 
bordering the mountain forest, but here it is the primates that invade nearby maize farms. When 
villagers complain that wild animals are destroying their crops, the authorities shift the blame, 
saying that the problem is that villagers invade wildlife corridors (Mariki, 2013).  However, the 
most pronounced conflict indicated during interviews is with the marauding elephants on the 
plains. The destruction of crops by marauding wildlife results in negative attitudes towards 
animals (Walpole & Goodwin, 2000). That is why Omond (1994:70) asserts that:  
Experiences of wildlife problems cause a very permanent feeling, especially where it involves 
loss of human life or an entire source of livelihood. In communities with subsistence economies 
even small losses can be of great economic importance and can generate negative attitudes 
towards wildlife and nature preservation in general.  
In Rombo District, which is most affected by the elephants, people see the government as 
assigning greater priority to elephants than to human life and property. A villager remarked, 
“when an elephant is killed the government makes a lot of noise condemning the ‘poachers’ but 
when our crops are raided and people killed we do not see equal efforts to help those affected 
coming from the government”. Thus, Sifuna (2010:46) correctly observes: 
While humans have responsibility for animal welfare, human welfare is paramount and should be 
given priority. Notably, while states have, pursuant to the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, the duty to safeguard wildlife within their territories, they also have a 
corresponding duty to ensure that these animals do not undermine social life, and economic 
productivity. 
It is difficult for the villagers to understand things like preservation of animals because of their 
importance for tourism because they do not receive any tangible benefit from the presence of 
these animals in their environment and because of the costs elephants incur on the villagers. How 
could they think positively about an animal that maims or kills them and destroys their crops? In 
fact, most of the villagers would rejoice and celebrate if they heard that elephants have been 
annihilated or extinguished, and that they will live in peace and expect their farms and villages to 
be free of marauding elephants. The foregoing assertion is vindicated by the incident of the 
Rombo Member of Parliament being praised for telling the villagers that they should kill 
elephants wherever they see them because the government failed to protect them from the 
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elephants. He also promised his voters that he would make sure that elephants that invaded their 
farms would be eradicated once and for all.  
Among other things, the perennial complaints by the villagers about the problem of elephants are 
due to local people not being fully involved in finding solutions to the problem of the elephants. 
The attitude of local people to the elephants and the responsible authorities attest to the lack of 
full involvement of the villagers in finding a common solution to the problem. While it is true 
that the District Government through their wildlife officers take some measures to address the 
problem, such as the use of explosives, firearms, paper sprays, etc., these measures are very 
ineffective and thus do not provide a long-term solution to the problem. As mentioned earlier, 
the local people have not been fully involved in finding a long-term solution to this problem. My 
argument is that full involvement of the villagers and other stakeholders for tackling the problem 
of elephants may lead to a permanent solution to this problem, and even be one of the 
contributing factors to restore their sense of ownership of the mountain resources. 
6.3 The importance of full involvement of the local community 
Part of my argument in this chapter has been that there is minimal involvement of the villagers in 
matters concerning the management and use of natural resources on the Kilimanjaro mountain 
slopes. This was apparent in how the decisions to ban harvesting of trees on the mountain slopes 
and the restriction of villagers to access the Half-Mile Forestry Strip (the buffer zone) were 
reached. The reaction of the villagers to these decisions, which resulted in even more destruction 
of the natural environment, underlines the importance of full involvement of affected people in 
making decisions that affect their sources of livelihoods.  
It is ironic that, despite the fact that the Tanzanian Natural Resources and Tourism Policy 
emphasises decentralised approaches to natural resource management through involving the local 
people in decisions affecting natural resources in their areas, the situation on the ground has been 
quite contrary to that policy goal (Mariki, 2013). Many scholars emphasise the importance of 
people’s participation in decision making about the use and management of natural resources as 
a way of winning their confidence and support for environmental protection(see, for example, 
Berzetti, 1993; Dhar, Rawal, Samant, Airi & Upreti, 1994; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Songorwa, 
1999; Hulme & Murphree, 2001). 
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With regard to the controversial and indiscriminate ban on harvesting trees and forest products in 
the entire Kilimanjaro Region issued by the Regional Government, it was evident that there was 
a bigger problem concerning participation by villagers in reaching that decision. It is interesting 
to note that almost all village leaders were involved in the meeting that passed the decision, but 
were the same people who began complaining about the decision when it became difficult to 
implement. However, it was reported that, although there was a turn-out of stakeholders at that 
meeting, it comprised a lecture more than a discussion. The village leaders did not participate in 
making the decisions in the wider sense of the term participation. It was a ready-made decision 
and they were asked to assent to it. It did not come from the village leaders themselves because 
they were only asked to approve the decision. It is no surprise therefore that the decision became 
highly unpopular among the people living on the slopes of the mountain.  
Not only did village leaders participate only marginally, the villagers’ opinions also were not 
sought before reaching the decision. What happened is that village and cell leaders were sent to 
communicate the message to the villagers. One villager reported that “they came to warn us to 
stop harvesting trees from our farms and the forest”, giving the clue that the villagers did not feel 
that they owned the decision. There had been no deliberation among them about the best way to 
combat the problem of deforestation and the rampant harvesting of trees on their farms; when the 
Regional and District government officials held meetings with the villagers, it was to explain and 
clarify the decision that had already been reached. This was top-down decision making par 
excellence and very much against the spirit of Norton’s process ethics that emphasises genuine 
participation as a dynamic, ongoing process of social learning and communication among 
individuals that seeks to preserve the plurality of values in an ongoing decision-making process 
rather than a discrete event or events, and the two-directional episodic information exchanges 
between decision makers and the public as it has been the case on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro (Norton, 2003:519). It is through genuine participation thus understood that the 
values and concerns of the local community on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro will be given 
room or space to force their way up to inform environmental policy and management decisions. 
Environmental management scholars furthermore point out that the attitude of people toward the 
natural environment is largely determined by how decisions about issues related to the natural 
environment are made; especially, by whether the local community have the control and makes 
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its own choices about what will happen to its environment (Adams & McShane, 1996; Hughes, 
2006: 105). Hughes, for example, points out that the declining power of local communities over 
their own environments is one of the prominent issues for the environment in the coming 
decades, especially in Africa. Studies show that, although the majority of people supported the 
protection of the natural environment or a park, they developed a very strong negative attitude 
and resentment towards the authorities when decisions to restrict the use of the forest resources 
were passed without their full consent (Walpole & Goodwin 2000; Silori, 2007; Sifuna, 2010; 
Mariki, 2013). Thus, it is evident that the protection of the environment and natural resources 
will be supported only if people are fully involved in the planning, management and use of the 
natural resources in their vicinity.  
To sum up, the above discussion has been about environmental challenges and concerns on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, why they are problems, and why they need to be addressed. I also 
established that many of the environmental challenges on the mountain slopes arise because of 
two related reasons. The first one is lack of full involvement or participation of all stakeholders 
in decisions regarding the management of the natural environment around the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. The second one, which follows from the first reason, is the loss of a sense of pride 
and ownership of the mountain and its surrounding forests and animals. The one pertinent 
question that remains is: How do we go about addressing these two related problems; namely, 
lack of participation or wide involvement of stakeholders in decisions regarding management 
and use of resources on the mountain slopes, and loss of pride and the sense of ownership of the 
mountain and its forests? It is my considered position that the solution to these problems is to be 
found in Norton’s adaptive management guidelines which basically underlie a process proposal 
or method.  
6.4 Addressing the problems of participation using Norton’s approach 
As mentioned earlier, Norton’s three pillars of adaptive management and their underlying 
process ethics give us some guidance on how to go about addressing these kinds of 
environmental management problems rooted in the problem of participation. When we examine 
Norton’s three guidelines, i.e., experimentalism, multi-scalar analysis and localism or 
contextualism, and the process guidelines that he proposes, we see clearly that Norton’s 
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approach actually comprises a methodology to bring about true or genuine stakeholder 
participation in the management and resolution of environmental problems. 
6.4.1 Commitment to experimentalism 
The first principle of adaptive management is commitment to experimentalism. Quoting Lee 
(1993), Norton (2003:521) writes: “Adaptive management is management designed to use the 
experimental method – in juxtaposition with public involvement and stakeholder advocacy – to 
reduce uncertainty in environmental decision making.” Public involvement or community 
participation is therefore central to the principle of experimentalism. Experimentalism, 
furthermore, is about subjecting all environmental management policies and decisions to the test 
of experience. Experimentalism is experiential learning. It entails an ongoing formulation and 
reformulation of both management goals and experiments through involvement of affected 
stakeholders to build trust, which is essential for social leaning (Norton, 2003:523). For social 
learning to occur, it is therefore essential that communities remain sufficiently involved and 
committed to an ongoing process of participation and in setting management goals and priorities. 
I should emphasise here that communities should not just participate but should remain 
sufficiently involved in decisions regarding management and use of resources on the mountain 
slopes. As shown in Chapter 5, this aspect of Norton’s adaptive management ethics was 
conspicuously missing in the environmental management on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. I 
showed that decisions regarding access to natural resources on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
were described by the local people as having been imposed by KINAPA and the Regional 
government authorities. Some village leaders claimed, in fact, that KINAPA and the Regional 
government colluded or conspired to impose harsh regulations and rules on the villagers. Note 
the lack of trust here because of the lack of genuine participation by the villagers. KINAPA and 
the Regional government resorted to protecting the mountain resources through draconian and 
less democratic rules, which proved a failure. The failure could be attributed, among other 
things, to the lack of commitment to social learning through experimental adaptation. According 
to Norton (2003), concrete experience as located within a very specific context should be the 
point of departure when environmental policy and management practices are to be formulated 
and implemented. In order to take concrete experience seriously, members of the society need to 
be in conversation with one another. Environmental managers, policy makers, and the 
community need to be in reiterative discussion with one another. For all these discussions to be 
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effective, public and democratic participatory processes and bottom-up approaches in decision 
making regarding the environment must be upheld. Thus, through democratic participatory 
processes, all stakeholders – the villagers, the environmentalists including KINAPA, scientists, 
environmental experts, and the government authorities and politicians, should ultimately come to 
a common understanding of the problems and how to address them through iterative discussion 
in spite of having diverse interests and value commitments.  This is because adaptive 
management basically is a participatory democracy, that is, it attempts to take the diverse 
interests and values of different stakeholders into the environmental decision making process. In 
this sense, adaptive management is pluralistic in that it seeks to help communities and 
stakeholder groups with diverse values and interests to articulate, discuss, revise, and reconcile 
competing values and interests through the participatory process (Norton, 2003:517).  
The social learning that is central to adaptive management cannot happen without the full 
participation of all stakeholders through dialogue and democratic public discussion. Decisions 
regarding environmental management on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro have not been 
democratic and participatory enough or inclusive of all stakeholders. Further decisions regarding 
environmental management on the mountain slopes were not subjected to the test of experience; 
as such, there were no feedback mechanisms to allow learning from mistakes. Lack of 
participation means that social learning through communication and cooperation, an important 
aspect of adaptive management, was not given enough space on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Dialogues and forums of discussions, which are critical in adaptive management, 
were not given enough space especially on village level to identify the real causes of 
environmental problems on the mountain slopes and their solutions. As a result, there has been 
vigorous resistance to the environmental management decisions made by the Regional 
Government and KINAPA. Even environmental experts at the level of districts have distanced 
themselves from these decisions. The villagers have simply been passive recipients of directions 
from top management. Participation has been about information exchanges between the decision 
makers and the public. This kind of participation, as I noted earlier, implies that sufficient 
interaction, discussion and hence social learning among community members to allow 
sufficiently valid “truth” to emerge was lacking. 
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6.4.2 Identifying multiple scales 
Another important guideline of adaptive management is identifying multiple scales. In terms of 
environmental management on the mountain slopes, multi-scalar analysis would be possible if 
stakeholders were made aware that environmental problems are played out on different spatial-
temporal scales, and thus they need long-term solutions. It is about being able to understand the 
long-term impact of our decisions and actions on the environment; that the people on the slopes 
of Mount Kilimanjaro should begin to learn “to think like a mountain”, to use Aldo Leopold’s 
metaphor. That is to say it is only the mountain that has lived long enough to see the long-term 
effects of environment changes in the concerned area. That is why Norton proposes three distinct 
time frames within which environmental problems should be understood. According to Norton 
(2003), environmental problems should be understood as unfolding over distinct time periods or 
scales. The 0 to 5-year time period; the 5 to 200 year time period and the 200 year to infinity 
time period. Thus environmental management policy and decisions should focus further than the 
usual short-term 0 to 5-year planning to a 5 to 200-year timeframe. That being the case, short-
term, quick-fix solutions such as those attempted on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro could not 
lead to a long-term solution to the problem.  Environmental protection does not fit in a 0 to 5-
year framework, that is, a short-term framework. When we talk of environmental protection or 
conservation we are referring to the long-term future. Thus long-term or sustainability indicators 
must be used. This approach is multi-scalar in the sense that these indicators will be used to 
assess the management decisions made about environmental protection on the mountain slopes in 
terms of whether the specific set aims are serving longer-term sustainability goals. Measures and 
environmental management decisions that have been taken on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro 
have been very vague. Currently, of course, the only indicator that is used to track progress of the 
condition of the mountain in general is the volume of snow on the mountain’s summit. The rapid 
disappearance of ice fields on the mountain has generally been used to raise the alarm about the 
graveness of the situation on the slopes. Scientists, for example, had estimated that there would 
be no ice left on the summit by 2015. This prophecy of doom did not come to fulfilment, though. 
While there is so much politics and propaganda around the issues of environmental crisis and 
climate change, some truth concerning the relationship between the melting of the snow cap and 
environmental destruction around the mountain slopes exists. A point of caution is in order here; 
that, studies have shown that the disappearance of ice-fields on the mountain cap is contributed 
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to by many factors, some of which are beyond what happens around the mountain slopes in the 
form of land use changes.  
So, apart from the indicator of the melting of ice-fields, which is usually monitored by the 
international climate change community rather than the local scientists, there are no other clearly 
set indicators of progress. For example, what would indicate that the measures taken by the 
Regional Government and KINAPA are achieving the expected results is not clear. Enthusiasm 
with environmental protection on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro has been largely dependent 
on the goodwill and interests of the Regional Commissioner, a political figure. So, it may happen 
that, when he is moved to another area, most of what he has begun (regardless of whether he 
used the correct approach or not) will collapse. Thus, besides the problem of vagueness of some 
of the orders and measures to protect the environment on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, there 
is also the problem of continuity to oversee a long-term sustainability environmental protection 
framework on the slopes. Most of the measures taken are ad-hoc and thus fail to address 
environmental problems on the mountain slopes as multi-faceted and multi-scaled in that they 
unfold on different scales of space and time. The approach also does not link or integrate the 
short-term and long-term impact of decisions. So, to adopt Norton’s guideline of multi-scalar 
analysis on environmental management on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, many changes will 
be needed including an explicit longer-term framework of environmental management that 
represents Norton’s 5 to 200-year time period, and would be able to demonstrate the impact of 
decisions and programmes over the longer term.  
6.4.3 Sensitivity to the local context (localism or place sensitivity) 
Connected to multi-scalar analysis is the fact that all environmental problems are localised. They 
are located in a particular place with its geophysical and socio-cultural particularities and 
peculiarities. So, localism requires being sensitive to local conditions, wisdom and values by 
which people live. Being contextual with regard to environmental management and decision 
making on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro also includes empowering the local people or 
villagers through their representative advisory committees to be involved as much as possible in 
decision making and resource use. As alluded to earlier, the direct involvement of local people 
and other stakeholders in the identification and alleviation of environmental problems is key to 
ensuring support and effective implementation of environmental management decisions. It can 
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be expected that robust information and data that depict the local peoples’ values and concerns 
will be generated through these processes of participation where indicators that represent local 
values and desirable biophysical conditions are chosen. These proposed indicators and eventual 
development paths could then be made available for discussion purposes at higher forums such 
as Village Environmental Committees and Ward Environmental Committees at which villagers 
are represented.  
Such indicators could be obtained through a combination of public participation processes and 
consultations with scientists and other experts. Norton writing with Steinmann (2003:535, 536) 
propose a system of evaluating development paths that encourage “the articulation of multiple 
values and goals, coupled with a process of ongoing discussion, debate, information-gathering, 
and revision of goals”. They suggest that citizens and stakeholders be involved in this “ongoing 
iterative process” to build “trust” and an “expanding database”. The outcomes they hope to 
generate through these processes are measurable indicators. They describe a process whereby an 
ongoing advisory committee chooses indicators to guide policy and then reflects on these choices 
based on the action outcomes. Localism thus requires some democratic participatory processes 
and structures through which local authorities can generate, monitor and revise sustainability 
indicators. Paying attention to the local wisdom and the local values does not mean that the local 
people always know best or that they always act wisely in their interactions with their 
environments, however, but rather comprises an inclination on the part of adaptive managers to 
consider seriously and to respect public inputs from local groups and residents, taking their 
hopes, concerns, and values as a starting point in the search for management goals (Norton, 
2003:521). 
6.5 Norton’s process guidelines as a technique for genuine participation 
I should mention, again, that by genuine public or community participation I mean a dynamic 
process of decision making that allows ongoing social learning and communication among 
individuals, rather than the traditional one-off, discrete event or events and the two-directional 
information exchanges between decision makers and the public (Norton, 2003:519). So, adaptive 
management actually proposes new ways of involving the public or community in environmental 
decision making. It goes beyond the traditional processes of participation such as environmental 
impact assessment that have proved to be wanting.     
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The process guidelines that result from the three core principles of the adaptive management 
approach are actually techniques or guidelines by which genuine participation of stakeholders in 
environmental management decisions could be better implemented. Norton uses the three 
guidelines to develop experimental, iterative, information rich processes that are steeped in a 
local context but are understood within multiple scales of time and space.  
In this process approach, diverse interests and values are expected to emerge through community 
dialogues and conversation. Norton focuses on preserving these diverse interests and values. By 
so doing, different development paths are kept open so long as they ultimately lead to the same 
goal of environmental protection. The emphasis Norton puts on setting up citizen advisory 
committees that include experts and community members is another technique that he uses to 
concretely operationalise the concept of participation. Norton also highlights the importance of 
creating feedback mechanisms that may enable stakeholders to learn by their mistakes and make 
adjustments accordingly for better outcomes. Finally, Norton emphasises the importance of 
subjecting all management decisions and indicators of progress to the test of experience. In 
essence, the bottom-line of all these proposals is community participation – directly or through 
representatives.  
One of the biggest implications of Norton’s three guidelines is taking concrete experience 
seriously. But taking concrete experience seriously includes paying attention to the local context 
and the values people live by. This, in turn, is only possible through wide involvement; intensive 
consultation; reiterative dialogue; and discussion among all stakeholders on issues regarding 
environmental management in the area.  This is also tantamount to giving a voice to the 
marginalised and those under-represented in environmental management and decision making.  
Once the local people are fully involved in matters regarding management of the mountain and 
its forests, we can expect this to rekindle their sense of pride and ownership of the mountain and 
its environs. So, Norton’s approach actually gives the concept of participation an expansive 
operational meaning in terms of how to bring about true and meaningful stakeholder/community 
participation in making and implementing decisions regarding environmental management on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
171 
 
In sum, Norton’s process guidelines provide us with methodological strategies and techniques 
through which the concept of participation could be concretely implemented on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro.  
Below, I show how genuine participation, through adoption of the three guidelines and their 
underlying process implications, also has the potential of restoring a sense of ownership of the 
mountain and its forests and, hence, the sense of place values among the people living on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.  
6.6 Restoring the sense of pride and ownership of the mountain  
and its forests 
It is my contention that true or genuine participation or involvement of the local people in 
matters regarding environmental management and resource use on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro requires that the local values and the way of life of the people are taken into 
consideration seriously. I have already mentioned that all the processes and means that can bring 
about true participation must pay sincere attention to the local context and hence to the values by 
which people live. Management practices that did not involve the villagers fully have resulted in 
the estrangement of the people from the mountain and its forests, which, in turn, has led to the 
loss of a sense of pride and ownership of the mountain and its forests, consequently resulting in 
the loss of sense of place values among the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
These losses have contributed to the despoliation of the mountain environment. I thus emphasise 
the need to restore the sense of place values or the local people’s pride and ownership of the 
mountain and its environs. Norton (2003:69) underlines the importance of upholding sense of 
place values by paying attention to the local context as he notes:  
According to [a] multi-scalar, contextual view, humans necessarily understand their world from a 
given local perspective. A preference for localism is really a preference over preferences – a 
favouring of values that emerge from experience of one’s home place. This home place locates 
the perspective from which one understands and values elements and processes in the natural 
context of our actions. 
I have already noted that the estrangement of people living on slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro from 
the mountain and its forests has impeded the emergence of values that result from their 
experience of their home place. It has impaired the ability of the local people to connect with the 
mountain and its forests. So, there is a need for a remedy. 
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That is why Norton (2003:69) goes ahead to advocate “many different locally originating 
sustainability ethics, each of which is anchored to a particular place by a strong sense of history 
and the future of that place”. Alternatively, a strong sense of the history of a place presupposes a 
strong sense of pride in one’s place which, in turn, presupposes a strong sense of ownership of 
one’s place. All of these are lacking among the people living on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. 
Emphasising the importance of sense of place values in environmental protection Norton & 
Hannon (2003: 350) write: 
If it is possible for individuals and communities to actively promote a positive sense of place, and 
if sense of place values in a community encourages protection of their local environments, it 
becomes an important question whether it is possible to adopt a policy of promoting a sense of 
local responsibility through strengthening the sense of a place in a community. 
I thus strongly maintain that restoring the positive sense of place values among the people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro will promote a sense of local responsibility for the 
environment there. That is why, as we attempt to seek a sustainability ethics for the protection of 
Kilimanjaro, it is imperative that we find ways to restore a strong sense of pride and ownership 
of the mountain and its surrounding forests. Norton (2003:69) says that restoration of the sense 
of ownership and pride in the area and hence the sense of place values is tantamount to restoring 
the power of “local determination and the inclination of citizens to fight and defeat solutions 
imposed by centralized and authoritarian institutions”. Residents cannot fight imposed decisions 
effectively if they do not have that strong sense of place and pride in their place. I maintain that 
adaptive management processes are designed to restore this sense of local determination among 
the residents of the mountain slopes. KINAPA and the Regional Government have often acted 
like authoritarian institutions actually colluding with the Regional government to impose 
environmental policies and management decisions on the local people on the pretext of an 
environmental crisis on the mountain slopes.  Restoring sense of place values is tantamount to 
restoring power to the local community; the power to determine what will happen to their own 
environment.  
Now, as I noted in Chapter 5, one of the biggest revelations from my case study on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro, is that environmental management approaches, notably the total 
conservation approach that is being practiced there, has completely alienated the villagers from 
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the mountain and the resources around it. This alienation, as a consequence, has undermined the 
ability of the villagers to connect with the mountain and its forests in healthy ways. I also noted 
in Chapter 5 that some of the villagers complain that the presence of the mountain has become 
more of a liability than an asset, more of a curse than a blessing. I already mentioned that there, 
for example, is no single cultural (or religious) activity that is carried out by the local people in 
relation to the mountain and the forests around it any more. This shows how much the local 
people have been isolated from the mountain and its environs. One would not expect a society 
that has lived for long – more than 500 years – in an area with such a special feature (the snow-
capped mountain) surrounded with forests full of springs and river sources, to fail to establish 
cultural and religious connections with the mountain and its surrounding forests.  
However, as I mentioned earlier, the failure to connect with the mountain is not as much a 
problem of the local people as it is the result of external forces. I noted in Chapter 4 that 
traditional cultural practices were carried out in relation to the mountain in pre-colonial times, 
but after the mountain and its surrounding forests were taken over by the colonial and post-
independence government, the local people became completely and systematically estranged 
from it through being denied direct access to it, even for cultural or religious functions. Thus the 
local people have completely lost ownership of the mountain and its surrounding forests and now 
see it and its resources as being the “property of the government”, which they, of course, feel no 
remorse to misuse or destroy when they have the opportunity. It is my argument that restoring 
religious and cultural attachment to the mountain is one of the crucial ways to restore the sense 
of pride and ownership, and hence the protection of the mountain and its surroundings.  
I showed in Chapter 5 that traditional religious and cultural practices were not given space to 
develop among the Chagga, by both the colonialists and the post-independence government. 
Neither did the new religion (Christianity) and the new governance institutions give room for the 
local people to have cultural (religious) connections with the mountain and its forests. It is 
common knowledge that the new religion discouraged their adherents to indulge in anything to 
do with respecting elements of nature such as mountains, rivers and forests as a way to suppress 
traditional beliefs and religions dubbed as paganism. It is my considered opinion that these new 
religions and governance institutions should have provided people with alternatives after they 
replaced the traditional religions and institutions. They should have propagated their new 
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religion in ways that gave room for the local people to connect with the mountain in ways that 
are less destructive to the environment. Despite claims that the local people have caused much 
destruction of forests around the mountain, I remain convinced that allowing the local people to 
connect with the mountain in less destructive ways could still be possible today as a way to 
restore their pride and ownership of the mountain and the forests around it, which is a sine qua 
non for the protection of the same. I say this because I have come to know that the villagers are 
not that responsible for the destruction that has occurred on the mountain slopes, but that some 
politicians in collaboration with business people are largely to blame. I therefore consider 
restoring the bridge between the local people and the mountain and its forests to be one of the 
best ways to help the local people to develop values that have direct positive bearing on the 
mountain and its forests.  
I have argued that full involvement of the community, which could restore the sense of pride and 
ownership of the mountain and its forests, is crucial in protecting the environment around the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. I do not claim that this project is going to be easy or that it is going 
to solve all environmental challenges on the mountain slopes, but it is a step in the right 
direction. In environmental pragmatism we do not look for certainty or perfect solutions to 
problems but rather focus on what has the potential of giving us best outcomes for the longest 
possible time. We give primacy to experiential learning. I reiterate, however, that the long-term 
solution to environmental problems on the mountain slopes can no longer ignore the involvement 
of the local community in finding those solutions.  
Having said all of the above, there remains a need to put in place some mechanisms of how 
Norton’s process proposals, whose bottom-line is full community participation, could actually be 
concretised in accordance with the local conditions or local prerogatives on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Below, I propose and discuss some strategies of doing just that by taking the local 
context on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro seriously. These are strategies that will eventually 
enable forums and groups for discussion and dialogues be conducted more effectively in a 
democratic bottom-up manner. 
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6.7 Strategies to implement Norton’s process guidelines on the Mountain 
slopes 
To recall, I argued that Norton’s process approach requires really taking experience into account 
in order that social leaning may also happen. This involves engagement in group and community 
dialogue, during which community definitions of thresholds, choice of policy, and laying down 
of targets, thresholds, and indicators are all deliberated in a democratic participatory manner. 
Taking experience seriously also involves defining safety margins, room for safety, room for 
turning back, defining time frames in which monitoring takes place, time frames in which the 
forum or group dialogue is undertaken again to determine how they stand with regard to the 
experience they have gained. All of the above processes require spaces and forums within which 
deliberations could be conducted.  Below, I propose such forums and platforms as dictated by the 
local context on the mountain slopes. These include taking advantage of Christian tradition in the 
area, appealing to educational institutions, an appeal to informal arrangements, and an appeal to 
laws and regulations. 
6.7.1 Taking advantage of Christian tradition in the area 
This strategy could be subdivided into two aspects: Appealing to Christianity as a theological 
tool to transmit ecological awareness, and appealing to Christianity as a platform through which 
to convey the environmental awareness message. The second strategy which has to do with the 
government and non-government institutions could also be subdivided into the following 
categories: Appealing to educational institutions, both formal and informal, and appealing to 
laws and regulations.  
6.7.1.1 Christian religion as an awareness raising tool 
Genuine participation in issues of environment and nature protection on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro cannot be effective if the local community does not have the requisite awareness and 
interest in environment and nature protection issues. It is my argument that the entrenched 
Christian religion among the Chagga could help to raise awareness and hence induce an interest 
in environmental management issues on the mountain slopes. It was shown earlier that the 
Christian tradition of over 150 years has become part and parcel of the culture of people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Genuine involvement of the local community in matters 
regarding environmental management on the mountain slopes requires taking the local context 
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seriously. Taking the local context seriously means also taking the influence of the Christian 
religion on the local community seriously. This is because people’s daily activities are structured 
around Christian traditions. So, appealing to Christian traditions and theology as a means to 
rehabilitate the values of the local people in the process of seeking their support for nature 
protection on the Mountain slopes cannot be ignored. 
Currently, there is little emphasis on nature protection and the role of Christians in fulfilling that 
end in most churches on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Yet there is so much in the scriptures 
and in Christian traditions that, if emphasised in church, this may influence the local people’s 
perspectives about nature protection. Despite earlier criticism levelled against Christianity by 
people such as Lynn White Jnr (1967) blaming it for being the root cause of the ecological crisis, 
there is much emphasis in the Bible and in Christian tradition, on the other hand, on the 
importance of protecting God’s creation, and the role of man as a steward or the Viceroy of God 
in taking care of creation (see also Steffen, 1992; Palmer, 2006). Much as many in Africa would 
like to cherish what is traditionally ours as opposed to imposed foreign religions, it unfortunately 
turns out that, it would be wishful thinking to try and sideline the influence of Christianity on the 
people with the current situation on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. It would, in fact, be 
counterproductive. Any efforts to try to persuade people to protect nature must, to the contrary, 
be built on the already present values and worldviews by which the local people live, through 
emphasising their useful or favourable elements. Christianity as currently practiced is not 
favourable to the environment because it still retains many traditional elements that see 
respecting some aspects of nature as sinful or as paganism.  That is why I am proposing an 
ecologically enlightened Christianity.  Many scholars (from both Catholic and Protestant 
traditions) have already written widely about the ecological potential of the Christian tradition or 
what could be called an ecologically oriented Christianity (see, for example, McDaniel, 1989; 
Linzey, 1990; McFague, 1993; Gitau, 2000; Attfield, 2001; Msafiri, 2007, among others).    
To reach that goal, I propose that efforts should be undertaken to educate religious leaders 
through seminars and workshops about the importance of making environmental protection an 
integral part of their teachings. Many religious leaders with whom I have spoken on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro are mostly concerned with planting trees around their parishes and keeping 
the surrounding environment green, but do not recognise that they have a responsibility as 
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church ministers to stress nature or environmental protection as a God’s call to Christians in their 
daily life. 
Thus, I propose special seminars and workshops for religious leaders on how to incorporate the 
ecological message in their religious teachings in general. An awareness and interest in 
environmental issues among the religious leaders is important because they are the ones who are 
able to transmit this environmental awareness message to the rest of their church members. This 
could also widen forums of discussion and dialogue about environmental management on the 
mountain slopes, which are critical in Norton’s adaptive management approach. I suggest this 
because some religious leaders and lay people in my interviews acknowledged that issues of 
nature protection are not usually given priority in the local church’s teachings. They do not see 
environmental issues as integral to their general Christian theology and teachings. That is why I 
propose that church teachings about ecology should be part of the training of religious leaders 
and should be mainstreamed and given more emphasis in all churches on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro than it has been so far. For example, there is a considerable potential for the 
people’s spirituality to be moulded around contemplating nature and natural objects as a more 
apparent manifestation of God’s presence among the people. In fact, their fore-fathers did this in 
pre-colonial times when they used to revere Kibo (the ice-caped peak) as symbolising the 
presence of Ruwa, God (see Chapter 4).      
One of the things that may capture the interests of Christians for nature protection on the 
mountain slopes is to try to emphasise the importance of seeing God in creation or in nature. 
People should be reminded to see the splendour of God in natural structures like Mount 
Kilimanjaro, forests and big trees. Christians should be reminded that God manifests himself 
through creation or nature. Destroying nature thus is tantamount to destroying the tool or the 
instrument that elevates us to God. It means destroying the path that leads to heaven. It will be 
noted that this is very close to traditional African and Chagga religion, and thus it would not 
sound too foreign, at least, because there are some who still adhere to the traditional Chagga 
religion, albeit in modified forms.  
Something else that may capture the interests of the local people for nature protection is to try to 
associate certain religious activities and ceremonies with the mountain. For example, a Christian 
shrine somewhere in the mountain forests or on the way to the mountain peak could be built for a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
178 
 
yearly pilgrimage. During the pre-colonial times the mountain had all along symbolised the 
presence of God/Ruwa or it was believed to have supernatural significance. Why did Christian 
missionaries not exploit this potential to make their religion more relevant to the local people is 
not very clear. Or was it the conviction (out of ignorance?) that everything that the local people 
did was pagan and heathen? So, I consider restoring the local people’s religious connections with 
the mountain and its environs as one of the best ways to attract the interest of the local people to 
participate in environmental issues on the mountain slopes and hence restore the sense of pride 
and ownership of the same among the Chagga. 
Another technique to attract the interests of the local people would be to use outstanding 
historical religious figures who have been champions of nature protection. For example, adorers 
or lovers of nature in the Christian tradition like St Francis of Assisi (1882), who is known as the 
patron saint of environmentalists, should be appealed to as well. Prayers could be offered in a 
way that extolls the ecological virtues of St Francis of Assisi.
41
 Since the cult of saints and 
devotion to saints is so popular among the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, 
rekindling Saint Francis’ ecological virtues through reciting his life history, especially his 
admiration for God’s natural creation, may help raise environmental awareness and interest 
among the local people. The Canticle of the Creatures may, for example, be of particular appeal 
to the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. People should be reminded that 
intentional or unnecessary destruction or killing of living creatures, both animals and plants, is 
wrong. In fact the Emeritus Pope Benedict XVI declared and thus added environmental 
destruction to the list of cardinal or mortal sins,
42
 arguing that environmental destruction is 
tantamount to the destruction of life itself or of God’s creation. Pope Francis, for his part, has 
repeatedly emphasised the same. In his most recent encyclical on the environment that is titled 
“Laudato Si” (Praise be to You) released in May 2015, he underscores the obligation of 
humanity to “care for our common home, the environment”. He thus calls for “ecological 
                                                          
41
 St Francis of Assisi was born in 1181 or 1182 in Assisi, Italy and died in 1226. Because of his extraordinary love of 
nature (creation) he was proclaimed the Patron Saint of Ecology by Pope John Paul II. It is narrated that St Francis 
preached sermons to animals and referred to all creatures in his prayers and praises as brothers and sisters under 
God.   
42
In the Catholic tradition, a mortal sin (pecattum mortale, in Latin) is a grave and sinful act that is committed 
willfully and deliberately against fellow human beings [or nature], which, if a perpetrator dies without repenting, 
leads to eternal damnation. This sin is usually contrasted with venial sin (see the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
1992).    
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conversion”43 of the faithful.  The World Council of Churches (WCC) has likewise emphasised 
and acknowledged the role of Christians as stewards of creation or nature, denouncing the 
narrow anthropocentric interpretation of the scriptures as giving humans unlimited power to do 
whatever they like with creation. The WCC reiterated that the directive to have dominion over 
nature does not imply domination, but care (see, for example, Harrison, 1999; Palmer, 2006). 
Thus construed, Christianity has the potential to become a powerful tool in raising awareness and 
attracting the local people’s interest to environmental issues, things which are crucial for genuine 
and meaningful participation in matters regarding environmental management among those 
living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. However, because of lack of awareness or, may be, 
because issues of environment and nature protection have not been given much priority and 
emphasis in churches, very few religious leaders have given serious consideration to the 
documents on nature and environment protection from their respective church hierarchies. My 
observations on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro is that The Vatican and the WCC 
pronouncements on environment and nature have not been received with the required enthusiasm 
and, in many cases,  have not been given any priority in respective churches. This could be 
attributed to the fact that environmental issues have not yet been an integral part of church 
teaching or, put differently, many local Christian religious leaders have not been able to give 
appropriate attention to environmental protection issues. They have not been able to recognise 
that genuine Christianity, from a stewardship point of view, must necessarily be ecological. The 
church pronouncements discussed above have in most cases remained at the level of the higher 
echelons of the respective churches, with little impact on the local churches at grassroots level.    
The above discussion presents one way of taking the local context, and hence the current values 
people live by, seriously. By so doing, we expect to raise the awareness and interests of the local 
community to participate in matters regarding environment and nature protection on the 
mountain slopes. Genuine participation and interest in matters of environment and nature 
                                                          
43
 The Pope seems to derive this concept of ecological conversion from Bernard Lonergan’s masterpiece, The 
Insight, in which he emphasises that the ultimate end of the activity of knowing is intellectual conversion, which, 
on deliberate individual efforts, brings about moral conversion which does not end there but also may result in the 
ultimate experience, i.e. religious conversion. It is here that the Pope adds another level, that is, ecological 
conversion. And I think ecological conversion should come after moral conversion. So, the order should be: 
intellectual conversion, moral conversion, ecological conversion, and religious conversion.  (For more on this, see 
Lonergan’s Method in Theology, first published in 1972, and Lonergan’s, Insight, 1992.)    
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protection is expected to assist in rebuilding or restoring sense of place values among the people 
living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Linking religious activities and teachings to the 
mountain and its forests could have the potential of restoring the sense of pride and ownership of 
the same. So, one way of doing this is to take advantage of their Christian faith and relate it 
directly to the mountain and its environs. We want the strong Christian values possessed by the 
Chagga to have a positive impact on how they see and relate with the mountain and forests 
around it. It may sound as if I am prescribing values here that are contrary to the spirit of 
environmental pragmatism, but, my proposals above are derived from the actual worldview and 
values by which people live and the models the local people use in talking about environmental 
problems on the mountain slopes. As I showed in Chapter 5, an appeal to religion is one of the 
dominant models used by local people to talk about the environmental challenges on the 
mountain slopes and solutions to those problems. Furthermore, these are just proposals that may 
change, depending on the changing values and priorities of the local people and biophysical 
conditions of the area. And, in my opinion, this is where the strength of environmental 
pragmatism lies.     
I will show in the following section that the Church could also provide forums or platforms for 
people to hold discussions and deliberate on environmental concerns. In this way many people 
could be reached making the concept of participation in its wider sense a reality, and thus re-
awaken the sense of ownership of the mountain and its forests.    
6.7.1.2 The Church as a platform 
Christianity may not just be used as a theological tool only, but also as a medium or platform for 
carrying out environmental awareness campaigns. This is because the only place on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro where there is a possibility of reaching many people at the same time is 
through church gatherings. Not only this, but also the organisational structure of the church (both 
Catholic and Lutheran) that starts from small units that they call Small Christian Communities  
(SCCs) comprising at least ten households could make the work of transmitting environmental 
awareness education even easier. As mentioned earlier, environmental awareness education is 
critical in bringing about true or genuine and meaningful stakeholder participation in 
environmental issues on the mountain slopes. So, all important church messages can reach 
almost all her members through SCCs, regardless of whether they attend church or not. It must 
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be remembered here that more than 90 percent of the people living on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro are Christians. 
Furthermore, environmentalists and ecologists, as well as government leaders could use that 
platform to initiate (and I emphasise, only to initiate or stimulate) discussions on environmental 
issues, and hence such discussions will be continued by each small Christian community or 
group in their respective areas. This is an avenue that is yet to be fully exploited on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro. As an example, since Small Christian Communities provide good forums for 
discussion of different issues regarding the environment, and since it is not possible to deploy 
environmental experts or leaders to facilitate or stimulate discussions in each of those 
communities, then, for example, an expert could help raise issues that could be taken up to 
stimulate discussions during church gatherings on Sundays. Alternatively, seminars on 
environmental or nature protection could be prepared for leaders from each of the Small 
Christian Communities. These assemblies of SCC leaders could constitute what Norton calls 
Advisory Committees. These leaders will then help to facilitate dialogue and discussions in their 
respective SCCs. The focus for discussions and dialogues at the level of the SCCs could centre 
on the environmental challenges experienced on the mountain slopes and how to resolve them.  
We expect that diverse values will emerge when representatives from various SCCs meet at 
higher level stakeholder meetings. However, through sustained discussion and reiterative 
dialogue we expect consensus on a common goal of environmental protection to emerge, despite 
the diverse values and interests that different groups of stakeholders may have. Ultimately, we 
expect an agreement on the most satisfactory course of action to be taken. 
What I have proposed above is one of the ways that could facilitate easier implementation of 
Norton’s process proposal on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Thus construed, appealing to 
Christianity as a religion and an institution could provide us with a platform and forum where 
many people could be reached and be brought together to participate fully in deliberating and 
formulating environmental management policies that will most probably receive wide enough 
approval among the villagers and other stakeholders. Through this process we expect social 
learning to occur and thus a new set of values, especially sense of place values, and, in particular, 
the sense of pride and ownership of the mountain and its forests, to re-emerge.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
 
6.7.2 Educational institutions and NGOs as platforms of discussion 
The concern in this chapter has been to find techniques that may facilitate wide and genuine 
participation of people in matters regarding the environment in keeping with Norton’s adaptive 
management methodology. It has also been an attempt to propose ways to rekindle the sense of 
pride and ownership of the Mountain and its forests by taking advantage of local conditions.  
However, appeal to Christianity or the Church is not the only platform where awareness 
education and hence genuine participation could be effected. Secular institutions, including 
educational institutions – both formal and informal – and NGOs working on environment-related 
issues also have the potential to be effective instruments of participation and nurturing of a sense 
of pride and ownership; which may consequently re-awaken sense of place values among the 
people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
6.7.2.1 Formal platforms 
I also propose to fully utilise the institutions of learning, particularly primary and secondary 
schools, as platforms to nurture environmental awareness education and pride in the mountain 
and its forest resources at a young age. Despite the Regional Government declaring 
environmental degradation on the mountain slopes a disaster, no special strategies have currently 
been undertaken to inject the environmental awareness message in pupils in institutions of 
learning, beginning from primary to secondary schools, and even to tertiary institutions.  
It will be noted that almost 90 percent of children are enrolled in primary schools and almost 60 
percent continue with secondary education, at least to Form Four in the Kilimanjaro region. That 
is why targeting these institutions of learning as a platform for disseminating the environmental 
awareness message is crucial. This will enable the students to grow up in an environment where 
they constantly hear the environment and nature protection message. This should be 
accompanied with trips, for example, to visit the mountain and forests surrounding it. It is 
unfortunate to note that currently there is not much enthusiasm for the mountain and its 
surrounding forests in primary and secondary schools, and even among the local people, despite 
the place being of considerable national and international significance. Further, currently, with 
the increased distance between areas of natural beauty and people’s settlements and the 
restrictions on accessing the mountain forests, a desire among the youth for visiting these natural 
places is growing. This is something that should be taken advantage of. That is why I propose 
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that the young people should be encouraged to visit areas of natural beauty as a strategy to 
persuade them to see the need to protect them and to raise or nurture or re-ignite pride in their 
natural resources. Thus, strategies including ease of access and setting low fees or even allowing 
free entrance for the young people in primary and secondary schools is important to help them 
develop the sense of aesthetics and love of nature, and of course nationalist feeling about local 
resources. At this stage, pupils and students at primary and secondary levels of education are 
introduced to discussions about environmental issues, particularly concerning the role and 
significance of the mountain and the need to protect it. Essay competitions, debate, songs, and 
different activities related to the mountain and its forests could be introduced in a special one-
week festival to celebrate Mount Kilimanjaro.  
I mentioned earlier that it is rather unusual that the local people do not have any cultural 
activities that may connect them with the mountain and its forests. Non-use value aspects of the 
mountain and its forests such as religious and other cultural issues could be nurtured this way. 
Currently, the local people have nothing in common with the mountain and its forests. The 
mountain and its forests have come to belong to the government and the tourists. As the villagers 
would say, “the mountain is for the tourists, not for us”. That is why there is a dire need to 
change the mind-set and attitude of the people, which might encourage local people to begin to 
view the mountain and its forests differently. KINAPA and the government have an important 
role here. They should look into the possibility of instituting something like a Mount Kilimanjaro 
Cultural Festival in collaboration with the local people or their representatives, where the local 
people can gather and celebrate the mountain and its forests through different activities that are 
of interest to them. These activities, for example, could involve climbing the mountain or just 
touring some sections of it to learn about the importance of its protection, and also raise 
awareness in the local people regarding how they may benefit from the non-use value aspects of 
the mountain. So, education and raising awareness are crucial in this regard. And here, I must 
reiterate that primary and secondary school students must be given priority in terms of education 
and raising awareness. So, the festival I am proposing could be a weeklong and it could include 
celebrating the traditional culture of the Chagga, with the mountain and its forests as the point of 
focus. This, also, should help to restore that pride and sense of ownership of the mountain and its 
forests. In this way, we expect the sense of place values to develop in direct connection with the 
mountain and its forests. What happens here in the long term is that the local people may even 
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begin to develop non-use values and attitudes to the mountain and its forests. That is to say, the 
local people may begin to see the importance of protecting the mountain and its forests, even if 
they do not derive direct material benefits such as firewood and fodder from it. I mean that the 
community may begin to develop environmental values. All these may be possible through 
experimental adaptation through experiential learning.  Through these activities, as Norton says, 
“it is possible for the community to be able to learn itself into [a] new set of indicators, [a] new 
set of concerns and a whole new understanding of their place and the space around that place”. 
Thus, a cultural festival presents a chance to help the people living on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro to develop new values and new understanding and attitudes towards the mountain 
and its forests. This Cultural Festival may also help to rekindle the pride in and restore the sense 
of ownership of the Mountain and its surrounding environment, as one of the best ways to 
protect it. 
A Cultural Festival represents some form of a platform or a forum for discussions, things that are 
crucial in Norton’s process approach. In such activities, we expect the young people to be able to 
articulate their hopes, fears, and expectations from the society with regard to the kind of a 
mountain environment they would like to inherit. In this way, we expect to inculcate pride in the 
mountain in these young people as they grow up. This is expected to result in what Norton 
(2003:69) calls a “strong sense of the history of the past and future of a place”. I mentioned 
earlier that our intention is to rekindle or rehabilitate the sense of place values which develops 
with a strong sense of pride in the history of a place, past and future. As I mentioned earlier, the 
sense of pride and ownership of the mountain and its forests has long been lost because of the 
reasons I explained earlier, the most important of which being the intentional impairment of the 
local peoples’ ability to connect with the mountain. We expect that targeting the young people in 
the manner explained above could be one of the best ways to generate the ability of the young 
people to connect and identify with the mountain and the surrounding forests.      
6.7.2.2 Informal platforms 
One may ask: what about those who are not in formal education or in formal institutions of 
learning? How will they be reached? Despite one of the ways to reach them being through the 
church, assuming that not everybody goes to church, or not everybody on the mountain slopes is 
interested in religious matters, forums for informal public awareness education must also be 
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sought. And here NGOs concerned with environmental issues must be up to this task. Most of 
these NGOs may have considerable persuasive power owing to the strategies they use to attract 
people to participate in environmental protection activities on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
Women’s informal groups, in particular, have been targeted by some NGOs through which they 
are helped to start tree nursery projects, in which case they benefit from selling the seedlings and 
also getting firewood later on when the trees mature. In this way they earn some cash for their 
families while at the same time contributing to environmental protection. This is why I will 
emphasise here that incentives, such as being provided with tree seedlings to start small tree-
planting projects, and other appropriate incentives that may attract people to participate in public 
meetings for nature protection are important. 
Currently, quite a large number of NGOs deal with environmental issues on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Examples of these NGOs and Community-based Organisations include the 
Kilimanjaro Environmental Development Association (KEDA), Community Economic 
Development and Empowerment (CEDE), Umoja wa Kina Mama National Housing 
(UKIMANAHO), the Mali Hai Club of Kilimanjaro, and the Woman Education and Economic 
Centre (WEECE). Thus, if these NGOs re-align their objectives to include advocacy of nature 
protection in its totality in their environmental awareness campaigns by targeting informal 
groups and gatherings, for instance in market places, they could have a considerable impact on 
influencing the local people’s attitudes towards nature protection.  
All these are set to accomplish two goals simultaneously. The first goal is that of contributing to 
the resolution of environmental problems on the mountain slopes. The second goal is to restore 
the sense of ownership of the Mountain through the participation of the local people in 
addressing those challenges. In this way, we expect long-term and sustainable solutions to the 
environmental problems on the mountain slopes to be achieved.     
6.7.3 Appeal to rules and regulations 
The current condition of the environment on the mountain slopes may also require stricter rules 
and regulations in some areas so as to avoid irreversible damage to the environment. The 
thresholds of irreversible damage, or rather what may be the safety margins within which the 
local people could access resources on the mountain slopes without causing irreversible damage 
to the environment, must be determined in dialogue with the local people. The biggest danger or 
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irreversible damage on Mount Kilimanjaro, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the disappearance of 
the ice-fields or the snow cap. This will pose a serious threat to the livelihoods of the people 
living around this mountain and even beyond because the ice fields contribute extensively to the 
springs and rivers that are sources of water for the majority of the residents around Kilimanjaro.  
Apart from being a source of water, the ice cap is actually what gives the mountain its 
uniqueness and hence makes it a tourist attraction. So, it is possible that consensus may be 
reached, by putting all the facts on the table and through reiterative dialogue with all 
stakeholders about the need to find alternative ways to meet local people’s livelihoods needs, 
which would allow the mountain forests to regenerate. However, such a resolution will require 
mechanisms to enforce it. This is where stricter rules and regulations become imperative because 
there will always be trespassers and greedy people among the people living on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro. 
 As I mentioned earlier, nature protection on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro can no longer be 
entrusted to the custodianship of traditional institutions and ancestors only. These traditional 
institutions could help in some circumstances and not in others. However, because of present 
greed, selfishness, and the competition for the dwindling resources, we can no longer put much 
faith in these traditional institutions alone to help protect nature on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro. The free market economy and trade liberalisation policies that the country adopted 
since the 1980s, coupled with competition for scarce resources, land scarcity, corruption and 
poverty, and Christianity, have systematically eroded the power and capacity of traditional 
institutions to be effective custodians of nature (at least some aspects of it) on the slopes of 
Mount Kilimanjaro. So, today, the use of laws and regulations and some minimal level of 
policing coupled with the other measures mentioned in the previous section cannot be avoided. 
On this aspect, Norton (2003: 84) writes:  
Too often local communities have acted on the basis of short-term interests, only to learn that 
they have irretrievably deprived their children of something of great value. So, as in the case of 
the temporarily depressed young adult who seeks to end his or her life, I would suspend the usual 
right of self-determination of local communities in the hope that a period of regulation and 
pressure from the centralized government ...will lead the local community to see the value of 
[protecting the mountain environment]. ... During the period of regulation, agencies of the central 
government [in this case TANAPA and KINAPA] and national environmental groups can attempt 
through public education, and perhaps economic incentives, to establish local support [for the 
protection of nature on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro].     
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However, one may contend that what has been happening on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro is 
actually in accordance with Norton’s advice above because the environmental condition there is 
in crisis. My reply, to the contrary, would first of all be that the local people on the mountain 
slopes have never had the right of self-determination with regard to the natural resources there. 
The local people have never had a voice in decisions regarding the management of resources on 
the mountain slopes. Secondly, government regulation, particularly restrictions on accessing the 
mountain forests, have never been followed by providing alternative means to the local people 
for meeting basic needs, let alone public education and economic incentives. So, what has been 
happening on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro is not at all close to what Norton suggests.  
It will be recalled that even common villagers on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro acknowledge 
that the current environmental degradation on the mountain slopes calls for more strict measures, 
including those that may deter greedy business people and selfish individuals, but this is only 
possible through enforcement of laws and regulations. However, enforcement of laws and 
regulations should be practised with care not to deprive the poor, whose needs from their 
immediate natural environment are just modest, such as collecting firewood, grass for their 
livestock, herbal medicine, and the like. The point here is that careful enforcement of laws and 
regulations with respect to the way people interact with nature may slowly encourage them to 
appreciate nature protection when they finally see the benefits of the sacrifices they make.  
Thus, the work of enforcing these laws and regulations should involve the local people, including 
village leaders and Ward Councillors, as much as possible. This would be to create that 
ownership mentality or feeling among the people. I mentioned in Chapter 5 that the local people 
have been complaining about outsiders being introduced as guards to protect the KINAPA 
forests. The villagers see this as a complete show of disrespect to them and this is a vivid proof 
of the villagers’ complete alienation from the mountain and its forests. I have already presented 
the impact this feeling of alienation among the villagers has had on them, namely the loss of the 
sense of ownership and pride in their natural resource. The villagers are seen as “the problem” 
and not as part of the solution. As I have been arguing, if this mentality of seeing the local people 
as the problem does not change to seeing them as a part of the solution by involving them fully 
in enforcing rules and regulations against wanton destruction of the mountain forests, no positive 
result will be achieved.  One strategy towards devolving the powers of enforcement of laws and 
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regulations would be through re-instituting the defunct/passive Village Environmental 
Management Committees that had the function of seeing to it that rules and regulations set by the 
villagers themselves about interacting with the mountain forests are observed. The government 
and KINAPA should provide these committees with the necessary support and capacity building 
to effectively perform their responsibilities in overseeing the mountain forests. Thus construed, 
KINAPA and the villagers will work together instead of working against each other. So, the full 
involvement of the villagers in the work of policing and law enforcement should help to restore 
their sense of ownership of the mountain and its forests.  
I have now discussed different strategies that may help to raise awareness and interest and hence 
allow wide participation of all stakeholders in deliberations on issues related to the management 
of the mountain and its forests. The strategies/techniques I proposed above provide an 
environment that would be conducive to the concretisation of Norton’s adaptive methods, which 
are characterised by experimental, iterative, information-rich processes. These strategies provide 
the right conditions and an environment where wide involvement of all stakeholders is possible, 
and this wide involvement as such has potential to rekindle the sense of pride and ownership of 
the mountain. The sense of pride and ownership of the mountain, in turn, has the potential of 
triggering the development of strong sense of place values. All of these strategies are necessary 
for making the task of persuading the local people to protect the environment around the 
mountain much easier. In the final analysis, we expect that the strategies and processes discussed 
above will help to generate locally originating and locally supportable norms to guide sustainable 
environmental management on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
6.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In this section, I give a general summary of the entire dissertation and my conclusion. I give a 
chapter by chapter summary, and finally pull everything together in the conclusion highlighting 
the major contribution of this research to resolving real environmental concerns in the study area, 
and thus adding to the wider environmental ethics literature. 
6.8.1 Summary 
The aim of this study was to find an environmental ethics approach that could help to address the 
concrete environmental challenges experienced by the people living on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro (the Chagga). This study was motivated by the observation that current 
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environmental ethics approaches, both western and African, do not sufficiently provide us with 
guidelines on how to address practical environmental problems such as those experienced on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. 
Chapter 1 provided an introduction and the detailed methodology that I followed in this study. I 
employed a mixed methodology, one aspect of which involved theoretical work mostly covered 
in Chapters 2 and 3. The other aspect involved a case study covered in Chapters 4 and 5. The two 
aspects of the methodology were very integrated in that environmental ethics theory was 
intended to inform practice. The discussion of the case study and its implications was also 
intended to inform the formulation of some theoretical insights. In brief, the methodology that I 
followed in this study was informed by a pragmatic environmental approach.   
Chapter 2 consisted of an overview of some of the main approaches to western environmental 
ethics in which I discussed its problems and alternative approaches that have been proposed. I 
showed that the main problem with western approaches to environmental ethics is that they have 
been formulated in a different context, with different cultural perspectives and worldviews, and 
thus with different questions being asked; many of them being ontological questions about the 
scope of ascribing moral status to beings/entities in the world and why. It is my considered 
opinion that these questions solicited two responses: the African response which was basically 
about reviving traditional values and practices; and the other response involving environmental 
pragmatism, which emphasised learning from experience, context and time scales while 
discouraging the use or search for a-priori overarching principles because these approaches are 
not very useful when it comes to resolving practical environmental problems in particular 
contexts.  Environmental pragmatism and Norton’s process proposal was partly discussed at the 
end of Chapter 2 and taken up later in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Chapter 3 thus presented a detailed discussion of the African response to western environmental 
ethics. I focused particularly on two writers on African environmental ethics, Murove and 
Kelbessa. I argued that the problem with the approaches promoted by Murove and Kelbessa is 
that they focus too much on the revival of African traditional values and practices, and, as such, 
tend to romanticise the traditional African past. I further argued that these two approaches to 
African environmental ethics, at the best reading, also refer to overarching metaphysical 
principles, or a value set of being closer to nature by going back to traditional African values and 
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practices. First of all, I argued that looking for overarching metaphysical principles or principles 
of any sort as the starting point (that is, the top-down approach) of theorising about 
environmental problems is against the spirit of pragmatic philosophy in which context and 
experience should inform principles and not vice versa. Secondly, I argued that the project of 
going back to traditional values and practices is suspicious because it is based on unquestioned 
assumptions or false beliefs about an unspoiled Africa; the belief that there existed an eco-golden 
age in Africa in pre-colonial times, and that, pre-scientific societies were “ecological saints”. I 
showed that these simply were false images or misconceptions constructed by missionaries and 
continue to be propagated today by modern environmental crusaders or fanatics. I concluded the 
chapter by emphasising that the shortfalls of traditional African environmental ethics approaches 
challenge us not only to take the concrete experiences of people seriously, but also the values by 
which people are living. 
In Chapter 4, the main aim was to show more specifically what happens when the approaches 
promoted by Murove and Kelbessa are applied to the Chagga situation. It was revealed that, 
while Murove’s and Kelbessa’s approaches helped to reveal many traditional practices and 
beliefs which informed the life of the Chagga in the past (one could call it “traditional 
pragmatism”), they do not really give us guidance on what to do when we encounter concrete 
environmental challenges, for two reasons. Firstly, as I showed, this is so because the pillars or 
supporting structures on which Murove and Kelbessa propose that we base our African 
environmental ethics, to a large extent, are not in place or dominant any longer among the 
Chagga. Things like the traditional governance systems, traditional legal systems, authority of 
chiefs and religious leaders, etc., have dwindled. Their power and influence on people’s daily 
lives have waned considerably. Secondly, the application of the approaches suggested by 
Murove and Kelbessa fail in the Chagga context because they neglect many things; notably, the 
current realities and experiences of the people.  I argued, therefore, that we need to look more 
deeply into the context and realities of the experience of the Chagga. That is, what the real 
environmental concerns and problems are that the villagers grapple with from day to day. 
In Chapter 5, I therefore delved into examining the present realities of the Chagga relationship 
with and experience of nature. Chapter 5 revealed issues such as exclusion,  top-down 
management procedures, poverty, dependency, and problems in accessing forests resources, 
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conflict with wildlife, and conflict with natural resources management authorities, as well as 
other policy problems. I argued that this is a much deeper insight into the lived experiences of 
the Chagga today. These experiences further reveal the plurality of values that are currently at 
play.  
In employing Norton’s Adaptive Management Approach and the process ethics it implies in 
Chapter 6, the last Chapter of my dissertation, I have argued that many of the environmental 
challenges revealed through the case study boil down to two related problems, namely the 
problem of lack of genuine and democratic participation which has led to a bigger problem but 
related problem of loss of pride and ownership of the mountain and its forests; which in turn, has 
led to loss of sense of place-based values. I have argued that addressing these twin problems of 
participation and the loss of the sense of pride in and ownership of the mountain and its forests 
will help to address other problems such as conflict regarding management and access of 
resources on the mountain slopes, and also conflict with wildlife.   
6.8.2 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this dissertation has been to determine an approach to environmental ethics 
that could help resolve environmental challenges experienced today by people living on the 
slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. This research goal was motivated by the fact that many of the 
earlier environmental ethics approaches fall short when called upon to provide guidance on how 
to resolve some of the environmental challenges experienced on these mountain slopes. I showed 
that Norton’s process guidelines, which proceed from environmental pragmatism and the 
philosophy of adaptive management, provide a clue to how to effectively address these 
environmental challenges. Using Norton’s guidelines, I showed that the challenges identified on 
the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are down to two underlining causes, The first one being the lack 
of full involvement of the local people in matters regarding environmental management on the 
mountain slopes and the second one closely related to the first, is the loss of the sense pride and 
ownership, and hence the loss of sense of place values among the people living on the mountain 
slopes. I argued that Norton’s process proposal is a tool that could help to address these two 
problems, and thus proposed some context-specific strategies that could help to concretise 
Norton’s process proposal. I argued that proper implementation of Norton’s process proposal 
implies full involvement of all stakeholders in all matters regarding environmental management 
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on the mountain slopes. Ongoing debates, reiterative dialogues, information gathering, and 
revision of goals, all of which are important aspects of process ethics cannot be realised without 
the full involvement of all stakeholders, particularly the local community. Full involvement of all 
stakeholders, villagers included, in matters regarding environmental management is expected to 
restore the sense of pride and ownership of the mountain and its forests, and consequently the 
sense of place values among the people living on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.  
Having said all of the above, I do not, however, claim to have provided a comprehensive 
application of Norton’s adaptive management ethics with regard to management of the 
environment on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. This dissertation has only been a modest 
attempt to begin to look into the possibility of a more practical approach to environmental ethics 
that is more responsive to the concrete environmental concerns experienced by the people living 
on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Having opened up this possibility, it is my hope that more 
work and research will be done in this direction with the aim of finding a long-term and 
sustainable resolution of the environmental challenges on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and 
other areas with similar conditions.      
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Appendix 1: Interview Schedule 
The questions were only tentative interview guides. The interviewer allowed more freedom to 
the informants to express themselves. 
Questions for general exploratory interviews  
1. What is your name?   
2. How long have lived in this area? 
3. What are/were your main economic activities? 
4. Do you use the land, forests, water and wild animals as sources of your income? 
5. If yes, can you explain more about it please? 
6. How do you see the state of the mountain, land, forests, water and wild animals for the 
last ten years? 
7. Are these resources increasing or decreasing? Why? 
8. Do you know or have you ever heard or been told of how things were in this area in the 
distant past, before independence (1961) for example?  
9. Were things better or worse? Why?  
10. In your opinion what might have caused the change? 
11. What is being done to change the situation for the better? 
12. Do you think enough is being done? 
13. In your opinion what do you think should be done to ameliorate the situation? 
14. Are people in this area doing any activities to protect the environment? If Yes, What are 
those activities?  
15. What things do you value most here with regard to the natural environment? 
16. What do you think will happen if these things you value are destroyed? 
17. Are there aspects of the natural environment towards which you have special reverence? 
Why? 
18. What should be done to prevent the destruction of these values or sacred places? 
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19. Are there groups in this area that campaign and educate people about environmental 
protection?  
20. What are those (government/nongovernmental/religious etc.  
21. Do you think it is helping to change people’s attitudes towards nature 
22. Do you know of any conflicts over land, water or forest resources in this area? 
23. What is the nature of these conflicts? 
24. What is being done to address those conflicts?  
25. What has been the state of rainfall and farming in this area? Are you getting enough 
harvest for the family needs?  
26. If there has been a change (in rainfall/harvest) what is that change and what might have 
caused it? 
27. How are you coping with the changes? 
28. What, in your opinion, should be done to ameliorate the situation? 
29. Do you think there are ways that people can use the natural environment without 
destroying it? 
30. Do you think it is possible to preserve the natural environment just for aesthetic and 
spiritual purposes? 
31. Anything else you wish to bring to my attention? 
 




Questions for in-depth interviews  
These questions will be put under different themes to reflect the major environmental problems 
facing Tanzania as follows. 
Land 
1. What does the land mean to you? 
2. Who owns the land?  
3. How did you get the land? 
4. What do you use the land for? 
5. Does the land have any cultural or religious significance to you? 
6. If yes, what is it?  
7. What was the situation in the past? 
8. Did you conduct any special traditional ceremonies associated with the land that are 
(a) still practiced today? (b) Not practiced today any longer? 
9. What were those rituals and practices? Why are some still practiced and others not? 
10. Do you have any taboos related to issues of land and soil? 
11. What were those?  
12. Do you know of any traditional land management strategies that are (a) still practiced 
today? (b) Not practiced any longer? 
13. Why are some are some still practiced and others not?  
14. Is there a problem of land degradation in this area? 
15. When did you begin to notice it? 
16. What do you think are the causes of land degradation? 
17. Is there enough land to accommodate the growing number of people in the area and 
for the coming generation? 
18. How are people coping with the problem of shortage of land? 
19. Are the coping mechanisms environmentally friendly? 
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20. If no, what do you think should be done? 
21.  Are there conflicts over land in this area? How are they resolved? 
22. Do you think the government policies and laws about land are favorable to people and 
environmental friendly? 
23. What are the loopholes that need to be addressed? 
24. Do the land policy and laws create a conducive environment for an attitude of care 
towards land among people living on the slopes of this mountain to emerge? 
25. If yes how? If no, what should be done to make these policies and laws more 
conducive?   
26. In your opinion, what kind of attitude should people have towards the land to avoid 
further degradation?   
27. Anything else you wish to bring to my attention? 
 
Water  
1. What does water mean to you? 
2. Where do you get water from? 
3. What is the state of water availability in this area compared to the past? 
4. Are there any mechanisms to conserve water? 
5. Are/were there natural water sources in this area? 
6. What happened to them? 
7. Who controls water sources in this area?  
8. How was it in the past? 
9. Were there taboos regarding to water and water sources like springs etc. 
10. What are the major reasons for water scarcity in this area? (If any). 
11. How are people coping with this problem? 
12. If things continue as they are now what do you think might happen in the future? 
13. What do you think should be done to rectify the problem? 
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14. Are there conflicts over water issues in this area?  
15. How are they resolved? 
16. Are the government policies and laws about water creating a conducive environment 
for the emergence of an attitude of care towards water and water sources? 
17. If not what are the loopholes that need to addressed? 
18. In your opinion in what manner do you think people should treat water and water 
sources to avoid further destruction? 
19. Anything else you wish to bring to my attention? 
 
Vegetation/ Forests 
1. What does the forest mean to you? 
2. Do you have access to the forest resources? 
3. To what extent are you allowed to access the forest resources? 
4. How was the situation in the past in terms of accessing the forest? 
5. Are/were there taboos linked to the forest? 
6. Apart from accessing forest resources, how else did you use the forest (spiritual 
functions, etc?) 
7. Did people in this area fear to enter the deep forest in the past? 
8. What is the situation now?  
9. Has the fear disappeared? Why?  
10. How do you assess the condition of the forests today compared to the past? 
11. Is there destruction? Why? 
12. What will happen in the future if the situation continues as it is now? 
13. What are the major causes of this destruction? 
14. What is being done to change the situation? 
15. What indeed should be done? 
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16. Do you think we should keep away from the forests to allow wild animals to thrive 
and attract more tourists? 
17. Is the revival of past traditional values as a strategy to address the situation possible? 
Should it be done? 
18. Are there conflicts over forest resources in this area? What is the nature of the 
conflicts?  
19. Are the current government policies and laws conducive enough to create an attitude 
of care towards the forest? 
20. Are there loopholes that need to be addressed? 
21. How indeed should people relate to the forests to avoid further destruction? 
22. Anything else you would like to add? 
 
Wildlife and domestic animals in general 
1. Are there wild animals in this area? 
2. Do you practice totemism or have you ever heard of this practice in the past? 
3. Do you hunt wild animals? Which season? 
4. Are there certain kinds of wild animals that people do not eat in this community? 
5. Are there certain kinds of wild animals that you ate in the past that you do not eat today? 
6. Are there conflicts in the community with regard to access to and use of wild animals (for 
example for hunting, etc?). 
7.  Was/Are there taboos in your community about animals? 
8. Do people show kindness to wild animals? 
9. Do you think wild animals need to be protected? 
10. Do you think animals have rights? 
11. Do you think animals should be treated with respect? 
12. Did you live in harmony with animals in the past? 
13. What do you do with animals that invade your fields and destroy crops? 
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14. Are the government policies and laws conducive enough to create an attitude of care 
towards animals? 
15. Do you think animals should be protected for the sake of aesthetic and spiritual needs? 
16. What values and attitudes should be cultivated among people in this community so that 
they protect wild animals for current and future generations? 
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Appendix 2: Questions for Focus Group Discussions 
Issues to discuss in the Focus Groups were mainly derived from pertinent questions from 
previous general explorative interviews and in-depth interviews. However, the following 
questions were asked.  
1. How did you relate to the land, forests, mountains, water and animals in the past? 
2. What were your beliefs and attitudes towards the land, forests, mountains and animals? 
3. What were the social practices, myths, legends, religious rituals, folktales, proverbs, 
songs and taboos with regard to the land, mountains, forests, and animals? 
4. Are these practices still relevant and actually observed today? 
5. When were they performed, how and why? 
6. When you say you respected certain trees, animals or other creatures, what exactly do 
you do /not do. 
7. Were/Are you free to go into the forest to collect firewood, timber, fruits, game, etc.? 
8. Do you think it is possible to re-appropriate traditional values with regard to nature? If 
no, why? If yes, how exactly? 
9. What are those values, practices and beliefs with regard to the land, mountains, forests 
and water that you cherish and thus you would like them be protected and promoted? 
10. How is the community learning from experience? How are the experiences analysed?  
11. What are the lessons learnt?  
12. Are things the same now as was in the past? 
13. Tell me the story of how things have changed. 
14. Why have things changed? 
15. How do you see the future of the land, mountain, trees, forests and mountains? 
16. How do you see the future of people living on this mountain slope? 
17. What about the people that will live here in the future? 
18. What is going to happen if things continue as they are now? Why do you say so? 
19. What should be done to prevent this? 
20. What really should be the desirable state of affairs? 
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21. What should be done to achieve it? 
22. Are the government policies and laws with regard to land, forests, mountains, water and 
animals conducive enough to allow an attitude of care towards these natural entities? 
23. What are the loopholes, if any, that must be addressed so as to allow an environmental 
ethics to develop among the inhabitants of this mountain slope? 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
A. Consent Form for General Exploratory Interviews 
 
TITLE OF THE STUDY 
 
Towards an approach to environmental ethic responsive to environmental challenges on the 
slopes of Mounts Kilimanjaro in Tanzania 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Michael F. Lyakurwa, a doctoral student in the 
department of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. The results of this study will contribute to my 
doctoral thesis. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your knowledge of this 
community especially in matters related to their daily interactions with the natural environment.  
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the study is to help articulate an environmental ethic that emerges from your experience in this area 




If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to participate in a quick exploratory interview with 
the aim of learning in a general way how people relate with the natural environment in this community. In this 
interview, I will ask you exploratory questions about your beliefs and practices with regard to resource use and the 
natural environment. 
 
A convenient time and place for this general interview will be agreed upon between us. Subject to your permission 
our conversation will be audio-taped or video-taped to facilitate easy record keeping. Photographs will also be used 
to capture data but with your permission only.This interview will not take more than half an hour.    
 
3. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
I don’t foresee any risks or major discomforts in this conversation. However, in may happen that you may 
experience pain if you talk about past or present experiences that may have been/or are traumatic to you. If that 
happens we shall discuss whether to continue the interview or stop it, and resume it at another time. We will then 
also discuss whether to refer you to a counsellor that can support them. Arrangements will be made beforehand to 




4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 




The findings of this study may help the society to relate more harmoniously with the environment. The findings may 
also assist the government to re-examine her environmental conservation and management policies so that they are 
more people centred and environmentally friendly.  
 
 
5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 





Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Confidentiality will be 
maintained by means of coding procedures and I will always safely keep the data in places that are only accessible 
to me, for example in password protected files in my computer, while hard copies of research data will always be 
stored in a locked cupboard. You are entitled to review the information on transcriptions, the audio tapes, videotapes 
or photographs during the time of my fieldwork in the area. The tapes and raw data will be used for further research 
purposes after completion of my doctoral thesis. This data will be stored anonymously on the hard drive of my 
personal computer protected by passwords only known to me, or in locked cupboards in my office. In this further 
research, confidentiality will be maintained by means of coding procedures, i.e. your identity will not be revealed in 
any subsequent research report based on this data. 
 
 
7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any 
time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and 
still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant 
doing so.  
 
8. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact me Michael Lyakurwa mobile: 
+255 755 368 403 or +27 822 262 178. Email: mlyakurwa2011@yahoo.com. My supervisor, Prof. Johan Hattingh is 
available at +27 218 082 418. Email: jph2@sun.ac.za. My co-supervisor is Dr. Sirkku Hellsten, Email: 
skhellsten@yahoo.com. You can contact any of us if you have any questions about the research. 
 
 
9.   RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are not waiving any 
legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  If you have questions regarding 
your rights as a research participant, contact Ms Maléne Fouché [mfouche@sun.ac.za; +27 21 808 4622] at the 
Division for Research Development, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
The information above was described to me by Michael Lyakurwa in Kiswahili/Kichagga and I am in command of 
this language or it was satisfactorily translated to me. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and these 
questions were answered to my satisfaction. 
 







Name of Participant 
 
 
________________________________________   ______________ 
Signature of Participant                                                                Date 
 
In case where verbal consent was given 




Name of Witness 
 
                                                                                                  _________________ 
____________________________________________                                   Date 
Signature of Witness 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCHER 
 
I declare that I explained the information given in this document to __________________ [name of the participant]. 
[He/she] was encouraged and given ample time to ask me any questions. This conversation was conducted in 
Kiswahili/Kichagga [no translator was used/this conversation was translated into ___________ by 
_______________________]. 
 
________________________________________  ______________ 










Please initialize the relevant 
box 
 
1.  I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study 
 
YES NO       
2. I hereby give permission that the interviews/ Focus Group 
Discussions can be recorded by audiotape/videotape/photographs 
YES NO 
3. I have been given a copy of this form 
 
YES NO 
4. I hereby consent voluntarily that the data of this research can be 
stored anonymously in an archive and may be used by Mr. Michael 
Lyakurwa for further research in environmental ethics 
YES NO 
 







CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
B. Consent Form for In-depth Interviews 
 
TITLE OF THE STUDY 
Towards an environmental ethic responsive to environmental challenges on the slopes of 
Mounts Kilimanjaro in Tanzania 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Michael F. Lyakurwa, student in the department of 
Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Results of this study will contribute towards the writing my 
PhD thesis. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you live in this area and/or you are 
directly involved in activities that bear on the natural environment positively or negatively. Therefore, you are in a 
better position to know more about human-nature interactions and the values you/they attach to the natural 
environment.  
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the study is to help articulate an environmental ethic that emerges from your experience in this area 




If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to participate in an in-depth individual interview 
where we will engage in a dialogue based on your understanding of various issues related to people’s manner of 
interactions with the natural environment in this particular area. Our conversations will specifically focus on the 
past, present and future prospects of people’s relations with resources and the natural environment in this 
community. The conversation may take up to one hour.  
 
A convenient place and time for our conversation will be agreed upon between us. Subject to your permission our 
in-depth interviews or conversations will be audio-taped or videotaped to facilitate easy record keeping. Photographs 
will also be used to capture data but with your permission only. 
 
3. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
I don’t foresee any risks or major discomforts in this conversation. However, in may happen that you may 
experience pain if you talk about past or present experiences that may have been/or are traumatic to you. If that 
happens we shall discuss whether to continue the interview or stop it, and resume it at another time. We will then 
also discuss whether to refer you to a counsellor that can support them. Arrangements will be made beforehand to 
ensure the availability of such a counsellor if the need for one arises. 
 
4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
The findings of this study may help the society to relate more harmoniously with the natural environment. The 
findings may also assist the government to re-examine her environmental conservation and management policies so 
that they are more people centred and environmentally friendly. 





5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
 No payment will be made for your participation in this study. However, refreshments (soft drinks and bites) will be 





Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Confidentiality will be 
maintained by means of coding procedures and I will always safely keep the data in places that are only accessible 
to me, for example in password protected files in my computer, while hard copies of research data will always be 
stored in a locked cupboard. You are entitled to review the information on transcriptions, the audio tapes, videotapes 
or photographs during the time of my fieldwork in the area. The tapes and raw data will be used for further research 
purposes after completion of my doctoral thesis. These data will be stored anonymously on the hard drive of my 
personal computer protected by passwords only known to me and in locked cupboards in my office. In this further 
research, confidentiality will be maintained by means of coding procedures, i.e. your identity will not be revealed in 
any subsequent research report based on this data. 
 
 
7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any 
time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and 
still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant 
doing so.  
 
 
8. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact me Michael Lyakurwa mobile: 
+255 755 368 403 or +27 822 262 178. Email: mlyakurwa2011@yahoo.com. My supervisor, Prof. Johan Hattingh is 
available at +27 218 082 418. Email: jph2@sun.ac.za. My co-supervisor is Dr. Sirkku Hellsten, Email: 
skhellsten@yahoo.com. You can contact any of us if you have any questions about the research.  
 
 
9.   RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are not waiving any 
legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  If you have questions regarding 
your rights as a research subject, contact Ms Maléne Fouché [mfouche@sun.ac.za; +27 21 808 4622] at the Division 




SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
The information above was described to me by Michael Lyakurwa in Kiswahili/KichaggaandI am in command of 
this language or it was satisfactorily translated to me. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and these 
questions were answered to my satisfaction. 
 
Please initialize the relevant 
box 
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1.  I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study 
 
YES NO       
2. I hereby give permission that the interviews/ Focus Group 
Discussions can be recorded by audiotape/videotape/photographs 
YES NO 
3. I have been given a copy of this form 
 
YES NO 
4. I hereby consent voluntarily that the data of this research can be 
stored anonymously in an archive and may be used by Mr. Michael 






Name of Participant 
 
 
________________________________________   ______________ 
Signature of Participant                                                                Date 
 
In case where verbal consent was given 




Name of Witness 
 
                                                                                                  _________________ 
____________________________________________                                   Date 
Signature of Witness 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCHER 
 
I declare that I explained the information given in this document to __________________ [name of the participant]. 
[He/she] was encouraged and given ample time to ask me any questions. This conversation was conducted in 
Kiswahili/Kichagga [no translator was used/this conversation was translated into ___________ by 
_______________________]. 
 
________________________________________              ______________ 




















CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
C. Consent Form for Focus Group Discussions 
 
TITLE OF THE STUDY 
Towards an environmental ethic responsive to environmental challenges on the slopes of 
Mounts Kilimanjaro in Tanzania 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Michael F. Lyakurwa, a doctoral student in the 
department of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Results of this study will contribute towards the 
writing of my PhD thesis. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you live in this area and 
you are directly involved in activities that bear on the natural environment positively or negatively. Therefore you 
are in a better position to know more about people’s manner of interactions with the natural environment in this 
particular area.  
 
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the study is to help articulate an environmental ethic that emerges from your experience in this area 




If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to participate in a Focus Group Discussion to 
deliberate on the past and current values, practices and beliefs of this community towards their natural environment. 
This group discussion may take at least two hours. A convenient time and venue for this discussion will be arranged 
between us. Subject to your permission, our Focus Group Discussion will be audio-tapedor video-taped to facilitate 
easy record keeping. Photographs will also be used to capture data, but with your permission only.  
 
3. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
I don’t foresee any risks or major discomforts in this conversation. However, in may happen that you may 
experience pain if you talk about past or present experiences that may have been/or are traumatic to you. If that 
happens we shall discuss whether to continue the interview or stop it, and resume it at another time. We will then 
also discuss whether to refer you to a counsellor that can support them. Arrangements will be made beforehand to 
ensure the availability of such a counsellor if the need for one arises. 
 
 
4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
The findings of this study may help the society to relate more harmoniously with the natural environment. The 
findings may also assist the government to re-examine her environmental conservation and management policies so 
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5. PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
 No payment will be made for your participation in this study. However, refreshments (soft drinks and bites) will be 





Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Confidentiality will be 
maintained by means of coding procedures and I will always safely keep the data in places that are only accessible 
to me, for example in password protected files in my computer, while hard copies of research data will always be 
stored in a locked cupboard. You are entitled to review the information on transcriptions, the audio tapes, videotapes 
or photographs during the time of my fieldwork in the area. The tapes and raw data will be used for further research 
purposes after completion of my doctoral thesis. This data will be stored anonymously on the hard drive of my 
personal computer protected by passwords only known to me and in locked cupboards in my office. In this further 
research, confidentiality will be maintained by means of coding procedures, i.e. your identity will not be revealed in 
any subsequent research report based on this data. 
 
 
7. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any 
time without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and 
still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant 
doing so.  
 
8. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact me Michael Lyakurwa mobile: 
+255 755 368 403 or +27 822 262 178. Email: mlyakurwa2011@yahoo.com. My supervisor, Prof. Johan Hattingh is 
available at +27 218 082 418. Email: jph2@sun.ac.za. My co-supervisor is Dr. Sirkku Hellsten, Email: 
skhellsten@yahoo.com. You can contact any of us if you have any questions about the research.  
 
 
9.   RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty.  You are not waiving any 
legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  If you have questions regarding 
your rights as a research participant, contact Ms Maléne Fouché [mfouche@sun.ac.za; +27 21 808 4622] at the 
Division for Research Development, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
The information above was described to me by Michael Lyakurwa in Kiswahili/Kichagga andI am in command of 
this language or it was satisfactorily translated to me. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and these 















Name of Participant 
 
 
________________________________________   ______________ 
Signature of Participant                                                                Date 
 
In case where verbal consent was given 




Name of Witness 
 
                                                                                                     _________________ 
____________________________________________                                   Date 
Signature of Witness 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCHER 
 
I declare that I explained the information given in this document to __________________ [name of the participant]. 
[He/she] was encouraged and given ample time to ask me any questions. This conversation was conducted in 
Kiswahili/Kichagga/ [no translator was used/this conversation was translated into ___________ by 
_______________________]. 
 
________________________________________  ______________ 
Signature of Researcher   Date 
 
 
Please initialize the relevant 
box 
 
1.  I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study 
 
YES NO       
2. I hereby give permission that the interviews/ Focus Group 
Discussions can be recorded by audiotape/videotape/photographs 
YES NO 
3. I have been given a copy of this form 
 
YES NO 
4. I hereby consent voluntarily that the data of this research can be 
stored anonymously in an archive and may be used by Mr. Michael 
Lyakurwa for further research in environmental ethics 
YES NO 
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